During the evening of 2/21/2015 Highway 61 was closed to through traffic for clearing work at the derailment Site.  Equipment was staged on Highway 61 to facilitate the movement of rail cars onto flatbed rail cars.  Three tanks were re-railed, two tanks were placed on rail cars, and two tanks were positioned to be placed on rail cars.  To date, nine rail cars have been re-railed.  Additional frac tanks were delivered to the Handley storage area.  A total of 14 frac tanks were staged at the storage area.  There were 7 frac tanks containing 123,962 gallons of oil and two frac tanks containing 21,319 gallons of oil/water.  A geo-probe with laser induced fluorescence was being used at the Site to check for soil contamination.

Work continued on the sheet piling barrier.  As of 0730 hours, 135 linear feet of the sheet piling had been installed.  The work continued around the clock.  The barges began to move up the river on 2/21/2015.  They overnighted at the London Lock and Dam for safety.  The barges arrived to the derailment Site during the afternoon of 2/22/2015.  Work was performed according to the approved work plan to safely secure the barges at the site.  Airboats were used at the derailment work zone area to collect surface water samples.

During the early morning on 2/22/2015, it was noticed at the Site that the water levels were rapidly declining around the piling wall.  It was discovered that the power plant had a faulty reading from their pond sensors and turned their turbines on.  This caused a sudden intake of water to the power plant and the water in the river dropped from the normal range, approximately 18 feet, to approximately 16.5 feet.  This caused the water level in Armstrong Creek to drop approximately 1 foot in 15 minutes.  This drastic drop in water level caused a release of oily material to Kanawha River. Much of this release was still contained in ice chunks and were captured by the contingency boom placed in the Kanawha River. The area between the shoreline and the piling wall was completely drained of water during this event.  The area behind the piling wall to the boom was also completely drained of water.  When the power plant was notified of the issue, they worked with UC and water flow was returned to normal.

During the night, a spike in VOC was recorded at the work area.  VOC readings reached 70 ppm.  When this reading was recorded, Benzene was checked and was 10 ppm.  Work was halted in the area until an investigation could be completed, as the action level was 0.25 ppm.  The investigation showed that the workers were conducting a pre-work screening of the area of the site and a worker stepped into a puddle of product and bent over.  The VOC reading was taken at boot level and not at breathing level.  VOC readings in the area at breathing level were 0 ppm.  VOC readings near the pool at the end of the interceptor trench reached 10 ppm; however benzene levels remained at 0 ppm.  Air quality readings at the frac tank area ranged from 0 ppm VOC to 0.3 ppm, with benzene at 0 ppm.

Safety concerns for the day included icy conditions at the Site.  Repeated walking and driving over snow had packed the snow to a solid surface that had iced over.  Conditions in the excavation area around the interceptor trench were muddy and sloppy.  Additional straw, sand, gravel, etc. was brought in to help with footing issues.  As a result of the small spill at the frac tank storage area in Handley, the protocol for unloading tank trucks into the frac tanks was amended.  It was decided that a worker would be stationed on the roof of the frac tank during all unloading operations to control the discharge hose.  Additional containment was also added at the frac tank area.

A plan was discussed with CSX to do outside confirmation surface water sampling.  It was determined that CSX conduct their own split sampling events at the WVAWC facility.

The Air Monitoring Plan was amended to include information about mobile air monitoring.  CSX received approval to move the flatbed cars carrying the disabled cars from the derailment Site to the Handley rail yard.  The amendment to the plan included the addition of personnel to the rail cars who would conduct air monitoring while the cars were moved to the rail yard.  The engine would pull the flat cars at approximately 2 mph from the derailment site to the rail yard.  The UC was informed that the US Army National Guard CST departed the site on 2/21/2015.  
 

A Press Availability Session was held by the UC at St. Anthony's Catholic Church.

CSX is the responsibile party.
CSX has been responsive, employing multiple cleanup contractors and environmental consultants to advise them on the technical aspects of the response. CSX has also provided their hazmat team and security on-site. OSC Matlock will coordinate with EPA and WVDEP enforcement personnel, as appropriate.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

U.S. fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)

Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA)

WV Army National Guard Civil Support Team (ANG CST)

WV State Police

Montgomery Police Department

WV Department of Highways (WV DOH)

WV Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety (DMAPS)

WV American Water Corporation (WVAWC)

Red Cross