



JTF-CS Command Briefing

JOINT TASK FORCE CIVIL SUPPORT



To Serve and Support



Definition of CBRNE

- ◆ CBRNE is defined as a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive situation or incident

A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a device or material specifically designed to produce casualties or terror

- ◆ CBRNE incidents include industrial accidents, acts of nature, acts of war, or terrorism



Chemical



Biological



Radiological



Nuclear



High-Yield
Explosive




What is JTF-CS?

- ◆ A USNORTHCOM standing Joint Task Force HQ of Joint military, DOD civilian and contractor personnel at Fort Monroe, Virginia.
- ◆ Originally established under USJFCOM (pre-9/11) to address national level concerns for planning and integration of DOD CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) support to civil authorities.
- ◆ A deployable Command and Control headquarters for DOD units and personnel executing CM operations in response to one or more CBRNE incidents.





JTF-CS Background





Mission Statement

- ◆ Joint Task Force Civil Support plans and integrates DoD support to the designated Primary Federal Agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When directed by Commander USNORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DoD forces providing support to civil authorities to
 - ◆ *Save Lives, Prevent Injury and*
 - ◆ *Provide Temporary Critical Life Support*




Deliberate Planning

CBRNE CM Guidance,
Policy and Plans

Contingency Planning and
Playbooks

National Response Plan
Local and State
Emergency Plans



CJCSI 3125.01

USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2002
CONPLAN 0500

CCMRF EXORD

DOD Capabilities

Nuclear



Radiological



Contagious & Non-
Contagious Biological



High-Yield
Explosive



Persistent & Non-
Persistent Chemical



Local / State /
Federal Capabilities

Mission Analysis and Assessment


CBRNE Assessments,
Modeling and Analysis

Emergency Plans



USNORTHCOM CBRNE CM Tiered Response Options

INCIDENT
MAGNITUDE



Command and Control



CBRNE Threat Spectrum

Greatest



HYE



Industrial
Chemicals



Biological
Toxins



Biological
Pathogens



Radio-
Isotopes



Chemical
Weapons



Nuclear
Weapons

Probability
Of Occurrence

- Most Likely: High Yield Explosive
- Most Dangerous: Nuclear Weapons

- **Greatest Threat: Contagious Biological Pathogen**

Least



A Different Mindset

*In CBNRE Consequence Management, the
Effects are the Enemy*

- ◆ Thermal
- ◆ Radiation
- ◆ Asphyxiation
- ◆ Chemical
- ◆ Biological
- ◆ Mechanical
- ◆ Psychological

Effects Cause Harm

**How we Counteract Harm Dictates
Method of Response**

Response Drives Forces Required

✓ Ability to Anticipate RFAs Affects Speed of Response



Full Spectrum Responsibility

R O U T I N E	Ongoing Support <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develops and reviews plans for CBRNE incidents• Advocates development of doctrine and requirements	Scheduled Event Support/Exercises <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Participates in interagency and DoD exercises• Prepares CBRNE CM contingency plans for, and participates in, National Special Security Events (NSSE) and other special events	I N C I D E N T	CBRNE Incident Support <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Responds to CBRNE incident (terrorist or accidental)• Assists LFA in support of civil authorities• Provides C2 for assigned DoD forces• Augments other Commanders for CBRNE CM ops (JPAC or JTAC)



Playbook Purpose

- Expedite Crisis Action Planning (CAP), the Commander's Assessment to USNORTHCOM and Operations Order (OPORD) development processes.
- Provide a pre-incident start point with refined tasks and required capabilities list.
- Designed as operational JTF “tools” for similar domestic catastrophic incidents— not an all - encompassing CBRNE CM “solution” set.
- ★ Use planning considerations developed in the Homeland Security Council (HSC) scenarios.

JTF-CS Operational Planning Tool designed to expedite CAP.




JTF-CS Playbooks

- ◆ Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device
 - ◆ Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
 - ◆ Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – **Pandemic Influenza**
 - ◆ Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Plague
 - ◆ Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
 - ◆ Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
 - ◆ Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
 - ◆ Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
 - ◆ Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
 - ◆ Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
 - ◆ Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices
 - ◆ Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device
 - ◆ Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination
 - ◆ Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)
- Nuc Playbook**
- Bio Playbook**
- PI Playbook**
- Chem Playbook**
- RDD Playbook**
- HYE Playbook**



Civil Response Process





Command Assessment Element

Concept of Employment

BPT deploy for domestic CBRNE CM assessment to provide situational awareness and early identification of potential DoD requirements.



PFO



FCO

ESFs

Governor

☆☆
TAG

State
EOC

☆☆
Command Assessment
Element
JTF-CS

CDR
Estimate

☆☆☆☆
USNORTHCOM

Considerations

Incident magnitude

LFA requests for assistance

Anticipated DOD tasks

Force Protection

Weather and terrain

Public reaction

Mission duration

CBRNE reconnaissance measures

Results

CCMRF modification

Force flow

Predictive RFF

JOA recommended

BSI recommended



Standard Task Organization

JTF-CS OPLAN 0500-06

FOR COORD (FINAL-DRAFT) – 08 JAN 07

UNCLAS – FOUO

JTF-CS (TROOPS)	TF RESPONSE	TF MEDICAL	TF SUPPORT	TF AVIATION
HQ, JTF (CAE)	HHC, BCT (ADVON)	SMART MC3T	HHD, SPT BD (ADVON)	HHD, AV BD (ADVON)
HQ, JTF (Initial)	CBIRF	SMART-BURN	MVMT CTRL TM	HHD, AV BD (-)
DTRA CE	HHC, BCT (-)	THEATER EPI TM	PERS DET	AV BN (SAR)
CBRNE CE	SMART-NBC	HHC, MED BD	HHD, AREA SPT BD (-)	AV MAINT
HAMMER ACE X1	CHEM Co (Decon)	MED Co X2	HHD, AREA SPT BD (-)	AV BN (MED)
HQ, JTF (Follow)	CHEM Plt (Recon)	SMART-HS	LOGISTICS Co	
COMM SPT Co	CHEM Plt (BIDS)	SMART-EMR	SUPPLY Co	
ACCE	HQs Security Force/ MP Bn	SMART-SM	TRANS Spt Co	
DIGI TOPO	Security / FP Co X2	EMEDS +25 Beds	MAINT Spt Teams X3	
CAISE (ADVON)	HQs Security Force/ MP Bn	AERO MED EVAC TM	MORT AFF Platoon	
HAMMER ACE X2	Security / FP Co	HHC, MED BD (-)	ENG Spt Unit	
MPAD		MEDLOG Unit		
SMART-PC		MED DET (SANI)		
AFRAT		NBC Bio Det TM		
DLA CST	DCO/DCE			
METOC TM	-JRMPS, EPLOs			
CAISE	LNOs			
HHD, COMM SPT Co				
COMM SPT Co X2				
BD LAW TEAM (BOLT)				

*** IAW CJCS EXORD DTG:
082130ZDEC06**

TOTALS
PAX: 4,482 personnel (approx)
STON: TBD
FORCE PACKAGE ONE
FORCE PACKAGE TWO
FORCE PACKAGE THREE
NO FORCE PACKAGE



Anticipated Tasks and Requirements

JTF-CS provides command and control, and coordination for the following types of tasks and requirements

JTF-CS





Joint Technical Augmentation Cell

*USNORTHCOM Responsibility
JTF-CS Leadership*



*Defense Threat
Reduction Agency
(DTRA)*

- Effects and response analysis
- Computer modeling of hazard areas
- Decontamination considerations
- Specialized medical advice
- Recommend CONUS-based DoD CM resources

*Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuc
Technical Advice
& Planning Support*

*Foreign
CBRN
Incident
Occurs /
Credible
Threat*

*USACHPPM,
USAMRICD,
USAMRIID,
AFRRI*

*CBRNE Command
(Guardian Brigade)*



- 9-11 persons w/reachback
- Tailorable to situation
- Deploy NLT N+24





Federal HSS Response Timelines


NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex





Federal HSS Response Timelines


NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex





Federal HSS Response Timelines

NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex



Total Deployed Non-DoD Force:

14 DMATs w/ equipment sets

NMRT


2 VMATs

2 DMORTs

USPHS Deployable Teams



CBRNE-CM Command and Control





Predictive RFFs Summary

KEY CM AREAS	PLAYBOOKS								
	CHEMICAL				BIOLOGICAL		RAD	NUKE	HYE
	NPS 5 Blister*	NPS 6 TIC	NPS 7 Nerve	NPS 8 Chlorine	NPS 2 Anthrax	NPS 3 Plague	NPS 11 RDD	NPS 1 10KT	NPS 12 IEDs
Medical Care	X			X	X	X		X	
Decontamination	X				X		X	X	
Site Security SPT							X	X	
Mortuary Affairs			X	X	X			X	
Mass Care Populace SPT	X				X		X	X	

Note: This matrix is based on National Planning Scenarios. Therefore, readers must understand an actual CBRNE incident will generate different RFFs based on METT-TC



ARDENT SENTRY 07 EXERCISE Situation

Background: ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHERN EDGE 07 (AS-NE 07) is a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, U.S. Northern Command sponsored homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) exercise that took place from 30 April -17 May 2007. The Homeland Security Council designated AS-NE-07 (and the associated exercises-VIGILANT GUARD, ALASKA SHIELD, INDIANA SENTRY, POSITIVE RESPONSE 2007 National Hurricane Preparedness Exercise) as a National Level Exercise for 2007.

Purpose: To provide local, state, federal, Department of Defense, and non-governmental organizations and agencies involved in homeland security emergency management the opportunity to participate in a full range of training scenarios that will better prepare participants to respond to a national crisis.

- The Primary exercise events took place in Indiana and New England, as well as Alaska and its adjacent waters.
- National Planning Scenario One (detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device) was used as the focus for JTF-CS.



ARDENT SENTRY 07 EXERCISE Situation

General Situation: At 1300Z 10 May 2007 a 10 KT improvised nuclear device was detonated Indianapolis, IN, vicinity 39.887745°N/86.052963°W. The device was detonated at ground level inside a large panel truck.

Incident scope and magnitude: Local and state authorities are overwhelmed with:

- Medical Care (medical staff and capacity, patient movement),
- Mass Care (sheltering, feeding, and related services)
- Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) distribution support
- Decontamination Operations
- Site Management (containment, detection /id, security and zone control)
- Mortuary Affairs Support

Actual Casualty figures:

- > Actual Fatalities Reported (list source): **TBP**
- > Actual Injured Reported (list source): **TBP**

Estimated Casualty figures:

- > Estimated Fatalities Reported (list source): **17,000**
- > Estimated Injured Reported (list source): **9,000**
- > Estimated low risk patients (worried well): **180,000**



Ardent Sentry 2007 Concept of Support

- ◆ **Med support to decon operations:**
 - Establish two decon and triage sites south of the plume using ASMCs
 - Use additional Level II facilities to establish ground evacuation points in the NW and South sectors to support additional evacuation of patients out of the JOA
 - Support ground transportation staging for low acuity casualties to FMS & expectant casualties to palliative care center
 - **RFF: 2 X Level II facilities**

- ◆ **Hospital augmentation:**
 - Use DOD level III facility (EMEDS/SC) to assist Methodist, Wishard Memorial and St Vincent Hospitals (trauma centers) with triage and treatment capability
 - Medical logistics support to assist hospitals and distribute SNS
 - **RFF: 3 X Level III facilities; augment Med Log Co to Med Log BN**

- ◆ **Low-Risk Patient and Palliative Care Capability:**
 - Coordinate with ESF-8 to establish 3 X Federal Medical Shelters
 - ◆ Two to support low acuity patient transfers from existing medical facilities (2 X 1000 bed capacity)
 - ◆ One to support palliative care needs of severely injured/expectant casualties (1 X 1000 bed capacity)
 - Recommend use of DMATs, USPHS Medical Reserve Corps and volunteer organizations to support mass care shelters, Federal Medical Shelters (FMS) and remaining level II hospitals
 - **RFF: No additional force requirements**

- ◆ **Support NDMS evacuation operations to increase throughput:**
 - Establish a MASF at Indianapolis International Airport
 - Augment MASF with a Level III facility (150 – 300 beds) to provide additional staging and stabilization capability
 - **RFF: 1 X MASF; 1 X Level III facility**

Take Aways

- JTF-CS is the only **standing joint operational headquarters dedicated exclusively to planning and integrating DoD forces in response to domestic CBRNE incidents.**
- JTF-CS and the USNORTHCOM force packages provide a **rapid DoD response capability, prepared to deploy and conduct CBRNE CM operations to support the NRP in protecting the public and environment from the effects of a CBRNE attack across the continuum of need.**
- JTF-CS routinely exercises its unique DoD capabilities in **planning, assessment and response to CBRNE incidents with local, State and Federal partners.**

JTF-CS is prepared to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support after a domestic CBRNE attack.

Questions?

◆ POC DCE Region VI

– Bill Gross

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
– Eddie Pack

Ralph.Pack@us.army.mil



Continuum of Need

Eleven of Fifteen DHS National Scenarios





Deployable Teams

Command Assessment Element (CAE)

- Tailorable size of 2- 12 JTF personnel (can include JTF Commander)
- Provides situational awareness and anticipated DoD tasks to CDR USNORTHCOM

◆ Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC)

- Tailorable size of 1 to 6 JTF personnel
- Provides planning support for CBRNE CM operations (including CBRNE hazards, medical, logistics, and capability assessments) to CONUS Commands

◆ Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC)

- Tailorable size of 8-12 personnel (made up of primarily of personnel from DoD CBRNE focused agencies)
- Provides CBRNE advice and planning support to OCONUS Commands

◆ Interagency Liaison Officers (LNO's)

- JTF personnel designated to quickly deploy and engage with the DCO, FEMA RRCC, and JFO



Joint Planning Augmentation Cell

MISSION: *When directed, the Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC) provides exportable planning expertise for CBRNE CM operations.*

	<u>Shaping</u>	<u>Deployment</u>	<u>Employment</u>
<p>Planned Support</p> <p>(Exercises, Deliberate planning, Special events)</p>	<p>Develop plans, such as Annex T (CM) for special events</p>	<p>Determine if on-site support required</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide supported element with JTF-CS's consistent approach and methodology to consequence management planning and CBRNE event mitigation • Assist the supported element's staff with the preparation of courses of action and by developing concept of operations (CONOPS) and/or plans • Support crisis action planning for CBRNE CM operations • Identify follow-on forces • Support transition planning
<p>Incident Support</p>	<p>Tailor JPAC to meet needs of supported command:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CBRNE hazard assessment • Medical assessment • Logistics 	<p>Deploy NLT Notification + 4 hrs Tailored JPAC team</p>	

Reachback capability: Fatality management planning, detailed CM area assessment, legal planning, JOPES / force flow support, communications planning, public affairs planning



CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force


CCMRF

- ◆ **Discussion:**

- ◆ The CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) is designed to be an initial entry force for CBRNE missions. The Command Assessment Element (CAE) provides CDR USNORTHCOM with an initial Commander's Assessment that defines the scope and magnitude of the CBRNE incident. Included in the Commander's Assessment are "predictive Request For Forces (RFF)" anticipating future Mission Assignments (MA) tasked to the DoD. Catastrophic incidents, particularly those caused by nuclear detonations, with casualties exceeding 10,000 will likely generate similar MA requiring additional capabilities and force packages beyond the CCMRF. Early identification and preparation for deployment of these force packages will mitigate the effect of the inherent delay in the federal response to a catastrophic incident.



Operational Phasing & Tasks





Disaster Response Phases

Standard of Care Undefined – measured in hours to days

P
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- State/City Emergency Plans
- National Response Plan
- Catastrophic Incident Annex
- EMS Programs Training Equipment
- CONPLAN/OPLAN
- Playbooks


- Local Response: Fire/Rescue HAZMAT Police
- Tactical DECON
- State/NG Response: CERFP ANG EMEDS EMAC
- CBIRF

- Mass Triage
- Definitive DECON
- Life/Limb Saving Surgery
- Strained Casualty to Care Provider Ratio

- Destroyed Medical Infrastructure
- Mass Care
- Degraded Standard of Care
- Casualty to Provider Ratio
- Logistics

- Mass Care
- Limited En Route Care
- Patient Tracking
- Family & Pet Issues

C
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
Unclassified
For Official Use Only



EXERCISE DOSE RATE – 6 Hours

U238TN(Dose Rate)
NWPN Radiation Dose
10-May-06 19:00:00Z (6.000 hr)


	cGy (rad) / hr	In contour population
	100.0	938
	10.0	19,010
	1.0	48,944
	0.1	261,881
	0.01	572,625



Unprotected			
Best Estimate			
	Prompt	Fallout	Total
Fatalities	7,000	8,000	14,000
Injuries	2,000	5,000	6,000
Casualties	8,000	12,000	21,000
Protected			
Best Estimate			
	Prompt	Fallout	Total
Fatalities	5,000	532	5,000
Injuries	3,000	1,000	5,000
Casualties	8,000	2,000	10,000

FACTS
 Indianapolis, IN
 Location:
 39.887745N/86.052963W
 Time: 1300Z 10 May 2007
 Type: Ground Burst
 Yield: 10 kT
 Weapon: IND
 Weather: Historical
 Model: HPAC 4.04R
 Static Population Estimates:
 Land-Scan 2004

Medical Concept of Support





Estimated Incident Effects on Populace

Estimated Displaced Populace (requiring evacuation): 250,000 total

- > Expect number of special needs evacuees: **47,500**
- > Expect number of immediately orphaned children: **TBD**

Estimated Companion Pets (requiring evacuation): 44,262 total

FEMA Priorities of effort are (DOD mission assignments are forthcoming):

- Mass casualty medical treatment (acute and definitive care)
- SNS distribution
- Site Management
- Fatality Management