

May 29-30, 2013



<http://rrt6.org/>

Meeting Location:

US EPA Training Center
16650 Westgrove Drive
Addison, Texas

RRT Co-Chairs

Ragan Broyles, EPA
CAPT Ed Cubanski, USCG

Alternates

Wes McQuiddy, EPA
Michael Sams, USCG

RRT Coordinators

Steve Mason, EPA,
C (214) 789-1871

mason.steve@epa.gov

Todd Peterson, USCG

C (281) 881-6573

Todd.M.Peterson@uscg.mil

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Adobe Connect: <https://epa.connectsolutions.com/rrt6may2013-1/>

Conference Call: 866-299-3188 214-665-2292# pin

Time	Topic	Presenter /Facilitator
8:30 - 11:00 AM	Executive Committee Meeting -- Separate agenda will be developed	
11:00 AM - 1:00 PM	Lunch / Set-up for General Meeting	
1:00 - 1:30 PM	Introductions / Administrative Announcements / Opening Statements	Mr. Ragan Broyles, EPA / Captain Edward Cubanski, USCG
1:30 – 1:45 PM	Review of 2013 RRT Priorities / Status	Michael Sams, USCG
1:45 - 2:30 PM	State Reports	State Agencies Present
2:30 - 3:15 PM	Exxon Pipeline / Mayflower, AR Oil Spill Review	Nick Brescia, EPA
3:15 – 3:30 PM	Break	
3:30 – 4:15 PM	ConocoPhillips Exercise / Incident Specific RRT Exercises / Teleconferences	Greg Duncan, ConocoPhillips / Michael Sams, USCG
4:15 – 4:30 PM	Revision/Expansion of Facility Above Ground Storage Tank Fact Sheet	Steve Mason, EPA
4:30 – 4:45 PM	Sector Mobile (RRT4) and Sector New Orleans/MSU Morgan City (RRT6) Boundary Change Update	Todd Peterson, USCG
4:45 – 5:15 PM	Revisions/Signing of Regional Contingency Plan	Michael Sams, USCG / Steve Mason, EPA
5:15 – 5:30 PM	RRT Website Update	Steve Mason, EPA
5:30 PM	Adjourn	
Networking Session – Location TBD		

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Thursday, May 30, 2013

Adobe Connect: <https://epa.connectsolutions.com/rrt6may2013-2/>

Conference Call: 866-299-3188 214-665-2292# pin

Time	Topic	Presenter /Facilitator
8:00 – 9:00 AM	USCG Captain of the Port Reports	USCG COTPs
9:00 – 9:45 AM	Refresher on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)	Paul Gilbreath, DHS
9:45 – 10:00 AM	Break	
10:00 – 10:45 AM	West, TX Fertilizer Explosion & Evacuation	Mark Hayes, EPA
10:45 – 11:15 AM	Update on NRT, HQ Initiatives	Wes Mcquiddy, EPA / Michael Sams, USCG
11:15 AM -- 12:45 PM	Lunch	
12:45 – 1:15 PM	Taylor Energy Oil Spill	Sector New Orleans, USCG
1:15 – 1:45 PM	Status of ACPs (Inland / Coastal)	Michael Sams, USCG / Steve Mason, EPA
1:45 -- 2:30 PM	Federal Agency Reports	Federal Agencies Present
2:30 – 3:00 PM	Review of RRT 2013 Priorities / Updates	Michael Sams, USCG
3:00 – 3:15 PM	Wrap-Up / Moving Forward / Closing Remarks	Ragan Broyles, EPA/ Captain Cubanski, USCG
3:00 PM	Adjourn	

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

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Addison!
TEXAS



Restaurants in the Addison area

There are literally over 150 restaurants within 4-5 miles of the meeting space and the hotel


Go to: www.addisontexas.net/where_to_eat/restaurants/
to see all the restaurants in Addison, menus, prices, and locations

Executive Steering Committee Priorities for 2013



Version: 1.1

	RRT 6 Priorities	Owner	Due Date
1	Realign the Near Shore & Offshore USCG Sector Boundaries (Technical Amendment and MOA)	<i>USCG D8 District</i>	<i>01-Feb-2013</i>
2	Review/Update the RRT6 By-Laws	<i>Executive Committee</i>	<i>01-Mar-2013</i>
3	Update Regional Contingency Plan (RCP)	<i>Response Committee</i>	<i>01-Mar-2013</i>
4	Establish the RRT 6 Web Page	<i>RRT Coordinators</i>	<i>01-Mar-2013</i>
5	Develop Surface Washing Agent (SWA) Checklist/ SOP	<i>Alternative Technologies Workgroup</i>	<i>01-Apr-2013</i>
6	Leverage Virtual Meeting Technology for future RRT Meetings / Conference Calls	<i>Science and Technology Committee</i>	<i>30-May-2013</i>
7	Elect New Subcommittee Chairs	<i>All Members</i>	<i>30-May-2013</i>
8	Review Coastal (USCG) / Inland (USEPA) Boundaries and update as needed	<i>Executive Committee</i>	<i>13-Jun-2013</i>
9	Develop Endangered Species Act (ESA) Checklists/ Biological Assessments / Consultation	<i>Alternative Technologies Workgroup</i> <i>ESA Ad Hoc Workgroup</i>	<i>01-Oct-2013</i>
10	Conduct Incident Specific Conference Calls, including Exercises and Document Results.	<i>RRT Function</i> <i>(Led by Incident Specific Chair)</i>	<i>Ongoing</i>




Railroad Commission of Texas

Region 6 Response Team Presentation

Peter G. Pope, P.G.,
Aimee Beveridge, P.G.

Site Remediation Section
Railroad Commission of Texas


Shale Play Map US




*from EIA updated 9 May 2011

RAILROAD COMMISSION of TEXAS


Current and Historical Producing Oil and Gas Wells and Other Permitted Well Locations November 2012





★ Pipeline Safety Division Regional Offices

- 1. Panhandle
- 2. Midland
- 3. Kilgore
- 4. Austin
- 5. Houston
- 6. Fort Worth
- 7. Corpus Christi



Natural Gas Pipelines



Crude Oil Pipelines



Hazardous Liquids Pipelines



Railroad Commission of Texas
Oil & Gas Division
Pipeline Mapping

Legend

- Natural Gas Pipelines
- Crude Oil Pipelines
- Hazardous Liquids Pipelines

TEXAS PIPELINES


June 2012



This map was generated by the Geographic Information System of the Railroad Commission of Texas. Base map information was obtained directly from U.S. Geological Survey 1:250,000 quadrangle maps. Pipeline data were obtained from public records of the Railroad Commission. Other data sets are continuously being updated and refined. This map is intended solely for the internal use of the Railroad Commission, which makes no claim as to its accuracy or completeness. This is not a survey grade product and should not be used to define or establish survey boundaries.


**To have pipelines located prior to excavation activities call
ONE-CALL BOARD of TEXAS at 811 or 1-800-545-6005**

Texas field production of crude oil over time




Source: <http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/>

Eagle Ford Drilling Permits



Eagle Ford Shale Play



Permian Basin

Drilling Permits issued 2012 – 9,630

Drilling Permits issued 2013 – 3,380*

*as of 5/6/2013

Statewide Rule 8 Amended



SWR 8(b): “No pollution. No person conducting activities subject to regulation by the commission may cause or allow pollution of surface or subsurface water in the state.”

Amended April 2013

- Encourage water conservation
- Authorizes non-commercial fluid recycling
- Streamlines permitting requirements
- Improve safety in waste hauling.



Rule 8: Waste Hauler vehicles must be appropriate for the waste type being transported.



RRC Upcoming Rule Making Activities

Casing, Cementing and Completions 16 TAC 3.13

Update standards to ensure protection of underground sources of drinking water.

Update requirements for fractured wells when formation top is less than 1,000 ft.

Adopted May 24, 2013

Injection/Disposal Wells 16 TAC 3.9 and 3.46

Clarify existing requirements (notice, amendments)

Require all wells in area of review to have cement across permitted interval

No automatic transfers of commercial permits

Rule 36 Hydrogen sulfide




Rule 36 is designed to protect the public from the hazards of hydrogen sulfide gas in oil and gas Operations.

- **RRC Statistics on H₂S as of Nov 2012**

- **Number of Facilities with H₂S Contingency Plans** 3,224
- **Number of H₂S Gas Wells** 11,492
- **Number of H₂S Oil Wells** 191,238
- **Number of Sweetening Gas Plants** 248
- **Number of H₂S Gas Pipelines** 310
- **<http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/fielddata/h2s/SWR36Statistics.pdf>**

AREAS OF MAJOR SOUR GAS PRODUCTION IN THE STATE





CAUTION
H₂S GAS MAY
BE PRESENT

09/22/2009

RRC Statewide Rule 20



•Release Notification Rule

- Operators shall give immediate notice of a fire, leak, spill, or break to the appropriate commission district office.
-
- Notice shall be followed by a letter with full description of the event, volume of crude oil, gas, geothermal resources, other well liquids, or associated products lost.

Shell 16" Pipeline Release to Vince Bayou, Pasadena, TX

•**Volume Lost: approximately 1,000 barrels of crude oil**

- 3/29/2013 Shell control center detected a drop in pipeline pressure. The pipeline was shutdown, valves closed and isolated. Pumped fresh water into isolated pipeline to find release.
- 3/30/2013 Ground and aerial surveys were conducted but no leak/spill located.
- 04/03/13 Shell discovered oil in Vince Bayou. Sheen was contained by a berms and hard booms to prevent the crude from flowing into Buffalo Bayou, which flows into the Houston Ship Channel.
- Cleanup in water overseen by GLO, on land by RRC. EPA and Coast Guard involved.
- 04/07/2013 Continue recovery of oil and remote air monitoring along pipeline ROW
- 4/15/2013 Excavation discovery of 5 inch break along a weld. Initiation of a slurry wall to contain the oil. Removal of impacted soil and placement of boom continues.
- Pipeline repairs complete, line hydrostatically tested, site is in remediation phase.
-



Source: parting of pipe weld



Sunoco 8" Crude Oil Gathering Line Release to Otter Creek, Chester, Tyler County

Volume: approximately 550 bbls of crude oil to Otter Creek and Russell Creek

NRC Incident Report: 1039285

- **2/23/2013 Landowner finds oil in Otter Creek, spill reported to NRC by County Constable at 16:48**
- **2/23/2013 EPA, RRC, TCEQ, TPWD onsite with Sunoco on the day of the release.**
- **2/24/2013 Pipeline release is isolated, vacuum trucks in use.**
- **2/25/2013 Leak repaired. Cleanup crew of 121 manually removing oil. Skimming of oil at the source. Activities included placement of soft boom, hard boom, flushing, and manual removal of impacted vegetation.**
- **Insitu burn not a viable option because of dry conditions.**
- **Source has been excavated. Assessment of surface water and sediment.**







State Managed Well Plugging



FY 2013 Completed Pluggings:

Bay and Offshore – 30 wells, \$8.4 MM

Statewide – 548 wells, \$16.6 MM

As of May 20, 2013

State Managed Cleanup Program



•Site Remediation Biennium Contractual Budget, Goals, and Performance Measures

•Budget

- FY12: \$5.3 MM
- FY 13 Projected: \$4.3 MM

•Goals

- FY12: 253 cleanup activities
- FY 13 Projected: 243 cleanup activities

State Managed Cleanup Program




FY 2013 Completed Cleanups:

- **127 sites**
- **\$2.17 MM**

As of May 23, 2013

Active Operator Cleanups by District




NEW Public GIS Map Viewer for Oil, Gas and Pipeline Data

- Map View of Operator Cleanup Program sites
- Select “Identify Operator Cleanup Site” under Map Tools
- Pop-up box with Site identification.
- <http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/data/online/gis/index.php#>



Public GIS Map Viewer



OCP ID	1774
SITE NAME	Chapman Ranch
STATUS	Active
COUNTY	Nueces
DISTRICT	04
LATITUDE	27.6275
LONGITUDE	-97.50194




RRC Brownfields Program

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
State Brownfields Program
- Offer free Assessments and Cleanup to
local governments, non-profits, schools,
churches
- Brownfields Certificate of Completion

Helping local communities!

Contact
Peter G. Pope, Site Remediation Section, RRC
512-463-8202



Powered by Longhorns

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

20 inch pipeline rupture in Northwoods Subdivision
Mayflower, Faulkner County, Arkansas



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill ADEM

Report to USEPA Region 6

- ADEM Report to EPA Phone Duty Officer @ 1605 3/29/13

1507 Incident # 12713

Pipe Line Event

Faulkner Co

Local Coordinator reported an Exxon crude oil pipeline has been ruptured at 44 Starlite Road North in Mayflower. The release of crude oil is ongoing at this time. Rate of flow is unknown. Approximately 50-60 homes have been affected as well as a release into Lake Conway. No evacuations have been made. Residents are sheltering in place at this time. Faulkner County Judge has verbally declared. Conway and Pulaski County Hazmat Teams are in route as well as a response crew from Exxon.

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

NRC Reports

- **NRC # 1042466 taken at 1706, March 29, 2013**

ExxonMobil Pipeline Company reported a pressure drop in a subsurface pipeline with an unknown amount of discharged crude oil at 1315

No damages or closures reported at this time

OSRO in route to scene

- **NRC # 1042476 taken at 1904, March 29, 2013**

ExxonMobil Pipeline Company reported the incident may be a significant material release with an unknown amount of discharged crude oil

Under Damages, **an evacuation was reported at this time**

Shutdown system and all the valves are closed

Release has not been secured, and release duration is 3 hours

Initial Emergency Response Actions taken by Faulkner County and City of Mayflower-What was happening on the ground

Evacuation of residents in the Northwood Subdivision

Blocked culverts into the main body of Lake Conway

Installation of dikes and underflow dams along the main drainage area from the spill location to the Lake Conway cove area

***These actions limited the environmental impact to a localized area**




ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Actions Taken

- EPA Phone Duty Officer activated EPA Response Duty FOSC
- EPA FOSC contacted ADEM
- EPA FOSC contacted ADEQ & Local Emergency Manager
- EPA FOSC activated EPA START and deployed
- EPA FOSC arrived on site at 2230

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill Organization – On Scene

- Mayor of Mayflower
- County Emergency Manager
- Faulkner County Judge
- Mayflower Fire Chief
- Mayflower Streets Dept
- ExxonMobil Pipeline Company
- ADEQ
- ADEM
- USEPA
- USDOT



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill Assessment

- FOSC Brescia conducted a site walk with ExxonMobil Pipeline President, Faulkner County Judge, and ADEQ SOSC from the source location to the cove of Lake Conway and determined the spill to be a Major
- Approximately 62 homes in the Northwoods Subdivision had been evacuated due to the release (Initial detections of VOCs and Benzene Exceeded Public Health Levels in multiple locations at the source and collection sites)
- ExxonMobil had cleanup contractors on site conducting vacuum operations at multiple pooled oil locations, deploying boom, and had ordered in additional cleanup contractors along with the ExxonMobil North American Regional Response Team (NARRT)
- Initial estimates provided to the USEPA FOSC by ExxonMobil was that approximately 2,000 bbls had been released, however the amount was believed to be larger and would be staffed accordingly

ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill

Air Monitoring and Sampling

ExxonMobil and USEPA START conducted stationary and roving air monitoring at the source location, within the neighborhood, and at multiple locations along the spill pathway. This began after the spill occurred and continued until levels remained below Public Health Action Levels.

As part of the Unified Command Home Residential Re-entry Plan, ExxonMobil and USEPA START have offered to provide air sampling to the 22 homes in the impacted area of the Northwoods Subdivision. Currently, 13 homes have been sampled. DOH then reviews the results and meets with the resident to discuss analyses. Once house is clear, resident can return. Currently 22 homes are still evacuated.



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Source Location between two houses in Northwoods Subdivision



Oil migrated from source down North Starlite Rd



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Oil migrated behind homes and between homes on North Starlite Rd



Oil migrated down North Starlite Rd



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Oil behind homes on North Starlite Rd



Oil migrated into drainage ditch, under Main Street and into a ditch



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Oil migrated from the ditch into an unnamed creek



Oil migrated from the unnamed creek under State Highway 365, under Interstate I-40 West



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

**Oil migrated under I-40 West
into the Cove of Lake Conway**

**Oil migrated into Cove of Lake
Conway**



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Impacted Cove



Impacted Cove



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Overview of Lake Conway Cove area impacted by the spill



Overview of Northwood subdivision impacted by the spill



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill ICS/Unified Command Stood Up

- ICS/Unified Command stood up at the Mayflower City Hall Office within the first 12 hours of the spill
- Unified Command consisted of:
USEPA/ADEQ/Faulkner County/ExxonMobil
- Initial ICS 201 created with objectives for 24 hr Ops period, IAP created within 3 days
- ExxonMobil began ordering additional resources (vacuum trucks, frak tanks, hard and soft boom/pads, skimmers, cleanup personnel, etc), NARRT en-route



ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill

Peak of Response-On the Ground

Personnel on Site (250 in Command Post/ 440 in Field)

- 1 USEPA FOSC, 2 USEPA PSCs, 2 USEPA OSCs, 1 EPA PIO
- 1 ADEQ SOSC, (15 State Personnel including ADEQ, ADOH, Arkansas Game & Fish)
- 1 LOSC (Faulkner County Judge)
- 28 City of Mayflower Personnel (Fire Dept/Police Dept/Streets/Public Works)
- 1 USDOT
- 1 USFWS
- 663 ExxonMobil personnel and contractors (ExxonMobil NARRT and Contractors)

ExxonMobil Assets on Site(Not including vessels, marsh equipment, etc.)

- 23 Vacuum Trucks
- 85 Frac tanks
- 9,593 ft Hard Boom
- 241,290 Soft Boom

ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill

Released Amount, Recovered Oil and Waste Streams

ExxonMobil estimates 5,000 bbls released

Oil/Water Recovered: 28,489 bbls

Roll Off Box Totals:



	Oily Soil	Oily Debris	Wood Chips	Vac Boxes	Total
Landfill	381	239	281	12	913
Conway	29	9	0	82	120
Total	410	248	281	94	1033

ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill

Neighborhood Cleanup

- Vacuumed free oil (surface and sub-surface)
- Pressure washing of impacted roads
- Excavation of oiled trees and impacted soil
- Removal and replacement of storm drain, water lines, driveways, asphalt, etc.
- Removal of the damaged pipeline
- Removal of oiled HVAC systems and electrical conduit
- Planned removal of impacted soil under foundations
- ExxonMobil offered residential buyout for the Northwoods subdivision

ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill

Neighborhood Cleanup

Excavated soil around foundations of homes



Excavation of Storm Water line along North Starlite Rd



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Cove of Lake Conway Cleanup

- Utilization of Vacuum trucks to remove free oil on water
- Utilization of skimmers, absorbent pads/boom
- Utilization of hard boom and skirts to contain oil to sections
- Utilization of Marsh Equipment for removal of oiled vegetation/soil
- Utilization of water flushing methods to remove residual oil from soil/sediment
- Utilization of wood chippers to reduce oiled vegetation waste
- Utilization of pumps to regulate water in cove for rain events and for cleanup purposes

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Cove of Lake Conway Cleanup

Cleanup along North Side



Cleanup along South Side



ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill Cove of Lake Conway Cleanup

**Marsh Operations removing
oiled vegetation**



**Marsh Operations using hard and
soft boom**



ExxonMobil Mayflower Spill Federal Funding

FPN Ceiling: \$600,000

PRFA issued to USFWS
for \$17,500, this was
essential to assist
state wildlife agencies
with a spill this size



ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Challenges

- Sequestration impacted how USEPA managed resources
- Joint Information Center was needed at the beginning to be staffed from the State and Federal level at a more accessible location for media
- Complex/Tedious cleanup techniques required due to foundations and utilities in neighborhood areas
- Amount of waste generated and limited staging areas in Mayflower

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Challenges

- Home Re-entry Plan: Scheduling with residents for the process including indoor air sampling and the delay time for results to be validated and reviewed
- Multiple agencies involved and the coordination between them for sampling, reviewing results, conveying to residents, and etc.
- Public meeting coordination and uniform media access
- State Agency operating outside of the Unified Command structure conducting independent sampling activities (Arkansas Attorney General Office)

ExxonMobil Mayflower Oil Spill

Lessons Learned

- An established ICS/Unified Command is essential between all agencies and the RP for a successful response
- A Local On Scene Coordinator(County Judge/etc) within Unified Command is essential and critical to ensure the impacts to the community are being addressed in a timely manner

TEAMWORK=SUCCESS

- Special Thanks to Faulkner County Judge Alan Dodson for assisting in the response efforts and for being engaged daily for the people of Faulkner County, Arkansas
- Special Thanks to ADEQ SOSC Dean Vanderoff for assisting in the response effort and for assisting the USEPA FOSC on all state issues
- Special Thanks to the USEPA Region 6 OSCs that assisted in providing oversight in this response (Rhotenberry, Mason, McAteer, Smith, Martin, Leos, Todd)

Cove of Lake Conway

Final Site Walk completed May 22, 2013

Cove three weeks ago



Cove today






ConocoPhillips.



GoM 2013 Exercise Summary
Greg Duncan, Senior HSE Coordinator
Regional Response Team Presentation

AGENDA

- Background Information
 - Thorn Overview
 - Tiered Incident Management
- Exercise Overview
- Concept of play
- Goals & Accomplishments
- Successes
- Opportunities

2013 Deepwater Activity - Thorn

- Thorn prospect spud date: late April, 2013
- Location is in 6,915 ft of water in Walker Ridge 460
- Transocean Deepwater Champion
- Total depth of the well is planned at 23,000 ft



Re-entry into post-Macondo GoM Exploration

Crisis Management and Emergency Response Framework

- Tiered response arrangement
- Structured to facilitate global mobility, readily scalable
- Utilizes universal principles of the Incident Command System (ICS)

TIER 3

Affects credibility of company
Very low probability

TIER 2

Exceeds site's capabilities
Low frequency

~100+ Crisis Support Personnel

Integrated team of trained
Emergency Response resources
Located globally


110 GIMAT Personnel

TIER 1

Majority of events locally managed

~1000+ COP Tier 1 Personnel


~500 Contract Responders



Comprehensive response structure ... readily expandable

Thorn Deepwater Exercise Overview

- Three-day exercise conducted April 2-4, 2013
- Based on a worst-case discharge from the Thorn Deepwater Exploration Well
- Exercise included both reactive and proactive/strategic phases of response
- Command-post-style exercise with Unified Command (OMINI Hotel – Houston)
- Tiered Incident Response:
 - Gulf of Mexico (COP GoM) Incident Management Team (IMT)
 - Global Incident Management Assist Team (Global IMAT)
 - Crisis Management Support Team (CMST)



CONCEPT OF PLAY

- Exercise started at hour 0
- First two days of exercise represented first 48-hour operational period
 - Ramp up – On Call Team plus GOM IMT plus GIMAT
 - Players develop and work off of an ICS 201 Incident Briefing Package
 - Players develop first Incident Action Plan (IAP)
- Time jump after Day 2 of the drill to Day 7 of Incident
- Day 3 of Drill - Operational Period 6

Date	April 2 nd	April 3 rd	<i>Simulated</i>				April 4 th
Day	Tuesday	Wednesday					Thursday
Drill Day	1	2					3
Incident Day	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Operational Period	1		2	3	4	5	6

Goals & Accomplishments

- Meet national Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) requirements
- Exercise COP Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan, Thorn Responsible Party (RP) Checklist and the New Orleans Area Contingency Plan (ACP)
- Exercise branch planning for source control and shoreline protection
- Source control
 - Source control tactical planning and integration with other Incident Command System (ICS) functions
 - Subsea dispersant operational planning, resourcing and approval process with regulators (Submitted plan prior to exercise to RRT)
 - SIMOPS
 - Use well flow modeling to develop plans for shutting-in the well
 - Knowledge sharing with Global IMAT



Goals & Accomplishments

- Documentation – optimization of Incident Action Planning (IAP) software
- Media/communications – ongoing support plus major press conference held
- Common Operating Picture – multi-layered Incident Situation Map
- Coordination and communication between deepwater wells and GoM business units
- Regional Response Team (RRT) consultation
 - Included NOAA, EPA, State of Texas, State of Louisiana, DOI, USCG and BSEE
- Robust Evaluation Team (internally/externally staffed with SMEs)



Successes

- Well-organized exercise
- Planning benefited from an integrated design team that collaborated well over many months
 - GCBU, Deepwater Drilling, Exploration, HSE/CM&ER
- Achieved regulatory Annual Oil Spill Exercise of the COP GoM Regional Oil Spill Plan
- Large exercise for COP
 - 165 IMT participants at OMNI Hotel (COP, contractors, response entities and regulators)
 - 42 CMST participants at COP complex EOC (8 of 18 Functional Support Teams)
- Three-day exercise was aggressive and in scope\objectives on par with recent exercises by other UG GoM operators
- Step change in COP response areas:
 - Source control – capping, subsea dispersant, blow-out modeling, relief well planning
 - SIMOPS – tested COP processes that are being leveraged across the industry
 - Common Operating Picture technology – improvements continue
 - Interaction with Regional Response Team (RRT) for dispersant use
 - Unified Command Structure and ICS evident – institutionalized
 - Integration of CMST
 - Environmental Unit capabilities

Opportunities

- ▶ Decision from RRT on Sub Sea Dispersant Plan
- ▶ Continue to promote Knowledge Sharing and response SME outside of drills
- ▶ Continue to build knowledge base of source control details: sub-sea capping, blow-out modeling, etc.
- ▶ Continue to build source control and operations section integration

Summary:

- ▶ Program delivered stated objectives:
 - Exercise response capabilities prior to re-entry of operated exploration drilling in the GoM
 - Achieve regulatory requirements
- ▶ Collaboration among key groups ahead of Thorn drilling activity was enhanced
- ▶ Exercise illuminated continual improvement opportunities for IMT/GIMAT, CMST and others

Questions & Discussion



Hurricane and Flood Preparedness for Aboveground Storage Tanks: *RRT-6 Recommended Best Practices*



Region 6 RRT

State of Arkansas

State of Louisiana

State of New Mexico

State of Oklahoma

State of Texas

U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency

U.S. Coast Guard

U.S. Department of Agriculture

U.S. Department of
Commerce/NOAA

U.S. Department of Defense

U.S. Department of Energy

U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services

U.S. Department of the Interior

U.S. Department of Justice

U.S. Department of Labor

U.S. Department of
Transportation

Federal Emergency Management
Agency/DHS

U.S. General Services
Administration

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission

U.S. Department of State

Due to the number and size of spills after hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the RRT-6 Executive Committee charged the Science and Technology Committee to review best practices: why some tanks failed, and why some tanks did not, and create a best practice.

The investigation of spills revealed that nearly all tanks failed due to one of three reasons. These reasons include storm surge, flooding or impact.

Typically the tanks that survived the event either had more product in them, and/or were securely anchored down to the ground surface.



Flooding hazard was looked at from a very basic viewpoint of raising water due to river/stream, rainfall, or snowmelt; while a storm surge was defined in layman terms as a wall of water of unknown size being pushed towards land from an impending storm.

The last cause, impact, is also the most difficult to prepare for. Whether it is a hurricane or flood event, debris is inevitable.

The tanks that had releases due to flooding and storm surge events eventually floated.

This was directly due to the surface area to weight ratio of the tanks and their contents to the external water level.

Once the external water level becomes equal to or greater than the product level inside the tank, the tank becomes buoyant.

A rule of thumb, repeated several times by industry representatives, is the contents should be at least 3-6 feet above the projected actual water level, based on the storm surge or event causing a rise in water level. This will help to prevent floatation, and not just above the ambient non-event water level.


In addition, the product level to water level ratio is dependent on the type of product contained in the tank (Density / Specific Gravity with respect to water.) For example, a tank of gasoline would need a higher volume than a tank of asphalt.



Response plans for facilities located in high-risk areas, including but not limited to, coastal environments, flood plains, in/or near deltas, base of mountains, swamps or marshes, must address this issue.

These plans should outline specific risk factors and timelines in preparing for storm events. Facilities located away from these areas or “off water” can better predict the amount of water that will affect their tanks.

Generally the limiting factor affecting tanks in off-water facilities are the secondary containment areas and the “rule of thumb” from above can be used. No matter the location, the plan should also address the piping and valves associated with the tanks.



The best practice is to have a Storm Plan included in facility response plans.

The best practice for tank preparation is to have all tanks and piping securely anchored and the tanks should be either empty or full of water. This way there is less risk of a release and the tank becoming impacted by an object, thus causing a release from another source.

Some events do not allow an appropriate time frame to accomplish these items for all tanks at a facility.

In general, full and / or anchored tanks and piping are stronger, and greatly increase the probability the tank will survive the storm event.

Report Oil or Chemical Spills to the National Response Center: 800-424-8802

This document does not substitute for specific agency regulations, nor is it a regulation itself. It cannot impose legally binding requirements on federal departments/agencies, states, or the regulated community, and may not apply to a particular situation based upon circumstances. This guidance does not represent any final department/agency action, and may change in the future, as appropriate.



Sector Realignment


Sector New Orleans



MSU Morgan City



Sector Mobile






Why?

1. Aligns CG COTP AORs with the State boundaries near shore, and follow an offshore line that better correlates with Outer Continental Shelf Features
2. Eliminates undesirable regulatory complexities in dealing with multiple States.
3. Adjusts RRT boundaries to correlate with respective State boundaries:
 - RRT 4- Mississippi
 - RRT 6- Louisiana




Current Boundary






USCGC COTP Changes






Current & Proposed Boundaries






Current & Proposed Boundaries






Pearl River





Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Process





Questions



Todd Peterson

Eighth Coast Guard District
District Response Advisory Team (DRAT)
Room 1330
500 Poydras Street
New Orleans, LA 70130
(work) 504-671-2232
(cell) 281-881-6573
Todd.M.Peterson@uscg.mil

Region 6 Regional Contingency Plan Volume 1



Final: 05/29/2013

Volume 1: Region 6 RRT Regional Contingency Plan (RCP)


Volume 2: Region 6 Inland Area Contingency Plan (ACP)

Volume 3: Region 6 Coastal Area Contingency Plan (ACP)

Volume 4: Region 6 Supporting Documentation for Plans


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d.	Department of Agriculture (USDA)
e.	Department of Commerce (DOC)
f.	Department of Defense (DOD)
g.	Department of Energy (DOE)
h.	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
i.	General Services Administration (GSA)
j.	Department of Justice (DOJ)
k.	Department of Labor (DOL)
l.	The Department of State (DOS)
m.	Department of Transportation (DOT)
n.	Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
o.	Department of the Interior (DOI)
p.	State of Arkansas
q.	State of Louisiana
r.	State of New Mexico
s.	State of Oklahoma
t.	State of Texas





U.S. Coast Guard District 8 Captain of the Port (COTP) Reports





6/4/2013


USCG COTP Reports



MSU Morgan City



Captain Jonathan Burton
MSU Commanding Officer



NRC Notifications	RRT Activations	Federal Projects	CERCLA Projects
635	00 Surface Washing Agents 00 In-situ Burns 00 Dispersants	00	00



SUNK CEMENT BARGE

Captain Jonathan Burton
MSU Commanding Officer

**RRT Activation:**

No

Type and amount of product spilled:

50 gallons Produced Water/Diesel Discharge

Cause of spill:

Barge sank due to compromised integrity of structure; overweight and cracked hull

Time & date of spill:

30 April 13

Responsible Party:

Saratoga Energy

Key operational activities:

LAD Salvage hired to refloat sunken barge and transit to dry dock

Major lessons learned:

Lack of site safety & situational awareness by operator. Poor engineering design, not fit for safe voyage due to less than one foot of freeboard & additional helicopter flight deck

Lead Coordinator Contact Information:

MST3 Evan Bledsoe/ENS Ryan Harrison





MSU Morgan City

Meetings

Description	Dates
Area Committee	06Mar
GRP (w/ state)	16Apr

Training

Description	Dates
FOSCR	12-15May
Booming (AMPOL)	Feb


Drills/Exercises

Company (exercise lead)	Date
GoMex Energy (BSEE)	30Jan
Black Elk (BSEE)	08Apr
Noble/ Helix (BSEE)	23-29Apr
LOOP (industry)	16May
Hilcorp (industry)	? Sep




NRC Notifications

Oil Discharges



Breakdown of Reports







MSU Port Arthur



Captain George Paitl
MSU Commanding Officer



NRC Notifications	RRT Activations	Federal Projects	CERCLA Projects
138 MSU Port Arthur <u>102 Lake Charles</u> 240 Total	00 Surface Washing Agents 00 In-situ Burns 00 Dispersants	00	01



Mystery Cylinders 24JAN13

Captain George Paitl

MSU Commanding Officer



RRT Activation:	N/A
Type and amount of product salvaged:	11mystery containers various sizes (Unknown quantity); Five 5gallon unmarked buckets; 1 container with Anhydrous Ammonia (Unknown quantity)
Cause of spill:	N/A
Time and date of discovery:	Approximately 1100 CDT, 24 January 2013
Responsible Party:	Unknown
Key operational activities:	Opened CERCLA fund, monitor contractor cleanup, Conference Call with NPFC/SILC for permitting/disposal issues
Major lessons learned:	Ensure OSRO's permits allow for misc transportation of hazmat
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur; ENS Jeremy Leggett





Orphan Well SN# 175836 (Ongoing)

Captain George Paitl

MSU Commanding Officer



RRT Activation:	N/A
Type and amount of product spilled:	Natural Gas Condensate
Cause of spill:	Broken Well Head
Time and date of spill:	17JUL2012 -LA State reported sheen from condensate on site visit
Responsible Party:	Unknown
Key operational activities:	Coordination with LA Office of Conservation Oilfield Site Restoration, NPFC, SILC
Major lessons learned:	<ul style="list-style-type: none">-Need more guidance within organization on orphan well response procedures.-Need more Federal funding for P&A cases involving sporadic discharges of non recoverable product.
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	Marine Safety Unit Port Arthur; ENS Jeremy Leggett





MSU Port Arthur

Meetings

Description	Dates
SETX/ SWLA AC MTNG	21 MAR
SETWAC	25 APR
JEFFCO LEPC	Multiple Dates
Sabine Neches Chiefs	Multiple Dates

Training


Description	Dates
FOSC-R	20-24 May
Boom	21 May
ICS (Multiple Courses)	Multiple Dates
SCAT	Multiple Dates

Drills/Exercises

Big Hill- Pipeline Rupture	14-17 January
Merit Energy Unannounced Drill	8 April
COOP Hurricane Exercise	9-10 May




U.S. Coast Guard District 8 Captain of the Port (COTP) Reports







Sector Corpus Christi




NRC Notifications	RRT Activations	Federal Projects	CERCLA Projects
190	0 Surface Washing Agents 0 In-situ Burns 0 Dispersants	6	4



SABCO



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount:	Potential: 7700 bls/323,400 gl med crude
Cause of spill:	Hole in the tank on the platform, caused by sounding stick repeatedly being dropped in the sounding tube causing a puncture in the bottom of the tube
Time/date of spill:	April 30 th – May 2 nd
Responsible Party:	SABCO
Key operational activities:	Personnel monitored the transfer of product from the platform tank to tank barge EMS2604 Response by: CG/GST, TGLO, NOAA, TP&W, Railroad Commission
Major lessons learned:	Limited availability of offshore resources, Remote/sensitive location of impact (Matagorda Island), Private Property
Lead Coordinator Contact Info:	MSTC David Creager David.B.Creager@USCG.MIL





M/V CLIPPER TRUST



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount of product spilled:	Approximately 1100 gallons fuel oil on deck, 1000 gallons into the waterway
Cause of spill:	The valve on the #2 fuel tank failed allowing fuel oil to continue to be pumped to the tank, eventually overflowing through the vent. High level & overfill alarms were inoperable
Time and date:	May 15 th at 0100
Responsible Party:	M/V CLIPPER TRUST
Key operational activities:	USCG Personnel (IMD, FAC, IO, PSC) monitored cleanup operations and conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the discharge
Major lessons learned:	Inaccurate/confused reporting by RP delays and makes discharge estimates a challenge early in the response
Lead Coordinator Contact Info:	MST1 Gordon Bellinger Gordon.H.Bellinger@USCG.MIL





Sector Corpus Christi

Meetings

Description	Dates
Area Committee	3 Jun 2013

Drills/Exercises

Description	Dates
Government Led PREP Full-Scale Exercise	16-20 Sep 2013

Training


Description	Dates
FOSCR College 45 students: CG, TCEQ, TGLO	4-7 Mar 2013
Spill Control course 25 students: CG, TCEQ, TGLO	7-8 Mar 2013
SCAT Course 20 students: CG, TCEQ, TGLO	7-10 May 2013



Sector Houston-Galveston



Captain James Whitehead
Sector Commander



NRC Notifications	RRT Activations	Federal Projects	CERCLA Projects
157	02 Surface Washing Agents 00 In-situ Burns 00 Dispersants	03	00



F/V CAPT HUNTER

Sector Houston-Galveston



RRT Activation:	None
Type and amount of product spilled:	Diesel fuel – 400 Gallons (Potential) Lube oil - unknown
Cause of spill:	Engine Room Fire
Time and date of spill:	1000 CDT, 12 April 2013
Responsible Party:	F/V CAPT HUNTER
Key operational activities:	Search and Rescue (Sector Houston Command Center), Monitoring firefighting, media relations.
Major lessons learned:	Immediate media interest, waterways management, activated Public Affairs Detachment early and coordinated with media.
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	MSU Texas City; MST1 Joe Byrne MST1 Christina White

6/4/2013

COTP Reports





Shell Pipeline

Sector Houston-Galveston



RRT Activation:	None
Type and amount of product spilled:	Crude Oil – 940 Barrels
Cause of spill:	Ruptured/ Weld Failure Pipeline
Time and date of spill:	1408 CDT, 29 March 2013
Responsible Party:	Shell
Key operational activities:	Conduct investigation, monitor containment, monitor clean up, unified command.
Major lessons learned:	Multiple layers of jurisdiction, Emergency Operations Centers
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	Sector Houston Galveston; MST1 Joel Blanchard





Sector Houston-Galveston

Meetings

Description	Dates
CTCAC	06 Jun
CIMA	Monthly
LEPC	Monthly

Training

Description	Dates
Pollution <u>Investigator</u>	Oct 2013
Offshore Well Control	Oct 2013

Drills/Exercises

BP – Pipeline Rupture*	15-16 January
Conoco Phillips Offshore Spill*	2-4 April
Sector Hou/Gal HURREX 2013	22-25 April
Sunoco – Gasoline Spill	14-15 May
Strategic Petroleum Reserves	22-23 May



Sector Houston-Galveston






Sector New Orleans



Captain Peter Gautier
Sector Commander



NRC Notifications	RRT Activations	Federal Projects	CERCLA Projects
655	00 Surface Washing Agents 01 In-situ Burns 00 Dispersants 01 Taylor Energy consult	05	01



Black Elk Energy Platform Fire

Captain Peter Gautier

Sector Commander



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount of product spilled:	Approx 08 gal/crude oil (WCD: 1300 Bbls)
Cause of spill:	Hotwork operation on a 3" flowline connected to a crude oil tank caused an explosion. Tanks with residual product entered the water.
Time & date of spill:	1000/16-Nov-12
Responsible Party:	Black Elk Energy
Key operational activities:	SAR case: 1400 sq miles searched over 33 hours, 20+ non-essential personnel evacuated, 11 injuries req'd MEDEVAC, 2 fatalities (1 found a week later). Multiple CG & civilian surface/aerial assets. CGA skimmer Grand Bay deployed for pollution – no recoverable product. Two tanks blown off side of platform after explosion identified as the source = minor sheening. High media interest. Platform shut in & not producing. Workers were making preparations to put it back on line.
Major lessons learned:	Communications vital between SAR assets, USCG/BSEE joint investigation and pollution response. Coordination with BSEE early for RP identification/platform info. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7T8lwxt0moQ
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	MST2 Christina Pierce





Bayou Sorrel In-Situ Burn

19 Jan 13

- On 9JAN13 received notification of a pipeline rupture from a 2 mile transfer line, discharging oil into a swamp area
- Original report was 10 barrels
- Soil in area saturated due to suspected long term leak, during clean-up oil has been leaching into the water
- 180 Barrels skimmed and 550 cubic yards of debris recovered



ORB Exploration, Bayou Sorrel

USCG & NOAA Site Visit



N 30° 11.552' W 091° 27.285'

333 ft

01/18/2013 9:35:40 AM

ORB Exploration, Bayou Sorrel

USCG & NOAA Site Visit



N 30° 11.460' W 091° 27.236'

13 ft

01/18/2013 12:50:03 PM





ORB Exploration, Bayou Sorrel

USCG & NOAA Site Visit



N 30° 11.458' W 091° 27.244'

01/19/2013 4:21:53 PM



In-Situ Burn

- 3 burns conducted & self extinguished
 - Estimated 20-30 barrels burned
 - Cleared out underbrush & enhanced accessibility
- Lessons Learned- more aggressive corralling of oil, more resources earlier





MP-295 Loss of Well Control

Captain Peter Gautier

Sector Commander



RRT Activation:

No

Type and amount of product spilled:

No Discharge- Underground Blowout; causing gas breach between depths of 8000' up to 1000'. WCD from "dry gas" condensate or oil/water mixture

Cause of spill:

Blowout caused by kick (pressure surge) while drilling an exploration well Ensco 87 jack up rig 33 miles east of Venice – blowout preventers at sea floor activated

Time & date of spill:

1040/14-Feb-2013

Responsible Party:

Apache Corporation

Key operational activities:

15 non-essential personnel evacuated. Gas intermittently detected on surface indicating slight seepage through surface connections. Contingency plan activated for possible relief well (another drilling rig deployed to scene). Apache able to regain well control by pumping barite plugs (heavy drill mud) without the need to drill a relief well --- 2700 psi down to 300 psi in 6 days. OSRO and SMT placed on standby. 87' patrol boat on scene as C2 platform for worst case.


Major lessons learned:

Safety remains first priority due to projected worst case scenarios. Worst case scenarios included whether the wellhead would begin to leak or if gas breached beyond the depleted zone @ 1000 ft. Showed need for more formal and timely comms between BSEE & FOSC.

Lead Coordinator Contact Information:

LCDR Brian Khey

COTP Reports





16000
Serial #CID-13-0135

15 APR 2013

Bureau of Safety & Environmental Enforcement
Gulf of Mexico OCS Region
ATTN: Mr. Lars Herbst, Regional Director
1201 Elmwood Park Boulevard
New Orleans, LA 70123-2394

Dear Mr. Herbst:

As Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) oil and gas activities continue to expand, close coordination between the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) becomes even more critical. Recent events, such as the Apache Main Pass 295 well control incident, further highlighted the value of early and close collaboration between our respective agencies. Understanding that emergent issues on the OCS that fall under one of our agency's primary jurisdiction often impact decisions and actions by the other agency, we tasked our staff to develop a list of such occurrences that require immediate notification from one agency to the other. Our staffs are already initiating these notifications at the USCG field unit and BSEE District level and we look forward to better formalizing this process through continued partnership with your organization.

Staying in line with BSEE's reporting requirements prescribed in 30 Code of Federal Regulations § 250.188, we request BSEE Districts notify USCG Sector New Orleans or Marine Safety Unit Morgan City of the following occurrences.

- All losses of well control
- All fires and explosions
- All incidents that damage or disable safety systems or equipment
- Any BOP EDS (Emergency Disconnect Sequence)
- Any occurrence that requires evacuation of personnel from an OCS unit
- All reportable releases of hydrogen sulfide (H₂S) gas, as defined in § 250.490(l)
- All collisions that result in property or equipment damage greater than \$25,000

USCG Sector New Orleans and Marine Safety Unit Morgan City will notify the appropriate BSEE Districts of the following occurrences.

- Any reported Dynamic Positioning (DP) failure
- Any deficiency resulting in rescission of the Certificate of Inspection or Certificate of Compliance for a Floating Offshore Installation (FOI) of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU)
- Any reported degradation in power generation/management system
- Any reported stability/marine issue where personnel or unit are at risk

Recommend all notifications from BSEE, for incidents that occur in the Sector New Orleans or MSU Morgan City OCS area of responsibility, go directly to the Sector New Orleans Command Center at 504-365-2533. Pending further clarification, our staffs will notify the appropriate BSEE District Office using the published day phone numbers and after hours cell phone number.

We realize this list and process may need further refinement and encourage additional input from your staff. Primary points of contact for this effort are CDR Mark McManus at MSU Morgan City and LCDR Brian Khey at Sector New Orleans. They can be reached by phone at (985) 380-5352 or (504) 365-2292 respectively.

Sincerely,

J.C. BURTON

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspections
Morgan City, LA

P.W. GAUTIER

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Officer in Charge, Marine Inspections
New Orleans, LA

Copy: D8 dpi
OCS NCOE
Sector Mobile
Sector Corpus Christi
MSU Port Arthur
MSU Texas City



Swift Energy Wellhead Allision/Blowout

Captain Peter Gautier

Sector Commander



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount of product spilled:	152 bbls/crude oil
Cause of spill:	Allision between 42 ft. aluminum hull uninspected crew boat and an inactive wellhead.
Time & date of spill:	2000/26-Feb-13
Responsible Party:	Swift Energy Operating, LLC
Key operational activities:	Gulf Strike Team activated for SCAT & contractor oversight. ES&H was OSRO & SMT. 29 sq.miles impacted, 4 linear miles of shoreline oiled (33 targets). Wellhead plugged w/ TIW (Texas iron works) valve within 3 days and wireline plug set at 2700 fit (well depth 3100 feet) with assistance from Wild Well Control. Oyster beds closed and recreational fishing impacted. CGA skimmer Grand Bay, 2 MARCO skimmers, 5000 ft. of hard boom, 30000 ft. of absorbent boom deployed. 350 cubic yards of oiled absorbents recovered. \$25K FPN for GST and NOAA info mgmt.
Major lessons learned:	Safety was major emphasis since air reading for hydrogen sulfide reached as high as 150ppm when well was active. HSIN and ERMA were valuable common operational picture tools for RP, stakeholders and SMT.
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	LCDR Lushan Hannah






Settoon/Chevron Pipeline Allision/Fire

Captain Peter Gautier

Sector Commander



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount of product spilled:	unknown amount of Diesel Fuel, particulate/soot & LPG
Cause of spill:	A Settoon tugboat pushing a tank barge loaded with 2,215 bbls of crude oil struck a 16-inch Chevron pipeline containing Liquefied Petroleum Gas – Bayou Perot/Lafitte
Time & date of spill:	1730/12-Mar-13
Responsible Party:	Settoon Towing
Key operational activities:	The allision caused explosion and fire, engulfing the tug and barge. Master suffered severe burns but survived, 3 other crew member evacuated w/o injury. The pipeline was isolated at two valve stations - 18.9 mile section. A Temporary Flight Restriction (media helos) and one mile safety zone established. Approx 13000 ft. containment boom deployed; no shoreline impact. Flare was extinguished on 16 Mar 13. A second flare was installed in order to continue to burn off product. Pig inserted into pipeline. Product continued to burn until pipeline clear. Transitioned to long term salvage operation.
Major lessons learned:	Delay in activating vessel's VRP. Incident occurred on Morgan City/NOLA AOR border. – good handoff. Needed better integration of contractors and USCG personnel throughout up and down the ICS chain of command --- also, stricter adherence to ICS principles. Early and transparent coordination with NGO (as per ACP) was key to successful public messaging..
Lead Coordinator	LCDR Lushan Hannah & LCDR Keith Smith
Contact Information:	OTR Reports





Chalmette Refinery “Odor”

Captain Peter Gautier
Sector Commander



RRT Activation:	No
Type and amount of product spilled:	Approx 20-25 bbls of “sour water” - oily water with volatile organic compounds (benzene, H2S, & SO2)
Cause of spill:	sour water from a damaged pipeline
Time & date of spill:	0225/03-Apr-2013
Responsible Party:	ExxonMobil
Key operational activities:	Parishes received numerous 911 calls, local FD responded and initially thought it was from a barge cleaning operation. USCG/DEQ patrols searched along Miss River for potential sources. Damaged line was isolated and repaired with clamp. AFFF and a deodorizing agent applied to affected area to eliminate vapors. Vacuum trucks used to recover product, and air monitoring conducted with DEQ oversight --- no impact to navigable waterway.
Major lessons learned:	Delay in discovery and reporting of spill caused long investigation of RP. The weather (winds & low cloud ceiling) caused odor to hover around city and not dissipate. DEQ took lead as SOSOC, however, FOSC exercised authorities due to widespread impact to coastal zone and potential for exceeding reportable quantities. Public information coordination with NGOs essential for community health concerns.,
Lead Coordinator Contact Information:	MST1 Jason Screws



COTP Reports



Sector New Orleans



Meetings

Description	Dates
Taylor UC Meeting	09-Jan-13
Garden Island Bay UC Meeting	23-Jan-13
AC Executive Steering Luncheon	14-Feb-13
AC Meeting	20-Feb-13
Garden Island Bay Legal Meeting	11-Apr-13
Taylor Energy/RRT-6 Meeting	11-Apr-13
Taylor Energy UC Meeting	02-Apr-13
Taylor Energy/ERA Workshop #1	13-15-May-13
Jefferson Parish LEPC	14-May-13

Training

Description	Dates
NDOW Workshop	10-13 Dec-12
CORN Demo	28-Feb-13
FOSCR Boom Deployment Course	08-13-Apr-13
Hurricane COOP Exercise	23-25-Apr-13
EPA Spill Prevention/FAC Response	25-Apr-13
Clean Gulf Equipment Deployment	23-May-13


Drills/Exercises

Company (exercise lead)	Date
W & T Offshore Inc (BSEE)	06-Jan-13
John W. Stone (EPA)	09-Jan-13
Retif Fuel & Oil (EPA)	10-Jan-13
GoMex Energy LTD (BSEE)	30-Jan-13
YUMA Exploration (USCG)	24-Apr-13




NRC Notifications

Enforcement Breakdown



Breakdown of Reports



An aerial photograph showing a large-scale environmental emergency response. In the foreground, a large area of land is covered in a dark, brownish sludge, likely fertilizer, with scattered debris and damaged structures. A road runs along the edge of the spill. In the background, a residential neighborhood with houses and trees is visible, along with a green field. The text is overlaid in yellow on the image.

West Fertilizer Emergency Response United States Environmental Protection Agency

West, McLennan County, Texas


Time Line

➤ April 17, 2013

- At approximately 1950 on Wednesday April 17, 2013 a fire and subsequent explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Plant in West, TX.
- Authorities reported 15 deaths, approximately 170 injuries requiring hospitalization, and damage and destruction of dozens of homes, schools, a nursing home, and an apartment complex.
- EPA mobilized resources to the incident, along with Federal, State, and Local resources.



West Fertilizer Plant prior to 4/17/2013





West Fertilizer Plant post 4/17/2013



April 18, 2013

- Federal, State, and Local resources continue to be mobilized to West.
- Search and rescue, as well as fire fighting are the primary objectives of the resources.
- EPA deploys air monitoring instruments to determine if ongoing fires and the prior explosion released hazardous materials into the atmosphere. Initiate 24 hr. operations.
- EPA deploys the EPA ASPECT aircraft to conduct an overflight of the facility. Ammonia detected between 6-10 ppm at 650 feet downwind of the site.
- CST and Waco FD conduct an entry to the site and secure a leaking anhydrous ammonia bullet tank.



Explosion site smoldering.



Point of detonation.



Fertilizer plant equipment destroyed.



ATF conducting assessments



Damage to rail line adjacent to the explosion site.



Crater at explosion site.



Damage to homes and property near the explosion site.



Texas Task Force 1 SAR personnel conducting house-to-house searches.

April 19, 2013

- EPA activities – 24 hr operations
 - Air monitoring in areas of ongoing search and rescue activities and ATF assessment activities.
 - VOCs
 - Ammonia
 - Results indicated no significant contaminants of concern
- Search and rescue operations completed



Site command post located at West High School.




Air monitor with Viper transmitter, located at park adjacent to site.



Damage to West Middle School.



Damage to homes within the surrounding neighborhood.

[Deployments \(4\)](#)[Help](#)[R6 West Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion Deployment](#)**All Times Central, DST Observed****Start:** 4/18/2013**End:** 5/9/2013**Description:** At approximately 1950 CST on April 17, a fire and explosion at the West Fertilizer plant decimated the town of West, north of Waco.**1628-25: West Texas 042713****Start:** 4/27/2013 7:44:06 PM**End:** 5/9/2013 8:22:13 AM**Description:** 3 MRs, 1 NWS Met Station**Location:**[View Recent Data in Google Earth](#)**Instruments and Latest Readings:****MultiRAE(s):**

~	Instrument ID	Connection	Location	NH3	VOC	CO	LEL	O2	Received
	(.180) MultiRAE	Up	31.8172180, -97.0892280	0.2 ppm	0.0 ppm	2.0 ppm	0.0 %	21.5 %	5/1/2013 6:15 PM
	(.196) MultiRAE	Up	31.8208520, -97.0890850	0.0 ppm	0.0 ppm	0.8 ppm	0.0 %	20.9 %	5/1/2013 6:10 PM
	(.226) MultiRAE	Up	31.8177980, -97.0888580	0.0 ppm	0.0 ppm	0.0 ppm	0.0 %	21.3 %	5/1/2013 6:14 PM

NOAA NWS Observations(s):

~	Instrument ID	Connection	Location	Observed	Weather	Temp	RH	WD	WS	Dew Point	Visibility	Received
	(.3001) NOAA NWS Observations	Up	32.0830000, -97.0970000	5/9/2013 7:55:00 AM	Overcast	68.0 F	83 %	160 Degrees	8.1 mph	62.6 F	10.00 Miles	5/9/2013 8:15 AM

April 20, 2013

- EPA activities – 24 hr operations
 - Continued air monitoring at fixed locations within the work zones.
 - Continued mobile air monitoring within the evacuation zone.
 - No concentrations of contaminants of concern were detected above site action levels.
 - Prepare operational plans for conducting soil sampling activities within the affected area.
 - Coordinate sampling activities with TCEQ and ATF representatives
 - TCEQ contractors and Union Pacific offload remaining anhydrous ammonia from onsite tanks. EPA conducts air monitoring during the operations.



Anhydrous ammonia tanks.



Apartment complex destroyed.



Damage and destruction of homes within the surrounding neighborhood.



Major damage to nursing home complex.

April 21, 2013

- EPA activities – 24 hr. operations
 - Collect 12 composite soil samples from City of West and West Independent School District properties proximate to the site. Samples submitted to contracted laboratory for analysis of contaminants of concern, including herbicides and pesticides.
 - Continued fixed and mobile air monitoring. No concentrations of contaminants of concern were detected above site action levels.

April 22, 2013

➤ EPA operations

- Reduce operations to daylight hrs. (7 AM – 7 PM)
- Continued fixed and mobile air monitoring. No concentrations of contaminants of concern were detected above site action levels.

April 23, 2013

➤ EPA operations

- Continued fixed and mobile air monitoring. No concentrations of contaminants of concern were detected above site action levels.
- EPA Region 6 Regional Administrator tours fertilizer facility to assess current site conditions.

April 24-26, 2013

➤ EPA operations

- Continued fixed air monitoring. No concentrations of contaminants of concern were detected above site action levels.
- EPA participates in Debris Coordination meetings with state and federal agencies.



Residential re-entry to restricted areas of neighborhood.



Residents and volunteers collecting personal belongings and moving debris to curbside.



Contaminant pathway from explosion site. TCEQ berms ditch to restrict further flow.



ATF continuing to remove debris from explosion site.

Debris Management

- April 19, 2013 – Presidential Declaration of an Emergency Through FEMA – McLennan County
- April 30, 2013 – TDEM Final State Situation Report: 350 Homes Impacted [142 Destroyed; 51 Major Damage; 27 Minor Damage; 130 Otherwise Affected]
- May 1, 2013 - FEMA Amends Declaration of Emergency to Include Individuals and Household Program (Category B)
- May 6, 2013 - FEMA Amends Declaration of Emergency to Include Debris Removal (Category A)
- Debris Coordination Efforts for the City of West Include: FEMA; EPA; USACOE; TCEQ; TDEM; DSHS; TFS; City of West; and, McLennan County Emergency Management

Photos Courtesy of TCEQ
May 13, 2013

Commercial and Residential
Structures Undergoing
Repair



Demolition of Structures
Is Underway





West High School and Middle School to be Demolished and Rebuilt



ATF, State Fire Marshal's Office and CSB Continue to Investigate the Cause of the Explosion

Responding Agencies

Agency	ICS Role
City of West FD, PD, Public Works and Administration	Fire Response, Public Safety, Infrastructure, Disaster Recovery
McLennan County Emergency Manager	Unified Command – Incident Commander
Environmental Protection Agency	FOSC, Air Monitoring, Soil Contaminant Assessment, Debris Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Disaster Recovery, Debris Management
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms	Incident Investigation
State of Texas, State Fire Marshal	Incident Investigation
U.S. Chemical Safety Board	Incident Investigation
Occupational Health & Safety Admin.	Health and Safety
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality	SOSC, Air Monitoring, Soil Contaminant Assessment, Debris Management, Haz Mat

Responding Agencies

Agency	ICS Role
Texas Division of Emergency Management	Disaster Recovery
Texas Forest Service	Incident Management Team
Department of State Health Services	Crisis Intervention, Asbestos Assessment
U.S. Army Corp of Engineers	Debris Management
Texas Department of Public Safety	Security
Texas Parks and Wildlife Department	Security
Fire Departments/Emergency Medical Services (Numerous)	Support the City of West
Texas State Chemist	Fertilizer SME Support
Volunteer Organizations (e.g. Red Cross, Salvation Army)	Disaster Assistance, Meals and Disaster Recovery

Presentation of the Colors Site Memorial





Environmental Monitoring for Atypical Dispersant Operations:

Including Guidance for
- Subsea Application
- Prolonged Surface Application

Michael Sams
Eighth Coast Guard District
Incident Management & Preparedness Advisor

29 May 2013



Outline



- **What it is not**
- **What it is**
- **Path forward**



What it is not



- **Final document**
- **Preauthorization for dispersants**
- **Prohibition of using dispersants**
- **Regulation through guidance**



What it is

- **Draft document**
- **Provides concepts & approaches**
- **Provides monitoring guidelines**
- **Presumes no preauthorization for subsea dispersant exist**
- **Living document**



Path forward

- **NRT will review & comment & vote**
- **Each RRT & Area Committee may review, discuss, & potentially develop more specific regional policy**
- **Educate coastal Area Committees**
- **Include in next revision of RCP (ensure ACPs link to these guidelines)**
- **Determine 'best' role for our Industry Work Group Committee**



Michael Sams
Eighth Coast Guard District
Incident Management & Preparedness Advisor
(c) 281-881-6193
Michael.K.Sams@uscg.mil



Welcome

Sector
New Orleans



Taylor Energy MC-20 Overview



RRT-6 Brief
30 May 2013



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2008:

- The FOOSC directs Taylor Energy to fabricate and install a subsea collection system over the plume sites and conduct daily overflights of the area to monitor and record sheen measurements.
- Taylor Energy successfully completes the 6" pipeline decommissioning. The pipe originated at the platform and terminated at a subsea tie-in in South Pass Block 50, 10 miles southwest of MC20.
- Taylor Energy also begins conducting well interventions at the UC's direction.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2008 (cont.):

- Admin Order 006-08 issued to Taylor Energy:
 - (1) Immediately deploy an open water skimming asset to mitigate the continuous discharge at MC-20 until such time that pollution domes are installed;
 - (2) Conduct over flights twice daily to monitor the discharge from MC20 and provide the Coast Guard with reports from these over flights;
 - (3) Install pollution domes to mitigate the continuous discharge in MC20 no later than November 1, 2008;
 - (4) Provide an updated Incident Action Plan reflecting all requirements of this administrative order.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2008 (cont.):

- 01 October 2008 & 23 October 2008 - Taylor Energy appeals Admin Order 006-08.
- 24 November 2008 & 17 December 2008 - FOOSC denies appeals.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2009:

- Well intervention work continues and subsea containment system installed and fully operational with 3 containment domes.
- FOSC permits over flights to be reduced to once daily since the installment of pollution domes in April 2009.

2010:

- Well intervention work continues.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2011:

- 9 intervention wells & plugging complete. Final disposition of remaining 16 wells pends BSEE/BOEM review.
- Taylor Energy continues to maintain the subsea containment system with regular pump offs, hose replacements, dome inspections, etc.
- CAPT Gautier takes command. Organizes monthly UC meetings, objectives and decisions into an IAP.



Current UC Members

Sector
New Orleans



United States Coast Guard
Captain Peter Gautier

Bureau of Safety & Environmental Enforcement
Mr. Lars Herbst

Bureau of Ocean Energy Management
Mr. John Rodi

Taylor Energy Company, LLC
Mr. Will Pecue



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2012 (summary):

- Subsea containment system disconnected due to minimal recovery amounts and subsidence of the single remaining dome.
- Multi-agency/multi-discipline Sheen Source and Well Review Work Groups formed.
- The FOSC orders Taylor Energy to re-activate and/or re-design the subsea containment system.
- The Well Review Work Group determines that it's too risky to attempt another well intervention at this time.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2012 (cont.):

- 15 Mar 2012 - IAP signed by USCG, BSEE, BOEM and Taylor:
 - (1) Outlines charters for sheen source and well review work groups and operational procedures for monitoring sheens, response thresholds and maintenance of the containment dome system.
 - (2) The UC established the IAP as a "living document" and the official record of the response, with additions/updates as necessary, to include a continuous ICS-214 Incident Log.



Incident Action Plan

Sector
New Orleans



1. Incident Name MC20 Platform Topping - Taylor Energy Company LLC		2. Operational Period to be covered by IAP (Date/Time) From: 03/15/12 To: indefinite		CG IAP COVER SHEET
3. Approved by Incident Commander(s):				
ORG	NAME			
FOSC	CAPT Peter Gautier			
BSEE	Lars Herbst			
BOEM	John Rodi			
RP	William Pecue			

<p align="center">INCIDENT ACTION PLAN</p> <p align="center">The items checked below are included in this Incident Action Plan:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 202-CG (Response Objectives)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 203-CG (Organization List) – OR – ICS 207-CG (Organization Chart)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 204-CGs (Assignment Lists) One Copy each of any ICS 204-CG attachments:</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 205-CG (Communications Plan)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 206-CG (Medical Plan)</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 208-CG (Site Safety Plan) or Note SSP Location</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Map/Chart</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Weather forecast / Tides/Currents</p> <p><u>Other Attachments</u></p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 209</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ICS 214</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unified Command Meeting Agendas/Minutes</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Well Review Work Group Agendas/Minutes</p> <p><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Sheen Source Work Group Agendas/Minutes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> _____</p>				
4. Prepared by: LCDR Lushan Hannah/William Pecue		Date/Time 03/09/12		



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2012 (cont.):

- 25 Jun 2012 - Admin Order 001-12 issued to Taylor Energy:
 - (1) Begin the design and planning for a new pollution dome system that is suitable for the environmental conditions found at the MC-20 discharge site.
 - (2) Submit a written plan that shows a projected timeline for fabrication and installation to the UC no later than September 1, 2012.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2012 (cont.):

- 01 Sep 2012 - Taylor Energy claims there is no existing containment system design which could eliminate all surface sheens resulting from the release of hydrocarbon-exposed soils. To begin designing, Taylor Energy needs to time to collect the following data:
 - (1) Site-specific low volume oil flow (collection) rate.
 - (2) Supporting capacity of soft bottom soils as it relates to mooring system.
 - (3) High and variable current profiles, from mud-line to water's surface.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2012 (cont.):

- 26 Nov 2012 - Amendment to Admin Order 001-12:
 - (1) Taylor Energy to reinstitute a containment dome system to capture oil from the MC20 discharge site and develop a sampling plan for obtaining samples from the oil/gas separator and the area beneath and in the vicinity of containment dome "C".
 - (2) The sampling plan was due to the UC no later than December 28, 2012.
 - (3) Taylor Energy shall choose at least two companies to present their best proposed designs for a new pollution dome system and/or recommendations to repair the existing system no later than the January 30, 2013 UC meeting.



Timeline

Sector
New Orleans



2013:

- February 2013 - Subsea containment system re-activated.
- May 2013 - Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA) process begins; Facilitated by NOAA as the lead Federal trustee. ERA consists of two 3-day sessions. 2nd session to commence in June 2013.



Ecological Risk Assessment

Sector
New Orleans



Involves more RRT agencies, state and local stakeholders:

EPA, DOI, NOAA, USFWS, LSU, LOSCO, DEQ, D8(drm)

Major Options Discussed During Workshop 1 (13-15MAY13):

- Status Quo (do nothing further) - a persistent light sheen does not make noticeable impact on the coastal or local ecology. Marine mammals will push the sheen out of the way. Less than 1% of the population of surface feeders (i.e. sea turtles) in the northern GOM would be impacted.



Ecological Risk Assessment

Sector
New Orleans



Dredge/Dispose or Dredge/Capping - concerns revolved around removing, decanting, transporting and finding a suitable/certified landfill that could handle and accept the waste material. Would also cause more oil that is currently trapped in sediments to release and create a worse discharge.

Well Interventions (16 or 2) - if oil from a reservoir were discharged during an intervention well/plugging attempt, it would introduce fresher/more toxic oil to the environment than the current, emulsified oil that is in the environment right now. **Overall, well interventions were the least desirable by the focus groups.**



Ecological Risk Assessment

Sector
New Orleans



• Remaining Options for Workshop 2 (25-27JUN13):

1. Maintain the current containment dome system
(“remove” was take out of the original option list)

2. Re-design the containment dome system

***evaluate the current response thresholds
(40 gal. = 2nd overflight //// 100 gal. = skimmer deployed)

***MC-20 site visit/X-band radar demo on a Clean Gulf Associates
FRV tentatively scheduled summer 2013.



Recent Sheen Pictures

Sector
New Orleans



28.930230 N, 88.971135 W; 2013-05-08, 8:45:06



28.949100 N, 88.791210 W; 2013-05-08, 8:36:03



Recent Sheen Pictures

Sector
New Orleans



28.936417 N, 88.985232 W; 2013-05-08, 8:45:35



28.918940 N, 88.819297 W; 2013-05-08, 8:40:39



Sector
New Orleans



QUESTIONS?