On January 23, 2026 at 4:40 pm, the self-propelled drilling module of Rig 26 left a gravel road in the National Petroleum Reserve–Alaska and toppled onto tundra, catching fire. Eight personnel sustained minor injuries and were released after treatment. Initial actions addressed the fire, and the site was released by the on-scene Fire Chief on January 24 at 3:45 pm and a Unified Command (UC) was established. The UC consists of Doyon Drilling Inc (DDI) as Incident Commander, EPA as FOSC, Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation as SOSC, North Slope Borough (NSB) as LOSC, and Inupiat Community of the Arctic Slope (ICAS) as TOSC.
The Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure plan lists maximum potentials of 8,400 gallons of diesel, 1,930 gallons of hydraulic oil, and 85 gallons of ethylene glycol, measurements taken 30 minutes prior indicated about 4,000 gallons of diesel onboard, 600 gallons of hydraulic oil, and 85 gallons ethylene glycol. The site is 6.5 miles northwest of Nuiqsut in the Alpine field; surface rights are held by Kuukpik Village Corporation, subsurface rights by Arctic Slope Regional Corporation, and the rig is owned by DDI. ConocoPhillips led the initial response before DDI assumed responsibility and activated Alaska Clean Seas (ACS) as the Oil Spill Response Organization.
The rig’s top landed within 50 feet of a pipe rack with pipelines, fiber optic cable, and power lines; no damage was found. The incident occurred on wet tundra under 12–24 inches of snow, within 500 feet of a tributary to the Nechelik Channel of the Colville River. While surface water is frozen, subsurface thaw could allow oil movement, and spring melt may create a continuous connection to the Colville River and the Arctic Ocean. The area includes anadromous streams and is designated as polar bear denning critical habitat; no wildlife impacts have been reported. ACS conducted a drone overflight and delineated contamination in the surrounding snow; no ongoing leaks were observed. Due to overhead hazards, a safety perimeter restricts access to the fallen module and tanks, and extreme cold, wind, and blowing snow are hampering response, delaying safety team deployment and construction of ice pads needed for heavy equipment, product recovery, demolition, and full contamination assessment.
.A well-attended stakeholder meeting occurred on January 26, and a Joint Information Center (JIC) stood up on January 27 to manage communications and draft a Stakeholder Communication plan. ACS has three responders onsite, delineating, deploying containment, and preparing flush/recovery tactics. DDI has 32 personnel ensuring the Nuiqsut evacuation route remains open, maintaining site security, and evaluating safety. EPA notified natural resource trustees, provided a Public Information Officer to the JIC, and participates in daily briefings with DDI, ADEC, NSB, and ICAS.
