REGION 6 REGIONAL RESPONSE TEAM (RRT) WINTER MEETING
South Padre Island, TX

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 2008: 1500 – 1730 RRT Executive Meeting

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2008

0800 – 0830	Introduction / Welcome/Administrative Notes (RRT 6 Co-Chairs)\ Approval of June Meeting Minutes	CAPT John Hardin / Mr. Ragan Broyles
0830 – 0930	**Committee Reports** Executive – Steve Mason, EPA Response – Craig Carroll, EPA Preparedness -- Karolien Debusschere, LOSCO Science & Technology – Michael Baccigalopi, TGLO Industry Work Group (IWG) -- John Temperelli, Garner Environmental	
0930 – 0945	**BREAK**	
0945 – 1045	Agrifos (Cotton Patch Bayou) Fertilizer Release	CAPT Bill Diehl, USCG / Chris Ruhl, EPA
1045 – 1115	RISK based overview of LNG facilities/vessels	Matt Hahne
1115 -- 1130	LEPC Workshops, Hotzone Conference, Awareness Training	Steve Mason, EPA
1130 – 1300	**LUNCH**	
1300 – 1400	State Reports by State Representatives	
1400 – 1415	**BREAK**	
1415 – 1445	Update on “Guidance for Response to Spills on Tribal Lands”	Steve Spencer, DOI
1445 – 1545	Federal Agency Reports by Agency Representatives	
1545 – 1600	**BREAK**	
1600 – 1630	Chemical Security Act	Monty Elder, DEQ
1630 – 1700	Update on Poison Control Center Project -- Action Item	Patrick Young, ATSDR

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THURSDAY, JANUARY 24, 2008

0800 – 0900	South Coffeyville Flooding, HHW Collection	Monty Elder, ODEQ / Chris Ruhl, Jhana Enders, EPA
0900 – 0945	DCO Support for Response to Major Spill or CBRN type event	Bill Gross, DCO, DOD
0945 – 1000	**BREAK**	
1000 – 1045	ESF # 11 – Natural & Cultural Resources, Historical Property Protection	Stephen Spencer, DOI
1045 – 1115	USCG OSC Reports	Captains of the Port
1115 – 1245	**LUNCH**	
1245 – 1315	USCG OSC Reports (cont.)	Captains of the Port
1315 – 1345	DHS Planning Scenarios: Radiation	Nick Brescia, EPA
1345 – 1400	**BREAK**	
1400 – 1430	USCG Strike Team Capabilities	CDR Virginia Kammer, USCG
1430 – 1500	MEXUS Discussion	CAPT Walter Reger, USCG
1500 – 1515	**Wrap—up / Adjournment**	Ragan Broyles, EPA / CAPT Hardin, USCG

National Preparedness Guidelines

National Response Framework

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
United States Coast Guard

TCEQ

Agrifos Phosphoric Acid Spill

- Cotton Patch Bayou -
Pasedena, TX

RRT Meeting January 2008

NOAA
NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
EPA
REGION-SIX
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

Incident

- Heavy rains filled surge capacity of ponds
  - Normal rain fall 60”/year, this year 94”
- On August 16, Tropical Storm ERIN dumps 7” of rain and overtopped the retention wall. Overflow stops after a couple of days
- Early September brought more rain.
- South Stack Moat fills with water
- Moat wall leaks/fails
- Agrifos begins pumping causing an illegal discharge

South Gypsum Stack

Estimated that this has a larger footprint than the Great Pyramid.

--180 feet high,
--1 mile long
--.75 miles wide

--185 million gallons in topside ponds.

Wed
Sept 5, 2007

- USCG learns of release from TCEQ and notifies Agrifos that pumping was a CWA violation.
- Agrifos countered that stopping would mean catastrophic wall failure resulting in a 25M gal release

Cotton Patch Bayou Acid Incident, Agrifos Facility, Pasadena, TX

Incident Location Map
prepared by NOAA

Date / Time: 08 September 2007

USE ONLY AS A GENERAL REFERENCE

Graphic does not represent precise amounts or locations



Thursday Sept 6

- IC/UC Established
- Objectives
  - Safety
  - Eliminate Release
  - pH monitoring
  - Assess wall integrity

Friday Sept 7

Ramp UC up

- USCG
  - NOAA
  - Gulf Strike Team
- TCEQ
- Agrifos
  - O'Brians Group
- EPA
  - START contractor

Friday 7 Sept (cont)

- Structural engineer concluded that the retaining wall would hold
- RP discontinued the discharge
- IAP listed workgroups to develop storage, treatment, and disposal options as well as contingency plans to quickly dispose of 25 million gallons of water

Sat/Sun 8/9 Sept

- Workgroups continued to evaluate storage, disposal, and treatment options
- Environmental Assessment begins
- EPA Emergency Response Notice of Consent issued
- Agrifos advises EPA and USCG of limited funds (2.4 million dollars)
- USCG, TCEQ and EPA (responders) starting to realize options are limited

Facility Background

- Phosphate fertilizer producer
  - Imports Phosphate Rock
  - Reacts rock with Phosphoric and Sulfuric Acids
  - Gypsum is a by-product of process
    - Gyp Piles created as a result
- Facility has capability to use 1.2 mgd of water
- 1” of Rainfall = 10 million gallons of water

Monday 10 Sept

Ardaman and Associates refocus efforts.

Don't worry about the 25M in the moat, worry about the 185M in the ponds. RRT call

Gypsum Stack Management -101



Past Incidents

- 1992 - Catastrophic Release
  - Mobil Mining owner
  - 45 million gallons of gyp and acid
  - Impacted Houston Ship Channel and Railroad
- Agrifos Florida Facility
  - Abandoned for FL and EPA R4 to cleanup (200 million spent thus far)
- 2002 Hurricane Allison
  - Retaining wall failure

Wed 12 Sept

- Forecasted Weather Worsens
  - 0700 - possible 1”, isolated 4”
  - 0800 - up to 7” over the next 3 days
  - 0900 - Tropical disturbance 24 hours away
- 1000 - RRT Call
  - EPA designated lead on response
  - Tropical disturbance could dump as much as 15” of rain, 45 mph winds, possible tornadoes
- 1300 – Tropical Storm Humberto forms expected to have a direct hit to facility
  - IC/UC developed Crisis Objectives
    - Readied all pumps to quickly remove water from top of stacks
    - Gyp expert indicated to prevent failure of stacks at least 48” of freeboard was necessary
- 1700 CERCLA UAO issued from Superfund to prevent stack failure

Wed Sept 12--HUMBERTO

1700 – RP initiated the pumping of water from gyp stacks to gain as much freeboard as possible

South Stack moat overflow at engineered low point and pumping
through plant into ship channel.

Thursday 13 Sept

- 0005 - Hurricane Humberto goes East of facility
- 0205 - EPA requested RP to shut down all of the pumps
  - Water continued to be pumped from the retaining wall
- 0800 - IC/UC was notified that approximately 17-19 million gallons was discharged
  - RP was requested to continue the discharge of 3-5 mgd until recommended freeboard was achieved
- 1200 - Environmental assessment was initiated

Day 8, Fri 14 Sept

- RP continued to discharge
- Environmental Assessment on going
  - pH, dissolved oxygen
  - Water quality samples
  - Sample plan developed (TCEQ, START, NOAA)
  - RP Contractor lead, START augmenting and data management

Yellow numbers -- 7 Sept readings

Black numbers – 17 Sept readings after Hurricane HUMBERTO prep discharge.



Resumption of ship traffic dispersed plume in ship channel.

Additional Actions

- Day 9 - Discharge from moat discontinued
  - Discharge from WWTP continues
- Day 11 – 2nd EPA UAO issued
- Day 15 – Minimum freeboard successfully achieved
- Day 18 – Emergency Response Phase Ends
  - WWTP went back to normal operation

Sept 17 2007



FUTURE PLANS

-EPA working with Agrifos/Exxon Mobil to address long term solution

-EPA and TCEQ are considering criminal charges due to Agrifos' poor management, which led to this situation.

-USCG and EPA continue to closely monitors rainfall impacts on Agrifos.



Liquefied Natural Gas

Matthew Hahne
LNG Program Mgr
504-671-2138

ALL THREATS ALL HAZARDS

ALWAYS READY

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

LNG HIGH School

Region VI Response Team

- Business
- Geography
- Chemistry
- Shop
- Seminar / Workshop
- QUIZZES! – w/ prizes!!

BUSINESS CLASS:
Just the FACTS.

- USCG are neither Proponents nor Opponents of LNG
- ARE proponents of process
- National Energy Strategy
  - Natural Gas Act
  - Energy Acts

. . . . . .Why LNG?

BUSINESS CLASS:
Supply : Demand.

- Interim Energy Source (2015-20??)
- 2025
  - Demand = 30.7 Tcf = 84 Bcf/day
  - Total Delivery 53.8 Bcf/day
  - Shortage: 30 Bcf/day
- Region VI has 38 Bcf of committed capacity

District Eight LNGC Arrivals



GEOGRAPHY CLASS:
Where in RGN VI . . .



17 terminals

MSU Lake Charles

MSU Port Arthur




Dow Barge Canal
Oyster Creek Cut
N
332
Old Brazos River
Surfside Beach
Brazos Harbor
Big Bend
Freeport LNG
Freeport Harbor Channel
© 2007 Tele Atlas
Image Houston-Galveston Area Council
© 2007 Europa Technologies
Google
Pointer 28°56'29.86" N 95°18'45.35" W elev 0 ft Streaming 100%
Eye alt 19074 ft


Calhoun LNG
87
N
Calhoun
© 2007 Tele Atlas
© 2007 TurnHere, Inc.
© 2007 Europa Technologies
Image © 2008 DigitalGlobe
©2007 Google™
Pointer 28°34'39.57" N 96°28'22.51" W elev 0 ft Streaming |||||||||| 100%
Eye alt 26.84 mi


inta Road
us Christi LNG (Cheniere)
Vista del Sol (4Gas)
Edwards Road
Ingleside LNG (Occidental)
Donnel Point
© 2007 Tele Atlas
Image © 2008 DigitalGlobe
© 2007 Europa Technologies
Google
Pointer 27°52'22.16" N 97°15'24.91" W elev 0 ft Streaming 100%
Eye alt 12750 ft

DEEPWATER

- Gulf Gateway (Excelerate)
- Port Pelican / Gulf Landing / Port Dolphin
- Main Pass (FMC)
- TORP – D/EIS out for comment

CHEMISTRY CLASS:
What is this stuff?

- Same as Natural Gas in your house
- NOT under pressure
- Cold! - 260F
- 1:600 Ratio (one drop is 600 gas)
- NOT flammable in liquid form
- Lighter than air when a GAS.

LNG contains no toxic chemicals or byproducts. If spilled on soil there is no potential for soil or groundwater contamination. Natural gas is colorless, odorless and lighter than air. The visible cloud is simply water vapor condensed by the cold LNG.

Port staff and Board Members got an up close demonstration of LNG's properties. Board Member Leo J. Kainer (r) observes as Port Director Robert Van Borssum gets a quick feel of how cold LNG is (-260°F).

CALHOUN LNG

AT THE PORT OF PORT LAVACA - POINT COMFORT

CHEMISTRY CLASS:

$$CH_4 + 2\ O_2 \rightarrow CO2 + 2\ H2O$$

LNG IS NOT A BOMB.
(POTENTIAL ENERGY (LIKE COAL)

FLAMMABILITY IS 5-15%

SHOP CLASS: Tanker Tank



A Cross-Section of the LNG Ship's Hull and Containment System – In Total More Than Six Feet in Width.



SHOP CLASS:


LOADING OF IHI SPB LNG TANKS
POLAR EAGLE
No.4 TANK
No.3 TANK
No.1 TANK

SHOP CLASS

SHOP CLASS:
Tanks Ashore



WORKSHOP/SEMINAR: R I S K

Risk = P_t (threat occurring) x P_s (system failure/threat) x **Consequences**;

Where: P_t = the probability of an accidental or intentional threat,

P_s = the probability that preventive or mitigating measures fail, and

Consequences = usually expressed in fatalities or costs.

33,000 SHIPMENTS, 3 BILLION CBM

SANDIA DECISION TREE



Risk…

HOLE SIZE (m^2)	TANKS BREACHED	POOL DIAMETER (m)	BURN TIME (min)	DISTANCE TO 37.5 kW/m^2 (m)	DISTANCE TO 5 kW/m^2 (m)
ACCIDENTAL		ENTS			
1	1	148	40	177	554
2	1	209	20	250	784
INTENTIONAL		ENTS			
5	3	572	8.1	630	2118
5*	1	330	8.1	391	1305
5	1	405	5.4	478	1579
5	1	202	8.1	253	810
12	1	512	3.4	602	1920

Risk…

Incident Heat Flux (kW/m^2)*	Type of Damage
35 – 37.5	Damage to process equipment including steel tanks, chemical process equipment, or machinery
25	Minimum energy to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure without a flame
18 – 20	Exposed plastic cable insulation degrades
12.5 – 15	Minimum energy to ignite wood with a flame; melts plastic tubing
5	Permissible level for emergency operations lasting several minutes with appropriate clothing

*Based on an average 10 minute exposure time

[Barry 2002]

VERY INTER-AGENCY

- FERC – Lead Agency
- DOT / USCG

ERP – Emergency Response Plan

QUESTIONS:

RRT Winter Meeting TCEQ Summary

EPA/TCEQ Equipment Exercise, Fort Davis, TX

TCEQ Annual Emergency Response Training, January 28, – February 1, 2008, South Padre Island, TX

Aransas National Wildlife Refuge, Matagorda Island HAZMAT Container Removal Action, February 16, 2008

Participants

- USEPA OSCs
- TCEQ Strike Team
- USEPA Logistics Team
- 6th Civil Support Team

Purpose

- Test communications systems
- Orient with equipment
- Drill instead of respond together
- GIS systems exercise


ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REGION 6 LOGISTICS STRIKE TEAM

TCEQ Annual ER Training

- Provide training to ~ 80 regional staff
- Advanced and beginner level drills
- Training to be held January 28 – February 1, 2008 on South Padre Island
- Drill notifications will be made to various response entities

Matagorda Island

- Component of the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge Complex
- Home to threatened and endangered species (Whooping Cranes)
- Only access is by boat
- Cooperative removal action – USCG, USF&W, TCEQ & TGLO

Aransas National Wildlife Refuge Complex

- Blackjack Peninsula
- Tatton
- Matagorda Island
- Lamar
- Myrtle Foester-Whitmire



Drums
30-55 gallons

Current Load **39-73 -50%**

Buckets - 5 gallon

Current Load **1500+ @ 20% Sealed = 300**

Current Status

- Logistics recon performed on January 16, 2008
- Final recon to be performed on February 13, 2008
- TCEQ, TCEQ Contractor (Eagle), USCG, USF&W & TGLO begin the response on February 17, 2008

Additional Response Actions

- Agrifos
- Hurricane Humberto

CHEMICAL TRANSPORTATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE

CTAC

US CG

1949

RRT VI - South Padre Island

Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee (CTAC)

Who We Are: We are members of industry involved in the transportation of hazardous materials in bulk, representing chemical manufacturing, vessel design and construction, safety and security, marine environmental protection, maritime training, and marine handling or transportation of chemicals. Individually appointed members represent a broad range of companies and interests, including:

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- American Commercial Line LLC // Bayer Corporation // Dow Chemical // AIG Global Marine // Shell Chemical // Flint Hill Resources // Odjfell Terminals // National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) // Kirby Inland Marine // Marathon Ashland Petroleum // PPG Industries // Lloyd's Register of Shipping // INTERTANKO // ExxonMobil // Campbell Transportation Company // M.T. Maritime Management Corp. // Marine Solutions Inc.// ECM Maritime Services // Marine Chemists of Louisiana // Marine Pollution Control Corp. // Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group // Shearer & Assoc. // Seabulk Tankers // Southern Towing Company // Garner Environmental Services

Homeland Security

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What CTAC Does:

Advise, consult and make recommendations reflecting its independent judgment, including industry outreach approaches, to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard on matters concerning the safe and secure marine transportation of hazardous materials in bulk on inland and international waterways, and related regulatory projects and issues.

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Current Projects and Tasks:

- NFPA 472 – Development of a Marine Emergency Responder Chapter in NFPA 472 *Professional Competence of Responders to Hazardous Material Incidents.* Tank and Non-Tank vessel Combined Standard to be completed
- New North American Emergency Response Guidebook update to include a marine transportation section
- Working closely with the American Chemistry Council and TRANSCAER in exploring the expansion of TRANSCAER to the Maritime Domain
- Barge Emission and Hazardous Communication Working Group working closely with the barge companies to develop a method of communicating cargo load more clearly to 1st responders

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- Subcommittee / Work Group to be convened as the Coast Guard moves forward in regard to a review and re-write of the MTSA regulations promulgated in 2002.
- Subcommittee / Work Group to convene as CTAC seeks input on the update to, and expansion of, existing vapor control regulations

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How You Can Become Involved:

Members of the public are encouraged to attend the full CTAC meetings and participate as members of Subcommittees and Workgroups.

Our next CTAC meeting will be held in the late spring, in the Washington D.C. Area.

For more information on CTAC, please visit our website at: http://homeport.uscg.mil/ctac.

For additional information, or to become involved, please contact the U.S. Coast Guard at 202-372-1425.

CG Homeport
(http://homeport.uscg.mil/ctac)



QUESTIONS

Above-Ground Storage and Infrastructure Spill Prevention

Michael Baccigalopi- TGLO

Bob Wells- EPA

Roland Guidry-LOSCO

Jim Staves- EPA

Regional Response Team-6

- *Destruction of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita*
- *15 Tanks floated*
- *8 Tanks impacted*
- *Science and Technology Committee*

RRT-6 S&T Sub-Committee

- *EPA*
- *USCG*
- *Department of Energy*
- *NOAA*
- *TX General Land Office*
- *Louisiana Oil Spill Coordinators Office*
- *American Petroleum Institute*
- *Industry Representatives*

Causes of Spills


Impacted


Floated

Hurricane Rita




SEP 28 2005


SEP 28 2005


SEP 28 2005

Hurricane Katrina




N
NOAA
09/15/05
Lake Pontchartrain
Lake Borgne
Chandeleur Sound
Chalmette Refinery and Murphy Oil
Alliance Refinery
Bay Eloi
Bass State Lease
Sundown #1
Sundown #2
Bass Tank Farm
Shell Nairn
Daybrook Fisheries
Chevron - Empire
Barataria Bay
PXP Plains Marketing
Chevron Wagonwheel
Dynegy - Venice
Gulf of Mexico
Displaced tank along River
Shell Pilot town
Chevron Port Fourchon
Vintage Oil
Forrest Oil
Alexandria
Baton Rouge
New Orleans
No additional response
Pre-response
Active response
0 4 8 16 24 32 Miles


21 11:08AM

Flood Events


Murphy Oil


Coffeyville

Oil Spill at CRRM

Coffeyville, KS

Photo courtesy of Oklahoma Senator John W. Ford taken on 7/1/07

Oil Spill at CRRM

Oil Laden Flood Waters



Goals

- *Why did the tanks fail ???*
- *Preventable ???*
- *Why did some tanks not fail ???*
- *Any regulations on AST and hurricane preparation ???*
- *Make a recommendation on the RRT and NRT*

How and Findings

- *Spill investigation*
- *Regulation review and searches*
- *Attendance to conferences and "fairs"*
- *Conversations with personnel from refineries*
- *Address storm surge vs. flood event*

Surface Area to Weight



Solutions and Issues

- *Empty all tanks 3-day prior to landfall.*
  - *HOW FAR INLAND*


47.7 miles
Houston, TX
Pasadena
Galveston Island
Image Houston-Galveston Area Council
© 2007 Europa Technologies
© 2007 TurnHere, Inc.
Image NASA
Google
Pointer 29°30'53.52" N 95°01'33.33" W elev 3 ft Streaming 100%
Eye alt 56.96 mi

Solutions and Issues

- *Empty all tanks 3-day prior to landfall.*
  - *How far inland*
  - ***INTO WHAT***


N
Image Houston-Galveston Area Council
© 2007 Europa Technologies
Google
Pointer 29°43'48.65" N 95°06'50.16" W elev 6 ft Streaming |||||||||| 100%
Eye alt 14830 ft

Solutions and Issues

- *Empty all tanks 3-day prior to landfall.*
  - *Into What*
  - *How far inland*
  - ***Hurricane Rita***


Hurricane Rita
September 21, 2005
10 AM CDT Wednesday
NWS TPC/National Hurricane Center
Advisory 16
Current Center Location 24.3 N 85.9 W
Max Sustained Wind 140 mph
Current Movement W at 13 mph
Current Center Location
Forecast Center Positions
H Sustained wind > 73 mph
Potential Day 1-3 Track Area
OK
AR
MS
LA
TX
FL
Mexico
7 AM Sat
7 AM Fri
7 AM Thu
10 AM Wed
35N
30N
25N
20N
100W
95W
90W
85W
80W
True at 30.00N
SM 125 250 375 500
Approx. Distance Scale (Statute Miles)


Hurricane Rita
September 21, 2005
4 PM CDT Wednesday
NWS TPC/National Hurricane Center
Advisory 17
Current Center Location 24.4 N 86.8 W
Max Sustained Wind 165 mph
Current Movement W at 13 mph
Current Center Location
Forecast Center Positions
H Sustained wind > 73 mph
Potential Day 1-3 Track Area
Hurricane Watch
Tropical Storm Watch
1 PM Sat
1 PM Fri
1 PM Thu
4 PM Wed
OK
AR
NM
TX
LA
MS
KY
FL
Mexico
35N
30N
25N
20N
105W
100W
95W
90W
85W
True at 30.00N
SM 125 250 375 500
Approx. Distance Scale (Statute Miles)

Solutions and Issues

- *Empty all tanks 3-day prior to landfall.*
  - *Into What*
  - *How far from the Gulf*
  - *Hurricane Rita*
- *Opening Secondary Containment Valves*
  - *Allows for the water to drain out*
  - *SPCC Rules and Regulations*

Solutions and Issues

- *Fill tanks*
  - *Water or product*
  - *To what level*
- *Anchor tanks*
  - *Bolt down*
  - *Strap down*


11.14.2007 12:23


11.14.2007 12:24


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Image Houston-Galveston Area Council
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Google
Pointer 29°43'48.65" N 95°06'50.16" W elev 6 ft Streaming |||||||||| 100%
Eye alt 14830 ft

Problems

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- *Wells.Bob@epamail.epa.gov*

CFATS
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

Monty Elder
Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality

In October 2006, Congress passed and the President signed the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, which in Section 550 authorizes DHS to require high-risk chemical facilities to complete security vulnerability assessments, develop site security plans, and implement risk-based measures designed to satisfy DHS-defined risk-based performance standards. The Act also authorized DHS to enforce compliance with the security regulations, including conducting audits and inspections of high-risk facilities, imposing civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day, and shutting down facilities that fail to comply.

Exemptions to CFATS

- PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS
- WASTE WATER SYSTEMS
- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

CFATS Requirements

- Top Screen
  - **Chemical in excess of Screening Theshold Quantities (STQs)**
  - **Must be completed within 60 days of final rule**
    - **Jan 22, 2008**
  - **Must be completed on-line**
  - **Must register first and receive letter from DHS before completing Top Screen**
  - **Facilities not completing Top Screen by Jan 22nd, will automatically be Tier 1**

STQs
Appendix A

- Release
  - Toxic 500-20,000 lbs.
  - Flammable 10,000 lbs.
  - Explosive 5,000 lbs.
- Theft/Diversion
  - CW/CWP CUM 100 grams – 220 lbs.
  - WME 15 – 500 lbs.
  - EXP/IEDP 100 – 400 lbs
- Sabotage A Placarded Amount

Special Provisions

- Propane
  - **Release flammable 60,000 lbs**
    - **Do not count any in containers 10,000 lb or less**
- Chlorine
  - **Instead of 45 lbs. for theft/diversion – WME, use 500 lbs**
  - **Note – Release Toxic is 2,500 lbs.**
- Ammonia Nitrate
  - **Theft/Diversion IEDP Explosive 400 lbs vs Agricultural 2,000 lbs (Note: Asst. Secretary Stephan send a letter on Dec. 21 extending/suspending Top Screen requirements on AG)**

Chemical Examples of STQs

- Anhydrous Ammonia – 10,000 (Release)
- Hydrogen Sulfide – 10,000 (Release); 45 (Theft)
- Chlorine – 2,500 (Release); 500 (Theft)
- Sulfur Dioxide – 5,000 (Release); 500 (Theft)

After Top Screen

- DHS will assign Tier based on risk
- Facilities complete Site Vulnerability Assessement (90 days)
  - Tier 2-4 must use on-line CSAT, Tier 1 may also use alternate SVA
  - includes asset characterization, threat assessment, security vulnerability analysis, risk assessment, and countermeasure analysis

After Top Screen

- DHS Reviews SVA (Approves or Disapproves in writing, corrective action is mandatory)
- Faciltiy develops Site Security Plan
  - There are 19 RBPSs in the rule, addressing the following areas:
    - *1. Restricted Area Perimeter*
    - *2. Securing Site Assets*
    - *3. Screening and Access Controls*
    - *4. Deter, Detect, and Delay*
    - *5. Shipping, Receipt, and Storage*
    - *6. Theft and Diversion*
    - *7. Sabotage*
    - *8. Cyber*
    - *9. Response*
    - *10. Monitoring*
    - *11. Training*
    - *12. Personnel Surety*
    - *13. Elevated Threats*
    - *14. Specific Threats, Vulnerabilities,or Risks*
    - *15. Reporting of Significant SecurityIncidents*
    - *16. Significant Security Incidents andSuspicious Activities*
    - *17. Officials and Organizations*
    - *18. Records*
    - *19. Others as determined by DHS*

After Top Screen

- DHS Review SSP
  - If disapproves will
    - **notify in writing**
    - **Corrective action is mandatory**
  - If approves will
    - **Notify in writing**
    - **Inspect facility for compliance**

Miscellaneous

- EXTENSIVE RECORDKEEPING
  - TRAINING, EXERCISES, INCIDENTS, MAINTENANCE, THREATS & AUDITS
- ENFORCEMENT BY ORDER & CIVIL PENALTY
- CHEMICAL-TERRORISM VULNERABILITY INFORMATION (CVI)
  - EVERYTHING GENERATED UNDER THIS PROGRAM
  - COVERED PERSONS MUST PROTECT
  - NEED TO KNOW
    - *Facility employees*
    - *Federal employees, contractors, and grantees*
    - *State/local government employees*
  - CVI access will include training and certification

Outreach

- DHS – Large high risk facilities, ie. Refineries; Associations
- States –
  - OK – letter to Tier 2 facilities
  - CO – letter to LEPCs
- NASTTPO – crosswalk of CFATS, EPCRA, RMP with updated list of lists

(DRAFT v10)

Region 6

Regional Response Team (RRT)/Joint Response Team (JRT)

Interim Activation Guidance

For

Poison Control Centers (Region 6)

February 2009

Poison Control Center Activation (PCC)

Activation #: 1-800-222-1222



Introduction:

Poison Centers (PCC), often called "poison control centers", has historically been unrecognized in the preparedness and response community as a major player in the role of protecting the health of our population during hazardous materials incidents or terrorist events. Functioning on a very limited patchwork of local, state and federal funding, Poison Control Centers have provided vital health services to the general public and health care professionals for over 30 plus years. The PCC's provision of **direct 24 hour patient care services** to residential callers, health care professionals and institutions adds value to the services provided by many government public health entities, health care providers and commercial insurance carriers. Not only can the PCCs provide medical evaluation and consultation, they also save the states substantial money by reducing the number of hospital ER visits because they can diagnose and often treat cases at home, saving States hundreds of thousands of dollars each year.

The Region 6 Regional Response Team (RRT6), Co-Chaired by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the US Coast Guard is the federal component of the National Response System for the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. RRT6 is composed of representatives from sixteen (16) federal departments and agencies and each of the five States. In addition, Region 6 shares its southern border with the country of Mexico. Similar to the RRT, a Joint Response Team (JRT) is established along the US/Mexico border consisting of federal, state and local agencies involved in chemical emergency prevention, preparedness and response on both land and water.

RRT6 has recognized the potential value and contributions that PCC's offer to the National Response System and drafted this interim guidance document for use of PCC's within its jurisdiction, and for consideration as a national guidance document by the National Response Team (NRT).

What are PCC's?

In the United States, PCC's provide immediate treatment advice for poison emergencies. PCC's are staffed 24-hours a day by nurses, physicians, pharmacists and other highly trained healthcare professionals. PCC staff offer expertise in the areas of chemical, environmental, radiological, biological, and agricultural hazardous materials to all public health entities, environmental agencies, hospitals, on-scene responders, and the general public. PCC's also have skilled linguists that can overcome multiple language barriers. PCC's in Region 6 have staff to handle Spanish speaking callers to reflect the communication and collaboration efforts between the PCC's and the Hispanic population, to include bi-national collaboration with Mexico.

Which PCC can be used?

There are ten (10) PCC's in Region 6; one (1) each in New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas and Louisiana and a network of six (6) inter-connected centers in Texas. The PCC's in Region 6 can be contacted to assist the RRT and its member stakeholders address public health issues within their respective states or even in the event of a national disaster.

To contact a PCC just call the toll free national number 1-800-222-1222 from a land line phone system within the State in which the disaster has occurred. Or contact the PCC directly through the non-emergency office phone number listed at the end of this document. Note: Cell phones can be used. However, the cell phone area code might route a caller to a Poison Control Center based on the area code the cell phone or Black Berry devise is registered. Regardless, calls can be re-routed back to the state in which the event has occurred.

When can PCC's be used?

PCC's are available to receive calls 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; thus, PCC's are available to receive telephone calls during all phases of a disaster. PCC's are accessible to anyone calling from within their state. PCC's can receive calls from the public, 911 operator/dispatcher, impacted citizens, the media, receiving hospitals, private industry, physicians, state/county health departments', state/county environmental agencies, federal environmental and health agencies, and emergency managers from local, state and federal agencies.

How can the PCC's assist the RRT and JRT?

PCC's have legally designated authority to address and to provide treatment recommendations to the people exposed to all types of poisons; this includes occupational exposures to hazardous materials. They also are available to serve as a vehicle for communicating information to callers during disaster events. This communication system also provides a broader approach to addressing the general public not impacted by

the event and may include concerned citizens, politicians and the media. Both the RRT and JRT, and their member agencies, can utilize the expertise of the PCC's to address human exposures due to any and all hazardous materials emergency events. In addition, the poison centers have the ability to track calls received and can provide valuable epidemiological data on types of calls received.

What types of incidents would involve a PCC's?

PCC's are available to assist local, state, and federal agencies by providing a public telephone-based service for any type of incident where hazardous materials may threaten public health. These incidents might include only localized impacts that are managed by local fire, police, and EMS. Or even larger events that involve State emergency response programs and disasters that require Federal assistance. Hazards addressed could be anything from a toxic industrial chemical release resulting from a chemical facility fire, to household hazardous waste such as pesticides, mercury thermometers, or oily residues that might be encountered by residents re-entering flooded neighborhoods caused by natural disasters, or a Chemical/Biological/Radiological/Nuclear (CBRN) event.

How Can PCC's function within Incident Command Systems?

The Incident Command System (ICS) is the response management structure used by all emergency response organizations, as described in the National Response Framework (NRF). The ICS establishes positions that accomplish the key functions of incident management, including command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance. PCC's may interact with many of these positions during the course of an incident. The initial

decision to activate a PCC would probably be made by the Incident Commander (IC). The activation of a PCC may be publicly announced by a Public Information Officer (PIO), and/or a Liaison Officer (LNO). Once activated, a PCC would need information on the nature and extent of potential hazards involved, which could be provided by the Planning Section, and particularly, the Situation Unit. In turn, the PCC could then offer advice on safety and treatment of potential exposures to the Safety Officer and Operations Section. If the event generates news media or political interest, it may be necessary to involve a Joint Information Center (JIC) in developing public statements for PCC to use during calls from the public. PCC's should familiarize their staffs with ICS principles so that they can interact appropriately within the Incident Command System. To determine what level of training an individual needs according to their level of responsibility during a multi-jurisdiction, multi-agency, multi-discipline incident, please review the FEMA web site: www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/TrainingGdlMatrix.pdf

What information would a PCC need from emergency response agencies?

PCC's can be used to provide treatment recommendations to callers at home, in a hospital setting or shelters. Seeking help from a PCC by phone can help alleviate patient surges to local healthcare facilities. In order to make informative decisions, the agency(s) that activate the PCC should provide the PCC's any data that can assist them to better respond to public inquiries.

The following information might become available through ICS liaisons and may include:

- notification from spill reports
- exact location of spill and/or releases
- amount of material spilled and type
- potential health/environment impacts
- plume maps
- weather conditions
- fact sheets
- sensitive populations (children, elderly, child bearing, etc)
- contamination maps/zone of contamination
- site photos
- sensitive issue (terrorism events, national disasters, political, etc)

What information can PCC's provide to incident command staff during and after an incident?

In addition to providing toxicology advice, PCC's generate certain data as a routine course of their duties that can be very useful to incident command staff. As PCC's begin to respond to calls from the public, they record information on the identities, numbers of callers, location where exposures may have occurred, and symptoms observed/reported. They also track the progress of persons they refer for medical treatment through the treatment process. This information can assist incident management staff in identifying potentially exposed populations and areas of contamination, which are necessary for developing effective response and mitigation strategies.

How are funding issues addressed when PCC respond to a disaster?

- **RRT/JRT Response Team Activation Guidance for Poison Control Centers**

  1. Incident Commanders request resources first at the local level

  2. If resources are not available at the local level, mayors/county judges may request assistance from the Governor

  3. If resources are not available at the state level, the Governor may request assistance from other states, or

  4. If resources are not available at the state level, the Governor may request assistance from the President

  5. In order for a state to provide resources to another state, an Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is required

- **EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COMPACTS (EMAC)**

  1. All states in FEMA Region VI have legislatively enacted the EMAC agreement

  2. EMAC's provide form and structure for interstate mutual aid

  3. EMAC's quickly/efficiently resolve two key issues upfront: **liability and reimbursement**

  4. Only authorized representatives (Governor or designee) may request assistance from another state

     a. Disaster impacted state can request and receive assistance from other member states
     b. States rendering aid shall be reimbursed by the state receiving aid
     c. States rendering aid may withhold resources to provide reasonable protection of their state resources

- **REIMBURSEMENT**

  1. In accordance with the EMAC's, states rendering aid shall be reimbursed for all costs by the state receiving aid

  2. In presidential declared disasters, FEMA reimburses impacted states on a cost-reimbursable basis

- Pursuant to the Stafford Act, division of costs among Federal, State, and local governments is a negotiable item
- The minimum federal share under the Stafford Act is 75%.
- However, depending on the circumstances, the Federal government may assume a larger percentage of the costs
- No dollars are sent directly from the impacted state to Poison Control Answering Points

Additional Information/Resources:

- **National Response Framework (NRF)** - http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nrf/
- **National Response Center (NRC)** - http://www.nrc.uscg.mil/nrchp.html
- **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) NIMS ICS Courses:** http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training.shtm
- **Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)** - http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/er/index.htm
- **Regional Response Team (RRT) 6** - http://www.epa.gov/Region6//6sf/respprev/rrt/rrt6.htm
- **Joint Response Team (JRT)** - http://www.epa.gov/Border2012/indicators/response.html
- **Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)** - http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/content/epcra/epcra_plan.htm#LEPC
- **American Association of Poison Control Centers (AAPCC)** - www.aapcc.org
- **Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)** - http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/2p-emergency-response.html
- **Centers for Disease Control (CDC)** - http://www.bt.cdc.gov/
- **National Centers for Environmental Health (NCEH)** - http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/emergency.htm
- **National Association of County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)** - http://www.naccho.org/topics/emergency/
- **Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)** - http://www.emacweb.org/

PCC Contacts by State (Non-emergencies):

Oklahoma PCC:	405-271-5062	New Mexico PCC:	505 272-4261
Arkansas PCC:	501-686-5532	Louisiana PCC:	318-813-3317

North Texas PCC, (Dallas) 817-372-4348; South Texas PCC, (San Antonio) 214-590-9010

RRT6 Ad Hoc Work Group Members
Interim Activation Guidance for
Region 6 Poison Control Centers (Draft for RRT/JRT Region 6)
May 13, 2008 to January 27, 2009

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Regionalization Concept of Poison Control Centers in Region 6: Emergency Preparedness and Response

Why Poison Centers?

Patrick Young, MS, RS
LCDR, US Public Health Service
EPA/ATSDR Region 6

SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLE™

Region 6
Poison Control Centers/ Emergency Management Assistance Compact Workshop

January 16, 2008
Little Rock, AR

SAFER • HEALTHIER • PEOPLE™

Workshop Problem Statements

- Lack of awareness and understanding of roles, responsibilities & capacities of PCCs
- Lack of awareness and understanding of EMAC
- Need for additional emergency response surge capacity for PCCs

Workshop Objectives

EMAC Advisory Group

NEMA 2007 Annual Conference

Oklahoma City, OK

- Demonstrate mission, roles, responsibilities, capacities & technical expertise of PCCs
- Increase awareness and understanding of EMAC
- Demonstrate mission, roles, responsibilities, capacities & technical expertise of EM and other response partners in the use of EMAC

Workshop Objectives
(continued)

- Increase collaboration and establish rapport between response partners in Region 6
- Highlight collaboration between PCCs and HAZMAT responders
- Present per-call rate for PCCs in Region 6

Workshop Objectives
(continued)

- Discuss and highlight need to establish mutual-aid agreements beyond EMAC
- Discuss additional methods to increase collaboration among response partners in Region 6

Issue: Poison Centers not State Connected or Integrated with Response Community – "What we know"

- Poison Control Centers/Networks managed by individual states
- Minimal state-to-state interaction between PCC's
- Minimal bi-national interaction (US/Mexico Border)
- Environmental/HAZMAT Agencies unaware of Poison Centers Role in Disasters and Preparedness (EPA/DEQ/LEPC)
- Need Inter-State connectivity to improve effectiveness and integration within the emergency response communities

Vision

- Vision: Create Regional “Connected” Network
- Build Relationships between PCC’s and Environmental Hazmat Response (EPA/State – On-Scene Coordinator’s (OSC’s))
- Integrate PCC with Local Emergency Planning Committees and State Emergency Managers
- Expand Capacity of PCC Regional Network
- Develop written protocols to outline role of PCC in disaster preparedness and response.

Coffeyville, KS
Flood and Oil Spill Response
Region 6/Region 7

Oklahoma Presentation

Incident Date: July 2007 to August 2007

Coffeyville Resources Refinery

Coffeyville, KS

City of Coffeyville, KS


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7/2
1010
07/27/2007 01:50

Multi-Regional Response

July 1, 2007: Initial Notification

- R6 EPA notified by ODEQ of flood status and Coffeyville Oil Spill

July 2, 2007: EPA Mobilization

- R7 requests R6 technical expertise for residences affected by oil

- Response OSC Enders, Jim Mullins and MCP mobilized to site

FPN Assignment?
NCP requirement vs. practical requirement

§ 300.140 Multi-regional responses.

(a) If a discharge or release moves from the area covered by one ACP or RCP into another area, the authority for response actions should likewise shift. If a discharge or release affects areas covered by two or more ACPs or RCPs, the response mechanisms of each applicable plan may be activated. In this case, response actions of all regions concerned shall be fully coordinated as detailed in the RCPs and ACPs. (b) There shall be only one OSC and/or RPM at any time during the course…

July 3, 2007: State Requests Assistance

- ODEQ requests assistance from R6 EPA for water sampling in Lake Oologah and the Verdigris River

July 1, 2007: R7 mobilizes (Incident Command in Coffeyville, KS)
July 2, 2007: R6 mobilizes (Incident Command in Nowata, OK)

July 3, 2007:

Helicopter Over flights Begin
(Coffeyville Refinery to Lake Oologah Spillway)


XMap 5
Professio
Data Zoom
8-0
Sedan City
Sedan
Independence Muni
Coffeyville Muni
Oswego
Oswego Muni
Columbus
Coffeyville, KS
Coff 65.39 mi
Caney
Chetopa
Baxter Springs
Picher
Hog Pen Public Access
Turkey Creek Point Public Use Area
Commerce
Miami Muni
Miami
Lenapah
Dewey
Bartlesville Muni
Bartlesville
Twin Bridges State Park
Nowata Muni
Nowata
Vinita
Vinita Muni
Grand Lake O' the Cherokees
Grove Muni
Grove
Barnsdall
Chelsea
Oologah Lake
Spencer Creek Cove Public Use Area
Craig County South Grand Lake
Oologah, OK
Dam Site West Public Use Area
Dam Site East Public
65.39 mi
Jay
Spavinaw State Park
Lake Eucha State Park
Skiatook
Skiatook Muni
Collinsville
Claremore
Latitude
N36° 45.0'
Longitude
W95° 26.9'
Elevation
Interval
250 feet
0 mi
Map Data
GIS
Print
Find
Phone
Info
NetLink
ImageReg
Draw
Profile
3-D
Route
GPS
Voice
Handheld Export
Slide 10 of 52
Default Design



Coffeyville, Kansas Estimated Flood Extent As of 7/2/07

Legend

Estimated Flood Extent (7/2/07)

Lakes and Rivers (Normal Levels)

0 1 2 4 6 8 Miles

N

Map Created: 7/3/2007 @ EPA Region 6 RRC

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
EPA
REGION-SIX
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM


Possible source area
Refinery
Coffeyville
Heavily Oiled Areas
in and around trolline
Thick Sheen
Sheen from Submerged Vehicles
Leaking Production/Standing Oil
Production Facility - Leaking Oil
Leaking Pumpjack
Leaking Storage/Production
Nowata Airport (MCP)
Southernmost extent of sheen (very fine)
Nowata
Bartlesville
Dam
Legend
Coffeyville High Water Line
Locations
County Boundaries
Kansas
Oklahoma
N
USEPA REGION 6
START-3
SITE LOCATION MAP
Coffeyville Floods
0 1.5 3 6
Miles
DATE
7/3/2007
PROJECT NO
28406.012.XXXXXXXX



Note: This is an ESTIMATED flood extent that is based off the USGS Water Gaging Stations on the Verdigris River at Coffeyville, KS and Lenapah, OK on 7/3/07.

Legend

- Dark Black Oil Stringers
- Large Rainbow Sheen
- Slight Sheen
- Estimated Flood Extent (7/3/07)
- Lakes and Rivers (Normal Levels)

Verdigris River Oil Cover Extents

As of 07/03/07

N

0 1 2 4 6 8 Miles

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
EPA
REGION-SIX
EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM

Map Created: 7/4/2007 @ EPA Region 6 ERC


Options
South Coffeyville
169
10
Verdigris River
Belleview Landing
California Creek
Lenapah
Brush Creek
Latitude
Longitude
Elevation
Interval
100 feet
Map Data
GIS
Print
Find
Phone
Info
NetLink
ImageReg
Draw
Profile
3-D
Route
GPS
Voice
Handheld Expor


Furthest extent of oil sheen
North of Nowata, OK

Over flight Video
1) Goose Neck Bend - South

July 4, 2007: South Coffeyville, OK

- EPA and ODEQ meet with City Officials
- Helicopter Over flights

July 5, 2007: DOI

- DOI/Fish and Wildlife Over flights

July 5, 2007

- ICS implementation in the field
- EPA R6 begins to integrate into R7 Unified Command Structure

** Begin deployment of boom at Highway 60 Bridge
** Water Sampling Begins

R6 Incident Command

Verdigris River Flooding
ICS 207 Organization



R6 EPA/ODEQ/CG

1) Oversight of R6/R7 water operations including;

Onion Creek (KS/OK); Opossum Creek (OK); Vinegar Creek (OK).
(July 5-August 27)

2) Water sampling

Drinking Water Intakes in the Verdigris River and Lake Oologah
(July 5 – Aug 21)

3) South Coffeyville, OK

Recon of houses initially identified as having external oil contamination and final inspection; Cleanup of oil at the SCV Waste Water Treatment Plant; Town Meetings; Liaison with fire department and EM officials; Address fish kills/Ag Issues

R6 EPA/ODEQ/CG

4) Boom Placement at Highway 60 Bridge
5) Shoreline Cleanup Assessment Team (SCAT) Process

The Work Begins…

July 5, 2007

Water Sampling
July 5, 2007 to July 21, 2007

I. Quality Assurance Sampling Plan (QASP)

II. Initial Analytes sampled for per EPA and ODEQ:

VOCs,
SVOCs
Total Metals (Including Mercury)
Organochlorinated and Organophosphorous pesticides
Polychlorinated biphenyls
TPH
Hardness and alkalinity

III. Analytes found (none above normal)

Concentrations below standards and criteria.

IV. Samples Taken:

EPA: 55

Split: 53

IV. RP takeover date:

AOC signed 7/10/07 by R7 Regional Adm.

Water Operations

July 5, 2007 to July 27, 2007


KANSAS
OKLAHOMA
Onion Creek
Verdigris River
Vinegar Creek
Opossum Creek

Onion Creek (KS/OK)

Onion Creek

Misc Photos


6 9:10AM


7 8:56AM


6 9:37AM


7 9:11AM


6 9:33AM


6 9:37AM

Opossum Creek
Oklahoma

Vinegar Creek

R6 EPA/ODEQ/CG

- *Approximate recovery each day: Over 5000 bags:* ***100+ Cubic Yards***

  (Bag size approximately 8 lbs. as difficulty in removal due to geographic area)

- *Approximately 100+ U.S.E.S. personnel with 16+ john boats*

Challenges of flood response

July 6, 2007: Vegetation/Livestock

- DOI apprised that large swaths of vegetation have been oiled and are visible due to receding floodwaters


07/15/2007 03:10


07/25/2007 04:14


07/14/2007 01:06

July 7, 2007

- EPA Region 7/USCG Over Flights

July 8, 2007

- South Coffeyville Fish Kill

July 8, 2007
Boom Transitioned to RP


Period 4

INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

Special Instructions
Includes booming water intakes and environmentally sensitive areas in the Lake Oologah area. Command and control of the Highway 60 operations have been transitioned from Regulatory Agency to the command and control of the Responsible Party with oversight from EPA. Management of the boom attached to the Highway 60 bridge by EPA Region 6 has been taken over by the Responsible Party. Boom operations will be based upon safety observations agreed upon by both the EPA and the Responsible Party. Mutually agreeable compensation will be delivered to the Regulatory Agency.


22 9:36AM

July 10, 2007

Information flow to the field becomes more…

complicated?



Coffeyville Resources Oil Spill
ICS 207 Organization

Initiation of R6 SCAT

(Completed 7/26/07)

Station	Latitude	Longitude	Description
1	36.96148	-95.61184	Oily debris [illegible]
2	36.96132	-95.61170	Oily debris ~ 90' x 30'
3	36.96132	-95.61172	Second large tree jam across Opossum Creek
4	36.96038	-95.61175	Oily debris ~ 100 x 90
5	36.96129	-95.61182	Oily debris ~ 60' x 30'
6	36.96128	-95.61214	Oily debris ~ 20' x 10'
7	36.96127	-95.61240	Oily debris ~ 40' x 20'
8	36.96128	-95.61200	Oily debris ~ 20' x 10'
9	36.96134	-95.61238	Oil on bank and corner of field
10	36.96141	-95.61201	Oily debris [illegible]
11	36.96130	-95.61156	First tree jam across Opossum Creek
12	36.96094	-95.61150	Oily debris ~ 150' x 25'
13	36.96038	-95.61115	Oily debris ~ 25' x 25'
14	36.96138	-95.61118	Oily debris ~ 25' x 10'
15	36.96130	-95.60073	Oily debris ~ 24' x 15'
16	36.96174	-95.61144	Oily debris ~ 4 [illegible] (seep in pit [illegible])
17	36.96148	-95.60002	Oily debris ~ 24' x 5'
18	36.96138	-95.61149	Oily debris ~ 20' x 5'
19	36.96134	-95.60700	Locations where U.S.E.S. is working today
20	36.96215	-95.60754	Oily debris pile higher on bank, towards road
21	36.96255	-95.60705	Oily debris pile ~12' x 15'
22	36.96251	-95.60655	Oily debris pile ~ 60' long
23	36.96341	-95.60072	Oily debris pile ~3' x 12'
24	36.96310	-95.60632	Oily debris pile On north bank of Opossum Creek
25	36.96306	-95.60600	North bank of Opossum Creek at verdigris River



Station	Latitude	Longitude	Description
1	36.30607	-95.31903	Oil debris pile on shoulder of creek bank
2	36.30604	-95.31862	Oil debris pile ~15' x 10' on leaves and sheen on water
3	36.30605	-95.31832	Oil debris pile, ~20' x 10'
4	36.30620	95.31773	Oily debris on shore and oil on water
5	36.30630	95.31726	Oily debris ~60' x 10' on north bank
6	36.30640	-95.31635	Large oil debris on bank, ~ 100' x 40' and oil on water
7	36.30611	-95.31416	Oil debris piles both in south bank, and on the water
8	36.30600	95.31164	Oil on water
9	36.30600	95.31161	Oil on water
10	36.30604	-95.31164	Oily debris on shore and oil on water
11	36.30613	-95.31165	Oily debris ~ 20' x 15'
12	36.30600	95.31166	Oily debris ~ 20' x 12'
13	36.30600	95.31162	Oily debris on shore and oil on water, "bubbles only"
14	36.30703	-95.31415	Oily debris ~ 12' x 30'
15	36.30711	-95.31376	Oily debris on shore and oil on water
16	36.30708	95.31378	Oily debris ~ 75' x 20' and oil on water
17	36.30708	95.31398	Oily debris ~ 20' x 15' 15'
18	36.30622	-95.31327	Oily debris on bottom of creek and oil on water
19	36.30623	-95.31318	Oily debris ~10' x 8' in middle of Vinegar Creek
20	36.30607	95.31319	Oily debris on bottom of creek
21	36.30601	95.31169	Both soft oily debris, taken from north bank
22	36.30600	-95.31122	Oily debris on water
23	36.30623	-95.31154	Oil debris pile ~15' x 10'
24	36.30600	95.31136	Light oil sheen on water, no visible
25	36.30607	-95.31103	Oil debris on side of ravine on north bank
26	36.30607	-95.31096	Big oily debris filled on north and south bank of Vinegar Creek. Oil also on water.
27	36.31021	-95.31049	Oily debris spread between Photo 2 and 10 (OK 69)
28	36.30600	95.30600	Log jam at these GPS, no sheen visible
29	0.30600	3.20000	Beach near mouth of Vinegar Creek and Verdigris River
30	36.30651	-95.30625	North bank of Vinegar Creek at Verdigris River



LEGEND

OBSERVATION LOCATION

- Both Water/Creek Bank
- Creek Bank
- Water

NOTE: OBSERVATION LOCATION 29 NOT SHOWN DUE TO MISSING LONGITUDE/LATITUDE INFORMATION.

N

0 400 800

SCALE IN FEET

SOURCE: U.S. CENSUS BUREAU - 2000

USEPA REGION 6
START 3

SOAT OF VINEGAR CREEK
NORTH AND SOUTH BANK
SATURDAY, JULY 28, 2007
OKLAHOMA

DATE	PROJECT NO	SCALE
JULY 2007	[illegible]	AS SHOWN

August 7, 2007

RP begins SCAT…

To Include: EPA R6/R7, RP and States (OK/KS)

Transition of Activities From EPA R6 to R7

August 30, 2007

(to ensure consistency with EPA R7 Administrative Order on Consent and per NCP 300.140)

Recommendations on more effective implementation of Section 300.140 using NIMS…

- Unified Command/ICS Structure in a multi-regional response. Utilization of the MACs? Possibly a MAC set up consisting of EPA R6 RRT chair, EPA R7 RRT Chair, OK RRT member, KS RRT member and other appropriate member of R6/R7 RRT; other OK/KS appropriate departments or agencies.

TO DECIDE OR PROVIDE:

- Cleanup Standards when two states are involved and a PRP Order has not been issued?

- Availability of expertise for indoor air

- Recommendation of state member for Unified Command

Agricultural Issues:

Ingestion of contaminated crops, consumption of potentially contaminated water by livestock, cleanup of cropland (burn/till/bioremediation). Process for handling potential agricultural issues.

- Ability of state personnel to cross borders

- Improve process for Integrating multiple agency EOCs into the planning cycle.

- Competing priorities for resources between regions. (Cleanup of houses vs. water recovery?)

- Improve process for input from RRT members in different regions when requested by UC (SCAT/NRDA – Comments on guidelines)

- How to handle potential NRDA issues written into the PRP order?

- SCATs or other criteria generated by an order with the PRP. Is the region writing the order responsible for the sign off or the state in which the event will occur?

- Unified Command input into work plan for PRP order

Private leases contributing to the site vs. the main PRP. Tracking costs against an FPN.

Contact Information:

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Jhana Enders/Region 6 EPA

Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC)

enders.jhana@epa.gov

(214) 665-6444

Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (ODEQ)

Monty Elder

monty.elder@deq.state.ok.us

Emergency Response Coordinator

(405) 702-9132

HHW/Orphan Container MA

HHW Collection Locations



Oklahoma Flooding HHW and JFO Support
HHW Inventory Summary
Bartlesville, Miami, and South Coffeyville, Oklahoma

Location Name	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Bartlesville HHW Pad	0	0	0	0	1388

Category	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Small Containers	0	0	0	0	755
Other	0	0	0	0	15
Cylinders	0	0	0	0	0
Large Containers	0	0	0	0	12
Lead Acid Batteries	0	0	0	0	35
Small Tanks	0	0	0	0	543
Large Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
BBQ Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	2
Large Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
White Goods	0	0	0	0	8
Electronics	0	0	0	0	18

Miami HHW	0	0	0	0	957

Category	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Small Containers	0	0	0	0	832
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Cylinders	0	0	0	0	0
Large Containers	0	0	0	0	63
Lead Acid Batteries	0	0	0	0	19
Small Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
Large Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
BBQ Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	4
Large Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
White Goods	0	0	0	0	6
Electronics	0	0	0	0	33

Orphan Container Collection	0	0	0	0	10

Category	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Small Containers	0	0	0	0	0

Orphan Container Collection	0	0	0	0	10

Category	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Small Containers	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Cylinders	0	0	0	0	0
Large Containers	0	0	0	0	10
Lead Acid Batteries	0	0	0	0	0
Small Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
Large Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
BBQ Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
Large Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
White Goods	0	0	0	0	0
Electronics	0	0	0	0	0

South Coffeyville HHW	0	0	0	0	31

Category	Today	Yesterday	Week to Date	Month to Date	Cumulative
Small Containers	0	0	0	0	31
Other	0	0	0	0	0
Cylinders	0	0	0	0	0
Large Containers	0	0	0	0	0
Lead Acid Batteries	0	0	0	0	0
Small Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
Large Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
BBQ Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
Large Propane Tanks	0	0	0	0	0
White Goods	0	0	0	0	0
Electronics	0	0	0	0	0

JTF-CS Command Briefing

JOINT TASK FORCE CIVIL SUPPORT

Definition of CBRNE

- CBRNE is defined as a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive situation or incident

  A Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a device or material specifically designed to produce casualties or terror

- CBRNE incidents include industrial accidents, acts of nature, acts of war, or terrorism

What is JTF-CS?

- A USNORTHCOM standing Joint Task Force HQ of Joint military, DOD civilian and contractor personnel at Fort Monroe, Virginia.
- Originally established under USJFCOM (pre-9/11) to address national level concerns for planning and integration of DOD CBRNE Consequence Management (CM) support to civil authorities.
- A deployable Command and Control headquarters for DOD units and personnel executing CM operations in response to one or more CBRNE incidents.

JTF-CS Background

	Incident	Initiative
2006		QDR & Strategic Planning Guidance
2005		Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support
2003		DHS and ASD(HD) were formed
2002		UCP 2002 & USNORTHCOM
2001	9/11 WTC, Pentagon, Anthrax	White House Office of Homeland Security formed
2000	USS *Cole*	
1999		Unified Command Plan 1999 JTF-CS stand-up
1998	Nairobi/Tanzania Embassies	Presidential Directive 62
1996	Khobar Towers, Olympic Park	
1995	Tokyo Subway, Murrah Bldg, Oklahoma City	Presidential Directive 39
1993	World Trade Center	

4

Mission Statement

- **Joint Task Force Civil Support plans and integrates DoD support to the designated Primary Federal Agency for domestic CBRNE consequence management operations. When directed by Commander USNORTHCOM, JTF-CS deploys and executes timely and effective command and control of designated DoD forces providing support to civil authorities to**
  - ***Save Lives, Prevent Injury and***
  - ***Provide Temporary Critical Life Support***

5

Deliberate Planning

CBRNE CM Guidance, Policy and Plans

Contingency Planning and Playbooks

National Response Plan
Local and State Emergency Plans

Nuclear

Radiological

Contagious & Non-Contagious Biological

High-Yield Explosive

Persistent & Non-Persistent Chemical

CJCSI 3125.01

USNORTHCOM
CONPLAN 2002
CONPLAN 0500

CCMRF EXORD

DOD Capabilities

Local / State / Federal Capabilities

Mission Analysis and Assessment

CBRNE Assessments, Modeling and Analysis

Emergency Plans

6

USNORTHCOM CBRNE CM
Tiered Response Options

INCIDENT MAGNITUDE

SCOPE OF DOD RESPONSE

Tier I

Defense Coordinating Officer or other O-6 Commander

- *DCO with DCE and EPLOs in National Response Plan role*
- JPAC from JTF-CS

Tier II

- JTF-CS
  - with technical augmentation
- JTF-CM (X2 if required)
  - Command and Control Headquarters 2 HQ(-)(ARNORTH)
  - Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JTF-CS)
  - Joint Manning Document augmentation required

DCO, DCE and EPLOs continue National Response Plan role

Tier III

USNORTHCOM Assigned O-9 level JTF Headquarters

Complex regional problem with multiple subordinate C2 elements

- JTF-CS
- JTF-CM
- MACDIS or Other JTFs

Formed from:

- Standing Joint Force Headquarters- North (SJFHQ-N)
- ARNORTH (with joint augmentation from SJFHQ-N)
- Force Provider resources

DCO, DCE and EPLOs continue National Response Plan role

Command and Control

7

CBRNE Threat Spectrum

Greatest

HYE

Industrial Chemicals



Biological Toxins



Biological Pathogens

Radio-Isotopes

Chemical Weapons

Nuclear Weapons

Probability
Of Occurrence

Least

- **Most Likely: High Yield Explosive**
- **Most Dangerous: Nuclear Weapons**

- **Greatest Threat: Contagious Biological Pathogen**

8

A Different Mindset

In CBNRE Consequence Management, the Effects are the Enemy

- **Thermal**
- **Radiation**
- **Asphyxiation**
- **Chemical**
- **Biological**
- **Mechanical**
- **Psychological**

Effects Cause Harm

How we Counteract Harm Dictates Method of Response

Response Drives Forces Required

✓ Ability to Anticipate RFAs Affects Speed of Response

9

Full Spectrum Responsibility

ROUTINE	Ongoing Support	Scheduled Event Support/Exercises	INCIDENT	CBRNE Incident Support
	• Develops and reviews plans for CBRNE incidents • Advocates development of doctrine and requirements	• Participates in interagency and DoD exercises • Prepares CBRNE CM contingency plans for, and participates in, National Special Security Events (NSSE) and other special events		• Responds to CBRNE incident (terrorist or accidental) • Assists LFA in support of civil authorities • Provides C2 for assigned DoD forces • Augments other Commanders for CBRNE CM ops (JPAC or JTAC)

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Playbook Purpose

- Expedite Crisis Action Planning (CAP), the Commander's Assessment to USNORTHCOM and Operations Order (OPORD) development processes.
- Provide a pre-incident start point with refined tasks and required capabilities list.
- Designed as operational JTF "tools" for similar domestic catastrophic incidents— not an all - encompassing CBRNE CM "solution" set.
- Use planning considerations developed in the Homeland Security Council (HSC) scenarios.

JTF-CS Operational Planning Tool designed to expedite CAP.

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JTF-CS Playbooks

- Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation – 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device
- Scenario 2: Biological Attack – Aerosol Anthrax
- Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak – Pandemic Influenza
- Scenario 4: Biological Attack – Plague
- Scenario 5: Chemical Attack – Blister Agent
- Scenario 6: Chemical Attack – Toxic Industrial Chemicals
- Scenario 7: Chemical Attack – Nerve Agent
- Scenario 8: Chemical Attack – Chlorine Tank Explosion
- Scenario 9: Natural Disaster – Major Earthquake
- Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane
- Scenario 11: Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices
- Scenario 12: Explosives Attack – Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device
- Scenario 13: Biological Attack – Food Contamination
- Scenario 14: Biological Attack – Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and Mouth Disease)

Nuc Playbook

Bio Playbook

PI Playbook

Chem Playbook

RDD Playbook

HYE *Playbook*

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Civil Response Process



13

Command Assessment Element

Concept of Employment

BPT deploy for domestic CBRNE CM assessment to provide situational awareness and early identification of potential DoD requirements.



Results

- CCMRF modification
- Force flow
- Predictive RFF
- JOA recommended
- BSI recommended

Considerations

- **Incident magnitude**
- **LFA requests for assistance**
- **Anticipated DOD tasks**
- **Force Protection**
- **Weather and terrain**
- **Public reaction**
- **Mission duration**
- **CBRNE reconnaissance measures**

UNCLAS – FOUO

Standard Task Organization

JTF-CS OPLAN 0500-06

FOR COORD (FINAL-DRAFT) – 08 JAN 07

JTF-CS (TROOPS)

- HQ, JTF (CAE)
- HQ, JTF (Initial)
- DTRA CE
- CBRNE CE
- HAMMER ACE X1
- HQ, JTF (Follow)
- COMM SPT Co
- ACCE
- DIGI TOPO
- CAISE (ADVON)
- HAMMER ACE X2
- MPAD
- SMART-PC
- AFRAT
- DLA CST
- METOC TM
- CAISE
- HHD, COMM SPT Co
- COMM SPT Co X2
- BD LAW TEAM (BOLT)

TF RESPONSE

- HHC, BCT (ADVON)
- CBIRF
- HHC, BCT (-)
- SMART-NBC
- CHEM Co (Decon)
- CHEM Plt (Recon)
- CHEM Plt (BIDS)
- HQs Security Force/ MP Bn
- Security / FP Co X2
- HQs Security Force/ MP Bn
- Security / FP Co

- DCO/DCE
- -JRMPS, EPLOs
- LNOs

TF MEDICAL

- SMART MC3T
- SMART-BURN
- THEATER EPI TM
- HHC, MED BD
- MED Co X2
- SMART-HS
- SMART-EMR
- SMART-SM
- EMEDS +25 Beds
- AERO MED EVAC TM
- HHC, MED BD (-)
- MEDLOG Unit
- MED DET (SANI)
- NBC Bio Det TM

TF SUPPORT

- HHD, SPT BD (ADVON)
- MVMT CTRL TM
- PERS DET
- HHD, AREA SPT BD (-)
- HHD, AREA SPT BD (-)
- LOGISTICS Co
- SUPPLY Co
- TRANS Spt Co
- MAINT Spt Teams X3
- MORT AFF Platoon
- ENG Spt Unit

TF AVIATION

- HHD, AV BD (ADVON)
- HHD, AV BD (-)
- AV BN (SAR)
- AV MAINT
- AV BN (MED)

*** IAW CJCS EXORD DTG: 082130ZDEC06**

TOTALS
PAX: 4,482 personnel (approx)
STON: TBD

- FORCE PACKAGE ONE
- FORCE PACKAGE TWO
- FORCE PACKAGE THREE
- NO FORCE PACKAGE

CBRNE-CM Command and Control



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Anticipated Tasks and Requirements

JTF-CS provides command and control, and coordination for the following types of tasks and requirements

JTF-CS

TF Response
Incident Site Support

- Coord w/ Local EM Director
- Facility Decontamination
- Surveying, Monitoring, and Marking of Incident Site
- Security
- C2 of Area Support
- Critical Civilian Skills Augmentation

TF Medical
Medical Support

- Triage /Treatment
- Definitive Care
- Medical Logistics
- Hospital Augmentation
- Epidemiological Support
- Agent Technical Support
- Stress Management
- Preventative Medicine
- Veterinary Support
- Prophylaxis/Immunization

TF Support
Logistics Support

- General Support Log
- JRSOI
- Displaced Populace
- Mortuary Affairs
- Transportation

TF Troops
HQ Support

- Communications
- Tech Augmentation
  - Intelligence
  - Mapping
  - Modeling
  - Weather

TF Aviation
HQ Support

- MED EVAC
- Med Lift capability
- Air Transport Personnel
- S&R
- Limited AVIM

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Joint Technical Augmentation Cell

USNORTHCOM Responsibility
JTF-CS Leadership

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

- **Effects and response analysis**
- **Computer modeling of hazard areas**
- **Decontamination considerations**
- **Specialized medical advice**
- **Recommend CONUS-based DoD CM resources**

Chem, Bio, Rad, Nuc Technical Advice & Planning Support

Foreign CBRN Incident Occurs / Credible Threat

USACHPPM, USAMRICD, USAMRIID, AFRRI

CBRNE Command (Guardian Brigade)

- **9-11 persons w/reachback**
- **Tailorable to situation**
- **Deploy NLT N+24**

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Federal HSS Response Timelines

NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex

Pre-Incident

Local Incident Response
0-48 hours

Disaster

+ 10 minutes	+ 1 hour	+ 2 hours	+ 3 hour	+ 4 hours	+ 6 hours

- Activate EMS
- Activate NDMS
- Activate the Red cross
- Activate supply distribution plans
- Convene the NDMS interagency planning group and medical inter-agency coordination group
- Initiate deployment actions for NMRT
- Alert JTF-HQ and designated IEF. Be prepared to deploy CAE
- Initiate deployment actions for 3 NDMS DMATs w/equipment
- Ascertain extent of contaminated victim access to medical treatment facilities and impact on operational status

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Federal HSS Response Timelines

NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex

Pre-Incident | **Local Incident Response** 0-48 hours | **Triage and Field Care**

Disaster

+ 12 hours

Activate USPHS

NDMS medical facilities inventory and bed report to federal coordinating facilities

Initiate deployment actions for 2 VMATs

+ 18 hours

NDMS hospitals prepare to receive evacuated pts

+ 24 hours

Initiate actions to deploy:
- 2 DMORTs
- 11 DMATs
- MST equipment cache

Assess short-term medical treatment needs of incident area population and evacuees

Prepare to terminate non-critical medical services

+36 hours

Initiate pt evacuation

Establish federal pt. movement through DoD TRACES system

Begin backfill of medical support packages from strategic national stockpile

Devise a national animal, plant, and health surveillance plan

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Federal HSS Response Timelines

NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex



Initiate deployment actions for veterinary team

Determine animal / livestock disposal options

Initiate actions to deploy additional supplies

Initiate deployment actions for all USPHS Commissioned Corps rosters

Determine animal / livestock treatment

Total Deployed Non-DoD Force:

14 DMATs w/ equipment sets

NMRT

2 VMATs

2 DMORTs

USPHS Deployable Teams

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CBRNE-CM Command and Control



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Predictive RFFs Summary

KEY CM AREAS	PLAYBOOKS								
	CHEMICAL				BIOLOGICAL		RAD	NUKE	HYE
	NPS 5 Blister*	NPS 6 TIC	NPS 7 Nerve	NPS 8 Chlorine	NPS 2 Anthrax	NPS 3 Plague	NPS 11 RDD	NPS 1 10KT	NPS 12 IEDs
Medical Care	X			X	X	X		X	
Decontamination	X				X		X	X	
Site Security SPT							X	X	
Mortuary Affairs			X	X	X			X	
Mass Care Populace SPT	X				X		X	X	

Note: This matrix is based on National Planning Scenarios. Therefore, readers must understand an actual CBRNE incident will generate different RFFs based on METT-TC

*=Persistent Agent

ARDENT SENTRY 07 EXERCISE Situation

<u>Background</u>: ARDENT SENTRY-NORTHERN EDGE 07 (AS-NE 07) is a Joint Chiefs of Staff directed, U.S. Northern Command sponsored homeland defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) exercise that took place from 30 April -17 May 2007. The Homeland Security Council designated AS-NE-07 (and the associated exercises-VIGILANT GUARD, ALASKA SHIELD, INDIANA SENTRY, POSITIVE RESPONSE 2007 National Hurricane Preparedness Exercise) as a National Level Exercise for 2007.

<u>Purpose:</u> To provide local, state, federal, Department of Defense, and non-governmental organizations and agencies involved in homeland security emergency management the opportunity to participate in a full range of training scenarios that will better prepare participants to respond to a national crisis.

-The Primary exercise events took place in Indiana and New England, as well as Alaska and its adjacent waters.

-National Planning Scenario One (detonation of a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device) was used as the focus for JTF-CS.

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ARDENT SENTRY 07 EXERCISE Situation

General Situation: At 1300Z 10 May 2007 a 10 KT improvised nuclear device was detonated Indianapolis, IN, vicinity 39.887745ºN/86.052963ºW. The device was detonated at ground level inside a large panel truck.

Incident scope and magnitude: Local and state authorities are overwhelmed with:

- Medical Care (medical staff and capacity, patient movement),
- Mass Care (sheltering, feeding, and related services)
- Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) distribution support
- Decontamination Operations
- Site Management (containment, detection /id, security and zone control)
- Mortuary Affairs Support

Actual Casualty figures:

> Actual Fatalities Reported (list source): TBP
> Actual Injured Reported (list source): TBP

Estimated Casualty figures:

> Estimated Fatalities Reported (list source): 17,000
> Estimated Injured Reported (list source): 9,000
> Estimated low risk patients (worried well): 180,000

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Ardent Sentry 2007 Concept of Support

- **Med support to decon operations:**
  - Establish two decon and triage sites south of the plume using ASMCs
  - Use additional Level II facilities to establish ground evacuation points in the NW and South sectors to support additional evacuation of patients out of the JOA
  - Support ground transportation staging for low acuity casualties to FMS & expectant casualties to palliative care center
  - **RFF: 2 X Level II facilities**

- **Hospital augmentation**:
  - Use DOD level III facility (EMEDS/SC) to assist Methodist, Wishard Memorial and St Vincent Hospitals (trauma centers) with triage and treatment capability
  - Medical logistics support to assist hospitals and distribute SNS
  - **RFF: 3 X Level III facilities; augment Med Log Co to Med Log BN**

- **Low-Risk Patient and Palliative Care Capability:**
  - Coordinate with ESF-8 to establish 3 X Federal Medical Shelters
    - Two to support low acuity patient transfers from existing medical facilities (2 X 1000 bed capacity)
    - One to support palliative care needs of severely injured/expectant casualties (1 X 1000 bed capacity)
  - Recommend use of DMATs, USPHS Medical Reserve Corps and volunteer organizations to support mass care shelters, Federal Medical Shelters (FMS) and remaining level II hospitals
  - **RFF: No additional force requirements**

- **Support NDMS evacuation operations to increase throughput**:
  - Establish a MASF at Indianapolis International Airport
  - Augment MASF with a Level III facility (150 – 300 beds) to provide additional staging and stabilization capability
  - **RFF: 1 X MASF; 1 X Level III facility**

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Take Aways

- **JTF-CS is the only standing joint operational headquarters dedicated exclusively to planning and integrating DoD forces in response to domestic CBRNE incidents.**
- **JTF-CS and the USNORTHCOM force packages provide a rapid DoD response capability, prepared to deploy and conduct CBRNE CM operations to support the NRP in protecting the public and environment from the effects of a CBRNE attack across the continuum of need.**
- **JTF-CS routinely exercises its unique DoD capabilities in planning, assessment and response to CBRNE incidents with local, State and Federal partners.**

JTF-CS is prepared to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support after a domestic CBRNE attack.

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Questions?

- **POC DCE Region VI**
  - **Bill Gross**
    william.gross1@conus.army.mil
  - **Eddie Pack**
    Ralph.Pack@us.army.mil

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Continuum of Need

Eleven of Fifteen DHS National Scenarios

Bombing Using Improvised Explosive Device

Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Blister Agent

Radiological Dispersal Devices

Plague

Aerosol Anthrax

10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device

Chlorine Tank Explosion

Nerve Agent

Food Contamination

Pandemic Influenza

HIGHER

MORE

Probability of Attack

Number of Incidents

LOWER

FEWER



Local | State | Regional | National

LESS ← Severity and Magnitude of Disaster → MORE

LIMITED ← Level of Required DoD Support → EXTENSIVE

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Deployable Teams

- **Command Assessment Element (CAE)**
  - Tailorable size of 2- 12 JTF personnel (can include JTF Commander)
  - Provides situational awareness and anticipated DoD tasks to CDR USNORTHCOM
- **Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC)**
  - Tailorable size of 1 to 6 JTF personnel
  - Provides planning support for CBRNE CM operations (including CBRNE hazards, medical, logistics, and capability assessments) to CONUS Commands
- **Joint Technical Augmentation Cell (JTAC)**
  - Tailorable size of 8-12 personnel (made up of primarily of personnel from DoD CBRNE focused agencies)
  - Provides CBRNE advice and planning support to OCONUS Commands
- **Interagency Liaison Officers (LNO's)**
  - JTF personnel designated to quickly deploy and engage with the DCO, FEMA RRCC, and JFO

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Joint Planning Augmentation Cell

MISSION: ***When directed, the Joint Planning Augmentation Cell (JPAC) provides exportable planning expertise for CBRNE CM operations.***

	Shaping	***Deployment***	***Employment***
Planned Support (Exercises, Deliberate planning, Special events)	Develop plans, such as Annex T (CM) for special events Tailor JPAC to meet needs of supported command: • CBRNE hazard assessment • Medical assessment • Logistics	Determine if on-site support required	**• Provide supported element with JTF-CS's consistent approach and methodology to consequence management planning and CBRNE event mitigation** **• Assist the supported element's staff with the preparation of courses of action and by developing concept of operations (CONOPS) and/or plans** **• Support crisis action planning for CBRNE CM operations** **• Identify follow-on forces** **• Support transition planning**
Incident Support		**Deploy NLT Notification + 4 hrs Tailored JPAC team**	

Reachback capability: Fatality management planning, detailed CM area assessment, legal planning, JOPES / force flow support, communications planning, public affairs planning

CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force

CCMRF

- **Discussion**:
- The CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) is designed to be an initial entry force for CBRNE missions. The Command Assessment Element (CAE) provides CDR USNORTHCOM with an initial Commander's Assessment that defines the scope and magnitude of the CBRNE incident. Included in the Commander's Assessment are "predictive Request For Forces (RFF)" anticipating future Mission Assignments (MA) tasked to the DoD. Catastrophic incidents, particularly those caused by nuclear detonations, with casualties exceeding 10,000 will likely generate similar MA requiring additional capabilities and force packages beyond the CCMRF. Early identification and preparation for deployment of these force packages will mitigate the effect of the inherent delay in the federal response to a catastrophic incident.

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Operational Phasing & Tasks

Phases overlap or at times are concurrent

Begin/ End

Continuous Situational Awareness & preparedness; actions include inter agency coordination, exercises

Identify potential CBRNE CM mission or directed by SecDef

Response Forces receive deployment order

Deployment

Forces ready to conduct mission

CBRNE CM response operations

Civil authorities prepared to assume responsibility

Civil authorities assume responsibility

Response forces begin redeployment and OPCON is transferred to their respective commands

PHASES

Shaping → **Staging** (Incident) → **Deployment** → **Consequence Management Operations** → **Transition**

JTF-CS TASKS

Shaping

- Preparedness
- Situational Awareness
- 24/7 Ops
- Exercise
- Interagency Coordination
- Public Affairs
- Coordination
- PI Team
- TSC Plan/ Implementation
- DIRLAUTH w/IEF
- CDRs Conf
- 0500 (Playbooks)
- Integration with: (JTF -AK, ARNORTH, JTF -NCR, NGB)
- JTF-CS Trng: (All Hands, Wed Trng, JPG, JPAC, JTAC) JTAC
- Personal Readiness
- City and State plans analysis
- BSI Analysis

Staging

- NSSE/SEHS Level 1 & 2 Support, CAE Alert/Deployment, Coordinate with state and local officials, JPAC/JTAC, BSI Recommendation, Recommend change to CCMRF Alert Posture/ CCRPL, Recommend change to Force Protection Levels, C2 Structure Recommendation, Determine scope and magnitude, Exercise DIRLAUTH, Final OPLAN modification, APOD primary and alternate location identification, CCMRF tailoring and employment, Predictive RFFs, Share assessments with subordinates; Identify required JTF -CS augmentation (SJFHQ -N, JTMD, JCOA); Execute JTF-CS LNO 2 to USNORTHCOM;

Deployment

- Establish and Conduct JRSOI
- OPCON of assigned Title 10 Forces
- adjust FPCON within the JOA
- Develop the COP
- Identify services/forces responding under immediate authority to integrate or release military commanders
- identify additional RFFs
- Develop CM movement plan
- Prepare to integrate coalition forces (TSC)
- Prepare to integrate NGO operations IAW NIMS
- Coordinate BSI support
- Integrate JTF -CS C2 element into JFO
- Integrate or receive OPCON of DCO/DCE (relief in place?)
- Undertake and report immediate response as required
- Prepare to integrate HD assets
- Commence branch plans

Consequence Management Operations

- Undertake and report immediate response as required
- Execution of assigned MAs
- Continue branch planning (PI and environment) and transition planning*
- RFFs
- Begin redeployment of CCMRF forces
- Begin Effects Based Assessment
- Track deployment and distribution cost (MA/deployment)
- Deconflict competing demands for resources
- Implement troop rotation plan

Transition

- Operational objectives achieved; JTF -CS two transition options: transition to DCO or transition to civil authorities; Consolidate cost reports; Environmental cleanup/site turnover; Deploy to follow -on or near simultaneous CBRNE incident; Redeploy forces and reconstitute CCMRF; Report costs; Capture lessons learned.

Situational Awareness

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Disaster Response Phases

Standard of Care Undefined – measured in hours to days

PHASES

Pre-Incident	Local Incident Response 0-48 hours	Triage and Field Care 48-72 hours	National Response 72-96 hours	Disposition &Transport >> 96 hours
• State/City Emergency Plans • National Response Plan • Catastrophic Incident Annex • EMS Programs Training Equipment • CONPLAN/OPLAN • Playbooks	• Local Response: Fire/Rescue HAZMAT Police • Tactical DECON • State/NG Response: CERFP ANG EMEDS EMAC • CBIRF	• Mass Triage • Definitive DECON • Life/Limb Saving Surgery • Strained Casualty to Care Provider Ratio	• Destroyed Medical Infrastructure • Mass Care • Degraded Standard of Care • Casualty to Provider Ratio • Logistics	• Mass Care • Limited En Route Care • Patient Tracking • Family & Pet Issues

TASKS

CARE LEVEL



EXERCISE
DOSE RATE – 6 Hours



Unprotected			
	Best Estimate		
	Prompt	Fallout	Total
Fatalities	7,000	8,000	14,000
Injuries	2,000	5,000	6,000
Casualties	8,000	12,000	21,000

Protected			
	Best Estimate		
	Prompt	Fallout	Total
Fatalities	5,000	532	5,000
Injuries	3,000	1,000	5,000
Casualties	8,000	2,000	10,000

FACTS

Indianapolis, IN
Location:
39.887745N/86.052963W
Time: 1300Z 10 May 2007
Type: Ground Burst
Yield: 10 kT
Weapon: IND
Weather: Historical
Model: HPAC 4.04R
Static Population Estimates:
Land-Scan 2004

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Medical Concept of Support



C2 Structure and Coordination Relationships



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Estimated Incident Effects on Populace

Estimated Displaced Populace (requiring evacuation): **250,000 total**

> Expect number of special needs evacuees: **47,500**

> Expect number of immediately orphaned children: **TBD**

Estimated Companion Pets (requiring evacuation): **44,262 total**

FEMA Priorities of effort are (DOD mission assignments are forthcoming):

- Mass casualty medical treatment (acute and definitive care)
- SNS distribution
- Site Management
- Fatality Management

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Sector Houston-Galveston

LCDR Joseph J. Leonard, Jr.
Chief, Response Department
USCG Marine Safety Unit Galveston

RRT VI Meeting

January 2008

Homeland Security

Sector Houston-Galveston

Area of Responsibility

Sector Houston-Galveston

Oil Spill Operations



Sector Houston-Galveston

Hazardous Materials Operations

Sector Houston-Galveston

Firefighting Operations

Best Practices

- Joint Training Working Group
- Joint Public Information Working Group
- Pre-Event IAPs
- Industrial Fire, Safety, and Security Conference

Homeland Security

Joint Training Working Group

- To maximize the benefits of all the JTWG member agencies by coordinating efforts that will facilitate the development, presentation and evaluation of multi-agency training.
- To provide an effective, efficient process that builds the requisite skills for optimum performance at all levels of staff. The ultimate purpose of the JTWG is to facilitate learning, networking, and interoperability.

Homeland Security

Joint Training Work Group

- Initially formed by combining training subcommittees of the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee, the Houston-Galveston Area Maritime Security Committee, and the Greater Houston Local Emergency Planning Committee.
- Extensive membership drawn from federal, state, and local government and partnerships with industry and the private sector.

Homeland Security

Joint Training Work Group

- The JTWG meets on a quarterly basis to discuss and deal with the administrative issues of the various training programs.
- There is no funding for the JTWG, nor is any anticipated or required.

Homeland Security

Training Calendar

- Forum for listing of multi-agency training opportunities—many free of charge.
- Distribution currently includes 621 individuals, many of whom forward this calendar to other recipients.
- Approximately 400 training hours conducted per month.

Homeland Security

Training Calendar

- Divided into several parts for enhanced readability, including:
  A. Meetings
  B. Training
  C. Exercises
  D. Conferences
- Notes on last page of calendar and within e-mails highlight significant changes or areas of concern.

Homeland Security

Houston-Galveston Regional Training Calendar
23 March 2007

Meetings			
Date	Activity	**Location**	**Point of Contact**
26-30 Mar 07	ICS 300 & Enhanced Incident Mgmt	Center of Excellence @ College Station, TX	Houston UASI
27 Mar 07	Deer Park LEPC Meeting	Deer Park City hall	www.deerparklepc.org
27 Mar 07	Galena Park LEPC Meeting	Alvin D. Baggett Com. Bldg.	jcchief@pdg.net
28 Mar 07	Greater Houston LEPC Meeting	Red Cross-Houston	www.houstontx.gov/fire/divisions/lepc.html
29 Mar 07	Area Maritime Security Committee Meeting	Port of Houston Authority	Tobi.Moore@uscg.mil
30 Mar 07	Emergency Preparedness & Response 101	Georgetown	DSHS
2-4 Apr 07	Incident Management/Unified Command (DHS)	Houston, TX	NERRTC (EST1)
2[illegible]	North Channel LEPC Meeting	Galena Park ISD Admin Bldg	www.nclepc.org
3-5 Apr 07	ICS 300	MSU Galveston	Joseph.j.leonard@uscg.mil
10 Apr 07	Galveston-Texas City-Freeport Port Safety Advisory Committee Meeting	TBD	Elizmeyer90@msn.com
12 Apr 07	La Porte LEPC Meeting	La Porte, TX	www.ci.la-porte.tx.us/Lepc
17 Apr 07	ICS 100/200	Spring, TX	Emily (RMA) www.rmaworld.com
18-20 Apr 07	ICS 300	Spring, TX	Emily (RMA) www.rmaworld.com
24 Apr 07	Deer Park LEPC Meeting	Deer Park, TX	www.deerparklepc.org
01 May 07	ICS 210	MSU Galveston	Joseph.j.leonard@uscg.mil
10 May 07	La Porte LEPC Meeting	La Porte, TX	www.ci.la-porte.tx.us/Lepc
15 May 07	ICS 210	MSU Galveston	Joseph.j.leonard@uscg.mil
15 May 07	Joint Training Subcommittee Meeting	Texas Medical Center--Houston	Joseph.J.Leonard@uscg.mil

Training Calendar

- Updated approximately weekly, based on input from all concerned stakeholders.
- Updates obtained from direct contact with stakeholders or via information obtained from other training calendars (such as the State of Texas Training Calendar).

Homeland Security

The Future

- Combining of Joint Training Working Group and AMSC Exercise Subcommittee to occur in February 2008.
- Semi-annual Agency Training (Federal-State-Local-Private Sector) initiated in January 2008.
- Expanded NIMS position-specific training starting February 2008.

Homeland Security

Joint Public Information Working Group

- To enhance networking and interoperability amongst public affairs personnel from federal, state, local, industrial, and private sector partner agencies.
- To provide effective public affairs training for interested parties.

Homeland Security

Pre-Event IAPs

- Serves as the bridge between the Area Plan and the Area Maritime Security Plan and an incident-specific IAP—the
- “The first ten plays out of the huddle”
- Interagency buy in at the federal, state, local, industry, and private sector levels

Homeland Security

Pre-Event IAPs

- ICS-202 (Response Objectives)
- ICS-203 (Organization)
- ICS-204 (Tactical Assignments)
- ICS-205 (Communications Plan)
- ICS-206 (Medical Plan)
- ICS-208 (Site Safety Plan)
- ICS-230 (Meeting Schedule)

Homeland Security

Pre-Event IAP Contingencies

- Type-3 Oil Spill
- Type-3 Hazardous Materials Incident
- Type-3 Vessel Fire
- Type-3 Maritime Security Incident

Homeland Security

Pre-Event IAP Locations

- Houston (completed)
- Texas City (completed)
- Offshore (completed)
- Freeport
- Galveston

Homeland Security


N
S
Image Houston-Galveston Area Council
© 2007 Europa Technologies
© 2007 Sanborn
Google
Pointer 29°43'24.11" N 95°11'18.43" W elev 24 ft
Streaming 100%
Eye alt 20147 ft

Southwest Hazards

- PTRA—Rail Tank Cars (assorted products)
  Major choke point .25 miles southwest of stack
- Kinder Morgan Tank Battery
- Pasadena Refinery
- State Highway 225 (.65 miles southwest)
- Pipelines (surface/subsurface)
- Egress/ingress

Homeland Security

Southwest Notifications

- Port Terminal Railroad Association
- Kinder Morgan
- Pasadena Refinery
- City of Pasadena Emergency Management
- Southeast Regional LEPC
- Pasadena ISD
- Harris County Emergency Management
- One Call (for pipelines)
- CAER Line

Homeland Security

Southwest Response Objectives

- Ensure the safety of responders and the general public throughout the incident.
- Implement measures to identify and protect sensitive areas.
- Take actions to control or minimize the effects of the release.
- Initiate efforts to secure the source.
- Mobilize resources for recovery and clean-up operations.

Homeland Security

Southwest Response Resources

- Responding to incident site:
  4 Chief Officers/CIMA Specialists
  4 Type-1 Engines
  2 Type-1 Trucks
  2 Type-2 Heavy Rescue Companies
  2 Type-1 Hazardous Materials Companies
  MCI-10 Response (CIMA)
  1 Type-1 Ambulance Strike Team
  4 Law Enforcement Officers

- Responding to Staging Area:
  4 Chief Officers/CIMA Specialists
  Regional Incident Management Team
  2 Command Vans
  4 Type-1 Engines
  4 Type-1 Trucks
  2 Type-2 Heavy Rescue Companies
  2 Type-1 Hazardous Materials Companies
  2 Type-1 Ambulance Strike Team
  16 Law Enforcement Officers
  2 Type-2/3 Helicopters (USCG and/or Life Flight)
  2 USCG Small Boats
  2 Port of Houston Authority Fire Boats
  USCG PADET
  PTRA Response Contractors

Homeland Security

Southwest Catastrophic Response



Homeland Security

INDUSTRIAL FIRE, SAFETY & SECURITY™

PLANNING • PREPAREDNESS • RESPONSE

www.ifssevent.com

5-8 February 2008 in Houston, TX

Homeland Security

Homeland Security

Joseph.J.Leonard@uscg.mil

Homeland Security



Sector Lower Mississippi River

July 8, 2005
December 31, 2005

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD

- Helping to correct the “Coastal only” perceptions of Region 6!
- Proud and pleased to be strong partners with Oklahoma, Arkansas, Louisiana and Region 6 EPA

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD


Kentucky
Tennessee
Oklahoma
Sector Lower Mississippi
Arkansas
Mississippi
Louisiana
0 25 50 100 150 200
Nautical Miles

Aids to Navigation Team Colfax - 64’ ANB

Work Area:
Black River,
Red River
MM 43.5 - 227

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD

Coast Guard Cutter MUSKINGUM

Homeport: Sallisaw, OK


Coast Guard Cutter KANAWHA
U.S. COAST GUARD
Homeport: Pine Bluff, AR

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD

U.S.
COAST
GUARD

U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Flotillas
Division 16

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD

Divisions 5 & 15

Join Today!

Homeland Security

U.S. COAST GUARD


JRC
COAST GUARD AUXILIARY
PATROL
AR 380 DDD
Wooldridge
Sport 2000

The one aspect of the operation heightening the excitement is the amount of noise created by the helicopter when its hovering right above your boat. It's not something for which you can prepare. BMC Dyer kept 25734 on a steady course during the entire evolution.

COAST GUARD

Coast Guard personnel periodically use the Tulsa Port of Catoosa's shipping channel to conduct training sessions. This year they emphasized "search-and-rescue" and "man-overboard" exercises.

The U.S. Coast Guard is the first line of defense of our nation's soil. Their responsibility is most often viewed as one to protect the coastal ports and shores. Less known is that they also are charged with protecting the inland waterway system, including inland ports and terminals like the Tulsa Port of Catoosa.

- Eleven Terminals
- 200-ton Bridge Crane
- Direct Transfer from Truck or Rail
- Handling and Storing of Commodities
- Safest Mode of Surface Transportation
- Connections to two Class I Railroads
- Foreign Trade Zone Services
- Industrial Sites Available

TULSA PORT OF CATOOSA®

www.TulsaPort.com

Contact the Tulsa Port of Catoosa at (918) 266-2291 or Dick@TulsaPort.com

U.S. COAST GUARD



The cooing tower is used by Arkansas No.2. The reactor units 1 and 2 can just be seen behind the trees to the right of the tower.

Aerial observation of discharge 15JAN08

Mile 200 Arkansas River

Dardanelle Tyson Plant


February 1st, 2007 - Vicksburg Bridge Allision/Fire/Spill


439.8 KINGS POINT LT.
437.3 CENTENNIAL ISLAND LT.
437.4 KLEINSTON BEAM LT.
434.4 CYPRESS BUNCH LT.
BULLETIN BOARD
SHOWING RIVER STAGE
CENTENNIAL
CUT-OFF
DELTA POINT
CASTING FIELD
Delta
MADISON
PARISH
LOUISIANA
VICKSBURG
WARREN
COUNTY
KENT
ISLAND
VERTICAL CLEARANCE =
116.3 FEET MINUS VICKSBURG GAGE.
LOWEST STEEL = 116.3 FEET N.G.V.D.
VICKSBURG BRIDGE HWY 80
CLEARANCE DATA

Near Miss on Major Spill

A great picture will give life to a story.

U.S. COAST GUARD



Mile Marker 504 LMR
Dividing line on the Mississippi River
Between Region 6 and Region 4

Joint Area Contingency Plan

- Teaming with Coast Sector New Orleans
- Keeping an active ACP up to mile 504 on the Mississippi River
- Participate in Area Committee meetings
- Populate plan with valuable, current information for 200 miles of the river between Mississippi and Louisiana.
- Connect the FOSCs for spills in this section of the river.
- Connect Sector Lower Mississippi River with One Gulf Plan.
- Bridging the boundary between Regions 4 and 6, MS and LA.

- Questions?

Sector small boat transiting Choteau Lock (No. 17) on the Verdigris River in Oklahoma.

AMT3 Benjamin Brown over the Port.

USCG SECTOR NEW ORLEANS

Regional Response Team VI

January, 2008

Discussion Points

- **High Profile Cases**
  - Mariner Energy
  - Forest Barge Explosion
- **Upcoming Events of Interest**
  - SECNOLA Area Committee Meeting (February 12, 2008, New Orleans Port Authority Building)
  - International Oil Spill Conference (May 4-8, 2008, in Savannah, GA)

MARINER ENERGY- South Pass 24



MARINER ENERGY- South Pass 24


Pressure Versus Time
Pressure (psig)
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1,200
1,180
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Time (Hrs:mins)


Temperature Versus Time
Temperature (Deg F)
105
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
Pressure Versus Time
Pressure (psig)
1,325
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1,315
1,310
1,305
1,300
1,295
1,290
19:00
19:15
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Time (Hrs:mins)


Temperature Versus Time
Temperature (Deg F)
84
82
80
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76
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20:00
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2:00
2:15
2:30
Time

MARINER ENERGY- South Pass 24

SPILL STATISTICS COMPARISION

MARINER ENERGY SPILL

- Potential – 840 gals/day
- Actual – 6,300 gals
- Location – Remote, brackish water marsh, South Pass Block 24
- Clean-up Cost - $3 M + remediation costs
- Unified Command – ICP established, USCG, LADEQ, LOSCO, LAWLF
- Media Interest – None

  No local media coverage

COSCO BUSAN INCIDENT

- Potential – 2M gals
- Actual – 58,000 gals
- Location – Recreational, public (hi-vis) area, San Francisco Bay
- Clean-up Cost - $61 M
- Unified Command – ICP established
- Media Interest – HIGH, CG press releases, local and national media coverage.

FOREST OIL BARGE EXPLOSION


Tank barge CHEROKEE
Crane barge MISS SANDY
Cheniere Pass



DAMAGE TO BARGE CHEROKEE

L SUP.
LE

SPILL STAT COMPARISION

CHEROKEE EXPLOSION

- Potential – 17,220 gals
- Actual – 126 gals recovered, 714 gals burned due to explosion
- Location – Remote, brackish water marsh, Pass A Loutre Management Area
- Media Interest – Medium

  1 CG Press Release, local and national coverage (CNN.com)

COSCO BUSAN INCIDENT

- Potential – 2M gals
- Actual – 58,000 gals
- Media Interest – High
- Location – Recreational, public (hi-vis) area, San Francisco Bay
- Media Interest – HIGH, CG, local and national coverage.

Upcoming Events of Interest

- **SECNOLA Area Committee Meeting,** February 12, 2008, New Orleans Port Authority Building.

  Topics Include: 2007 Response highlights, Industry Thank You letters, Geographic Response Plan Review (USCG), CAMEO Chemicals (NOAA), USFW Presentation

Upcoming Events of Interest

- **International Oil Spill Conference** (MAY 4-8, 2008) Savannah, GA

  SECNOLA to present paper on "The Katrina Oil Spill Response: The Road to Recovery and Post-Disaster Updates"

  Topics Include: Hurricane KATRINA overview, Future Hurricane Planning Considerations, Industry Best Practices

Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur/

Marine Safety Unit Lake Charles

Captain Thomas Sparks

Commanding Officer

Energy helping revive a region:

Houston Chronicle Jan. 19, 2008

In progress or planned

- Motiva — Refinery expansion, Port Arthur, $7 billion, 2011
- Eastman Chemical — Coal gasification plant, Beaumont, $1.6 billion, 2011
- Cheniere Energy Partners — LNG terminal, Cameron, La., $1 billion, 2008
- Golden Pass (Exxon Mobil affiliate) — LNG terminal, Sabine Pass, $1 billion, 2008

Under consideration

- Total — Refinery expansion, Port Arthur, $1.8 billion, 2010
- Valero —Refinery expansion, Port Arthur, $1.4 billion, 2010
- Sempra — LNG terminal, Port Arthur, $1 billion, 2010

MSU Port Arthur NRC Reports 2007

594 NRC Reports (as of 20 Dec 2007)



F/V GODS GIFT

Barge Break-Away Cameron Block 2 (08Jun2007)

Hurricane Humberto
13 SEP 2007

Humberto was a short-lived tropical cyclone that made landfall in extreme southeastern Texas as a strong category 1 hurricane (on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale). The hurricane is notable for its exceptionally rapid intensification near the coast of Texas from a tropical depression into a hurricane within 19 hours.






18 Oct Butadiene
23 Oct Sterling
5 Nov Tammany

Pipeline Explosion

Sterling Exploration Pipeline Discharge

Tammany Oil and Gas Pipeline Discharge




Pipeline
Gas Pipeline




HI 24L
~50 feet
35 feet
4.75 miles
3.5 miles
Beach

M/V Genmar Progress



Citgo Lake Charles Update

DBL 152 Update

?

USEPA REGION 6

RDD RESPONSE PLANS
for DHS Scenario 11

Nicolas Brescia, CHMM
USEPA R6 OSC
214-665-2291 office
214-789-8383 cell

EPA Prep Work for EPA RDD Response Plan

- Attended multiple RDD exercises(tabletop and field) with DHS/DOE/FBI and state and local agencies
- Reviewed and commented on the FRMAC NIMS Integration Document created by DOE
- R6 Assisted in the creation of our DRAFT Agency RDD response plan for the National Capitol Region
- Presented EPA's Response Plan to many Federal and State/local players at a tabletop exercise in D.C. this last year. (Much discussion on NIMS and integration occurred between DOE and EPA during the exercise)
- Attended TOPOFF 4 as an evaluator for EPA and DHS. (NIMS/Integration was an issue, No true Federal Lead)

DHS Scenario-11

- **The Universal Adversary (UA) purchases stolen CsCl to make an RDD or "dirty bomb." Cesium-137 is a high beta/gamma emitter and is harmful via ingestion/inhalation (beta) and through exposure (gamma)**
- **Devices are detonated in three separate, but regionally close, moderate-to-large cities. The cities are physically similar with geographic topography that is flat.**
- **The results in each city are essentially the same. The contaminated region covers approximately thirty-six blocks in each city and includes the business district (high-rise street canyons), residential row houses, crowded shopping areas, and a high school.**
- **Buildings in the affected areas are principally made of concrete and brick; some are stone faced.**
- **A sewage treatment plant becomes contaminated, and all transportations are now altered**

DHS Scenario 11:
Radiological Attack – Radiological Dispersal Devices

Executive Summary

Casualties-	**180 fatalities; 270 injuries; 20,000 detectible contaminations (at each site)**
Infrastructure Damage-	**Near the explosion**
Evac/Displaced Persons-	**Yes**
Contamination-	**36 city blocks (at each site)**
Economic Impact-	**Up to billions of dollars**
Potential for Multiple Events-	**Yes**
Recovery Timeline-	**Months to years**

What it will be like to manage an RDD event….

Solution to a smooth successful Unified Response

- National Incident Management System
- Unified Command using ICS
- Creating Plans and practicing together
- In this next year it is our goal to take our RDD Response Plan out to each state for discussion and familiarize all state agencies on how we plan to respond to an RDD event

Jurisdictions per NRP for an RDD

What are the Federal agencies that could respond in a significant radiological/nuclear incident?

DHS-FBI-DOE-DoD-NRC-NASA-EPA-USCG

DoD & NASA (if special material)
***DHS includes FEMA**

The National Response Plan operating in a public domain with an unknown foreign source (non DoD/NASA, NRC)

DHS:	**Lead Coordinating Agency (communication link)**
FBI:	**Lead of crisis management, criminal investigation**
DOE:	**Support of Emergency Response Operations (RAP & FRMAC)**
DoD:	**Mass Casualty Recovery/Decontamination (CBIRF & NAVY)**
EPA:	**Support of Emergency Response Operations, Leads long-term cleanup action. Supports the USCG operations in a coastal zone**
USCG:	**Leads response in coastal zone. Supports USEPA in land response operations**
FEMA:	**Funding, Interagency Agreements (IAG) and Mission Statements**
DHHS:	**Civilian Decon and Post monitoring utilizing State and Local Health Agencies**

Victim Decontamination and <u>Population Monitoring</u>

(1) External monitoring and decontamination of possibly affected victims are the responsibility of State and local governments. Federal resources are provided at the request of, and in support of, the affected State(s). DOE coordinates Federal assets for external monitoring and decontamination activities pursuant to criteria established by the State(s), in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

(2) HHS assists and supports State and local governments perform monitoring for internal contamination and administering pharmaceuticals for internal decontamination, as deemed necessary by State health officials.

(3) HHS assists local and State health departments establish a registry of potentially exposed individuals, perform dose reconstruction, and conduct long-term monitoring of this population for potential long-term health effects.

EPA's Single Event RDD Response Plan Overview

The plans presented are based on a timeline to estimate our Logistic needs for Operations. The plan incorporates EPA OSCs, EPA Special Teams (Environmental Response Team, National Decon Team, Radiological Emergency Response Team and DOE Assets). I will present our ICS 202 Form and then explain the Org Charts for specific operational periods.

(0-12 hrs)

(12-24 hrs)

(24 hrs- 5 Days)

(5 Days- 1 Month)

Go to RDD Response Plans-

Steve

Go to R6 QUICKPLACE Site- Radiation Folder- Page 2, Single RDD Event Response Plans

Significant Issues to Plan for…

- NIMS must be followed for a successful unified response (During TOPOFF 4 Unified Command and ICS failed due to the fact that some agencies had not been trained nor did they integrate into the system properly)

- Monitoring/Decontamination of affected civilians (Can State/local agencies handle this?) Remember, 20K civilians affected by some level of contamination. If state and local response agencies cannot handle this decon operation, who will be assisting them?

- Transportation cross-contamination issues with contaminated people(subways, trains, buses, etc) Checkpoints will be set-up to monitor for radiation and this will alter routes.

TEAMWORK=SUCCESS

National Significant Events

- 9/11
- Anthrax Attacks
- Ricin Attack
- Shuttle Response
- Katrina Response

- Practice with other Federal/State agencies, share ideas and use our ICS system, practice with State and Locals to prepare how we will integrate together into the ICS system
- Our Response will only be as good as we prepare for it

Questions ?

Entire Brief is UNCLAS

U.S. Coast Guard
National Strike Force

The World's Best Responders – Any Time, Any Place, Any Hazard

Homeland Security

National Strike Force Mission

Function as a "Special Team" within the National Response System (NRS) and assist USCG and EPA Federal On Scene Coordinators and other federal officials while executing responsibilities under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and the National Response Plan (NRP)

*Develop and **provide highly trained, experienced personnel** and **specialized equipment** for response to **oil** pollution, **hazardous substance** releases, and **WMD incidents** in order to protect public health and the environment.*

What We Do:

- Oil and Hazardous Chemical Response
- WMD Response including Radiological and Bio-Terrorism incidents
- Incident Command / Response Management Support
- Preparedness Exercise & Event Planning Support

Homeland Security

NSF Area of Responsibility



NSF International Response AOR



A sampling of NSF support in the International environment

Homeland Security

Response Policy

- **NSF Response Standards:**
  - 2 members dispatched immediately
  - 4 members within 2 hours notification
  - 12 members within 6 hours notification
  - Heavy equipment within 4 hours notification
  - **10-person Hazmat Team within 2 hours**

- **Response Resource Reach Back/Brokering**
  - DOE's Radiological Assessment Program (RAP) Teams
  - Civil Support Teams
  - FBI HMRU
  - DOD Explosive Ordinance Detachments
  - EPA RERT

- **Facilitate Interoperability**
  - Use standardized training and equipment

CST: Civil Support Team
NSF: National Strike Force
HMRU: Hazardous Materials Response Unit
CBIRF: Chemical Biological Response Force
EPA RERT Radiological Emergency Response Team



Homeland Security

Oil Spill Response

Equipment

- VOSS
- Inflatable Boom
- Foam-filled Boom
- Damage Assessment Tools
- SMART Gear – Flourometers & DataRams

Expertise

- Equipment Deployment
- Source Control and Removal of Oil
- Qualified FOSCRs
- Shoreline Assessment
- Site Safety
- Incident Management
- Salvage Monitoring & Liquid Transfer
- Contractor / RP Oversight

Homeland Security

Oil/Chemical Pumping Capability

- Oil pumping capabilities range from light sweet crude to heated asphalt with the Viscous Oil Pumping System (VOPS).
  - Pump types include:
    - CCN 150 (centrifugal)
    - Sloan (dewatering)
    - Multi-quip (trash pump)
    - Wildens: M1, M8, M15 (pneumatic diaphragm)
    - Desmi (DOP 250)
    - VOPS (DOP 160/250) for heavy viscous products; includes annular ring for heated water injection

- Chemical pumping capabilities cover a broad range of chemicals including Acids, Chlorine and Pesticides.
    - CCN 150 with chemical fittings/hoses
    - TK-5
    - Wilden pumps with Teflon diaphragms
    - Peristaltic

Homeland Security

Vessel/Boat Resources

Ardent Sentry Exercise

<u>NSF Inventory</u>

- 32 ft Munsons
- 23-24 ft Sea Ark/Munsons
- 17 ft RHIBs
- 15 ft Avon Inflatables
- 18 ft Jon Boats
- 14 ft Flood Response Boats

Homeland Security

HAZMAT/WMD Response

- Air and road response loads
  - Air load self supportive
  - 2-3 days before needing re-supply
- Carries Personal Protective Equipment to safely assess, mitigate, control, and remove hazards
- Containment capabilities
- Remote Sensing

Standard 48ft Trailer

- Provides long-term Hazmat Response Support
- 5000psi compressor
- Satellite including 2-way internet
- Elevated observation area
- Hot water heater
- 40-KW Generator or electrical shore tie

Standard 23-ft Hazmat trailer can be deployed via vehicle or C-130 aircraft

Homeland Security

Chemical/Biological Agent Response

- **Level A, B and C entry capability**
- **Decontamination (response personnel only)**
- **Site assessment, characterization, and mitigation**
- **Multi-media sampling (air, water, soil) for field testing and laboratory analysis**
  - Evidence/Chain-of-custody preservation
- **Industrial HAZMAT and Chemical (nerve, asphyxiant, blister) agent identification**
- **Biological agent identification**
- **Secondary device awareness and recognition**
- **Anthrax and Small Pox vaccinated**
- **EMTs / Site Safety personnel**
- **Contractor oversight**

Homeland Security

Radiological Response

- **Alpha, Beta, Gamma and Neutron detection capabilities**
- **Site assessment, characterization, and technical assistance with site mitigation**
- **Real-time dosimetry**
- **Coast Guard Level II Capable**
- **Radiological Isotope Identification Device (RIID)**
  - e.g. Thermo IdentiFINDER-U
- **Secondary device awareness/recognition**
- **Reach back capability**
  - DOE RAP
  - CBP LSS
- **Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)**

Homeland Security

Response Training & Exercise Support

- **Providing training in and technical support and expertise for:**
  - Spills of National Significance (SONS) & TOPOFF Exercises
  - National Special Security Events
  - PREP Drills
  - ICS 210, 300 and 400 Courses
  - Salvage
  - DOD Civil Support Teams
  - SCAT (Shoreline Countermeasures)
  - **S**pecial **M**onitoring for **A**lternative **R**esponse **T**echnologies (SMART)
  - VOSS/SORS/VOPS
  - Communications
  - HAZWOPER Refresher
  - International Exercises: Panama/MEXUS
  - Public Affairs/Joint Information Center staffing and training

In the Field and the ICP

Homeland Security

GST/CST Joint Terrorism WMD Exercises

July 24-26 2007
&
December 11-14 2007

Tested Interoperability among GST, AL CST (46th) and MS CST (47th)

Homeland Security

Response Management Support

- **Provide fully deployable ICS capability to fit any size of response and any type of event**
  - CO/XO can serve as Designated Incident FOSC (as appointed by FOSC)
  - Trained Planning, Operations, and Logistics Section Chiefs
  - Trained Situation, Resources, & Documentation Unit Leaders
  - Trained Division/Group Supervisors
  - ICS Position Coaching
- **Evidence collection support**
- **Resource/cost documentation**
- **Technical advice**
  - Plume/trajectory modeling
  - Chemical information
  - Safety and health issues
- **Public Affairs support**
  - Public Information Assist Team (PIAT) personnel and resources
  - Joint Information Center (JIC) assistance and operation

- **Mobile Incident Command Post (MICP)**
  - 1 unit at each Strike Team
  - Deployable by road or C-5 aircraft
  - Fully self-contained:
    - Power, heat, air conditioning
  - Communications:
    - UHF, VHF, base station, computers, 32 phone lines, & 2 TVs

MICP

ICS

Homeland Security

NSF/Strike Team Access

- **FOSCs contact us directly 24/7**
  - **There is no need for a "Request for Forces" for any service we provide**
  - We notify NSFCC and the DOG when we launch on a case
- **No message is required, just call us!**
- **If you just need information but not personnel or equipment, call us!** ***(251) 441-6601***
- **If you don't get what you need or want, call me… (251) 776-2793 (cell), anytime.**
- **Not sure what you need? Call us!**

Homeland Security

Semper Paratus

The World's Best Responders – Any Time, Any Place, Any Hazard

(251) 441-6601

Homeland Security

MEXUSGULF 2008

Captain Walter Reger
US Coast Guard

MEXUS Overview

- MEXUSGULF 2008 will be joint US-Mexico, full-scale exercise designed to test the MEXUS plan.
- Scheduled for June 3-5, 2008, the exercise will enable participating agencies to exercise the MEXUS plan protocols in a real-time, real-world fashion.
- These include conducting actual notifications, actual mobilization of personnel and response equipment across the international border and the establishment of a Joint Command Post.
- At the Command Post, exercise participants will utilize the Incident Command System to develop response strategies and tactics to mitigate the threats from a large, near-shore oil discharge.
- During the exercise, actual response and communications equipment will be deployed; this includes aircraft to test/evaluate the Regional Response Team VI Near-shore Expedited Dispersant approval process.

Participating Agencies

US Federal Government

- U. S. Coast Guard – Eighth Coast Guard District
- U.S. Coast Guard – Sector Corpus Christi
- U. S. Coast Guard – Gulf Strike Team
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Government of Mexico

- Mexican Navy
- PEMEX

State of Texas

- Texas General Land Office (TGLO)
- Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ)
- **Industry**
- The O'Brien's Group
- Garner Environmental Services Inc
- Marine Spill Response Corp (MSRC)

Exercise Objectives

- Evaluate incident notifications and field communications.
- Evaluate the process to use dispersants in accordance with the MEXUS-GULF Annex.
- Assess the process and procedures for the trans-boundary movement of personnel and equipment.
- Assess joint US and Mexican capabilities for the deployment of pollution response equipment in open water and shoreline areas.
- Establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) to provide the necessary interface between the Unified Command, media, and the public.

Planning Process & Scenario

- The exercise is being jointly designed and evaluated by the US and Mexico.
- The Exercise Design Team have been meeting to develop exercise scope, objectives, master timeline and evaluation criteria.
- Planning Conference Schedule – South Padre Island and Brownsville, TX
  - Initial Planning Conference: December 13 – 15, 2007
  - Mid-term Planning Conference: March 5 – 6, 2008
  - Final Planning Conference: April 30 – May 1, 2008
- SCENARIO: The sinking of the large vessel off the south-western coast of TX creates a major oil discharge threatening a sensitive bay-side estuary complex on southern Texas coast and the sensitive estuary complex in Tamaulipas, MX.

Pre Exercise Training

- Prior to the Exercise, there will numerous training opportunities including:
  - Incident Command System (ICS)
  - Dispersant Use Training
  - MEXUS Plan Familiarization
  - Joint Information Center & Risk Communications
  - Participant Orientation and Exercise Rules
  - Controller and Evaluator Training

- Training sessions will be made in both Spanish and English to facilitate widest participation.

Contacts and Questions

- For any questions regarding the MEXUS exercise, please contact the US Coast Guard:

LT Richard Russell

US Coast Guard

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