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1. Introduction
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1.1 Background
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Site Number: |
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Contract Number: |
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D.O. Number: |
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Action Memo Date: |
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Response Authority: |
CERCLA |
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Response Type: |
Emergency |
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Response Lead: |
PRP |
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Incident Category: |
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NPL Status: |
Non NPL |
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Operable Unit: |
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Mobilization Date: |
4/13/2010 |
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Start Date: |
4/13/2010 |
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Demob Date: |
4/13/2010 |
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Completion Date: |
4/13/2010 |
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CERCLIS ID: |
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RCRIS ID: |
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ERNS No.: |
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State Notification: |
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FPN#: |
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Reimbursable Account #: |
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1.1.1 Incident Category
Emergency Response
1.1.2 Site Description
The ammonia leak occurred within Conte Forum, the Sports Center Associated with Boston College.
1.1.2.1 Location
The reported address for Conte Forum is 2599 Beacon Street, Chestnut Hill, Boston 02167 although the actual location of the incident was within the City of Boston.
1.1.2.2 Description of Threat
Anhydrous ammonia was leaking from the ice making system within the sports center. Ammonia is a colorless gas with a sharp, intensely irritating odor and can be fatal by inhalation. It is also a moderate fire risk.
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2. Current Activities
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2.1 Operations Section
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2.1.1 Narrative
At 5:00 AM on the morning of April 13, 2010, Boston College officials discovered an ammonia leak within Conte Forum, the Boston College Sports Center. They then notified the Boston Fire Department (BFD) who responded to the scene along with a BFD Hazmat Unit. While the entry teams were preparing to access the building to identify and stop the leak, the BFD dispatcher was making the necessary notifications including EPA Region 1. On-Scene Coordinator Tom Condon was dispatched to the scene to integrate into the command structure and to offer assistance.
2.1.2 Response Actions to Date
Numerous entries in level A personal protective equipment were made by the BFD hazmat unit to secure the release. Four valves leading to the ice making system compressor were shut off. Once the ammonia was stopped, venting of the building began with an industrial fan. Additional fans were ordered to speed up that operation. Also on hand was Boston College's refrigeration contractor. One of their employees joined the hazmat team on a level A entry to identify the source of the leak and confirm the proper closing of the valves. Additional entries were made to confim complete closure of the valves, and to further ID the source. The refrigeration contractor identified the source of the release to be a failed seal in a compressor pump, and initiated the repair of the system.
2.1.3 Enforcement Activities, Identity of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs)
Mass DEP has issued a Notice of Responsibility to Boston College as the owner and operator of the facility.
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2.2 Planning Section
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2.2.1 Anticipated Activities
There are no additional or anticipated activities by EPA.
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2.3 Logistics Section
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No information available at this time.
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2.4 Finance Section
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No information available at this time.
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2.5 Other Command Staff
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2.5.1 Safety Officer
2.6 Liaison Officer
2.7 Information Officer
2.7.1 Public Information Officer
As EPA involvement at the scene was limited, public information was handled by the Boston Fire Department. The EPA public affairs office was notified of the response by the emergency notification e-mail issued by the phone duty officer.
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3. Participating Entities
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3.1 Unified Command
The OSC coordinated response efforts with the Incident Commander from Boston Fire Department.
3.2 Cooperating Agencies
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4. Personnel On Site
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No information available at this time.
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5. Definition of Terms
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No information available at this time.
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6. Additional sources of information
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No information available at this time.
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7. Situational Reference Materials
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No information available at this time.
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